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ABSTRACT 
As a result of the emergence of new technologies and application features in mobile devices. 
Personal own mobile devices have become part of one’s daily life activity including accessing 
an organisation’s network for resources, such as documents and applications. For this reason, 
security metrics should be used as a mechanism for investigating the security risk level of this 
system. The complexity in monitoring, identifying and evaluating the growing number of 
security risk on computing systems is on the increase. Hence, the potential of security 
evaluation inadequacy defies standard security risk measurement as organisations find it 
increasingly difficult to predict the security level of a system as well as to accomplish its 
security goals. Existing security measuring methods which are mainly centred on security 
analysis fails to address the systematic classification of security metrics for a BYOD employed 
network and its variables. Although security metrics use quantitative measurement there is 
often a lack of information on BYOD variable and existing BYOD security measurements are 
based on static qualitative methods. Another limitation is that they do not provide an inclusive 
knowledge about the degree of vulnerabilities associated with a particular BYOD variable 
according to their attack impact on the network and its users. 
This research offers a novel systematic metrics approach used in scoring BYOD variables that 
match organisations and individual users need, by integrating appropriate available metrics 
input about known and unknown vulnerabilities in safeguarding a BYOD environment. This 
thesis is made up of three core contributions: firstly, it proposes a BYOD Absolute Score 
metrics (BASmetric) framework which focuses on quantitatively ranking the security risk level 
of both an organisation and its BYOD user by integrating probability theory and user induce 
severity rule with support from security attribute taxonomy. This metrics framework is for 
measuring vulnerabilities and aimed to quantify an organisation and its BYOD systems 
vulnerabilities through their security attributes, host-level (operating system ) vulnerabilities. 
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Also, the proposed framework has been applied to different domains(known and unknown 
vulnerabilities) which resulted in the second and third contribution. The second contribution is 
the systematic classification of the framework used to measure a  BYOD known vulnerability 
information on an employed organisation variable(security policy, technology and users).it also 
shows the vulnerability severity level of a present BYOD system by producing an absolute 
value. The final contribution is the BYOD Absolute Score framework principle being used in 
assessing the steps involved in measuring the unknown vulnerability level of a BYOD variable 
based on organisation security attributes and produce a practical understanding absolute value. 
In addition, using different network security metrics the overall results show that the proposed 
approach produces better outcomes compare to preceding ones that consider network security 
level in whole without measuring the BYOD systems variable. Furthermore, BAS metric 
calculation shows a practical way to label and evaluate vulnerabilities for improved systems 
performance. 
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION 
Information technology (IT) has transformed the present world and greatly affected the way 
information is traded, from the small priced and costly books to the newspapers and magazines, 
the innovation of computers and its internet technology simplifies and quicken up the process 
of procurement, publication, and ultimately the exchange of information. Additionally, the 
recent era presents a more flexible and effective communication means via modern digital 
transmission technologies. However, with this enormous growth in IT comes with its demons 
as there are also security issues ( Jain & Shanbhag, 2012; Seigneur, Kölndorfer, Busch, & 
Hochleitner, 2013; Keyes, 2016), Such as information being at risk of maliciously accessed by 
unauthorised users ( Garba, Armarego, & Murray, 2015a). 
The Internet is advancing at a significant rate in all areas of society, especially with the 
penetration of smart devices affecting every aspect of a user’s life, a study by Today in Tech 
reports approximately 1.3 million android devices are being activated globally every day 
(Burns, 2012). This is a significate outcome as both the internet and smart devices are 
considered a de-facto standard for data communication, particularly in schools (University), 
hospitals and agencies where there are a larger group of potential users (Tropmann-Frick, 
2018). The prompt increment in organisations allowing personally owned mobile devices to 
access their network either on the premises or outside the premises (Inc., 2012), have given 
rise in internet traffic and it emerging complications in computer network exploits. Also, it 
could lead to an increase in attacks over the internet and putting a great impact on security 
requirements (Availability, Confidentiality, Integrity, Authorisation, Non-Repudiation, 
Privacy) in essential data information. 
The phenomenon of Bringing Your Own Device (BYOD) is the use of personally owned 
devices within a working environment for professional purposes, this could be smart devices 
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such as smartphones, tablet, mobile devices, and laptops. Thus BYOD affects people’s life, 
being in education, social and economy, whilst it has its many benefits so are it related 
disadvantages. BYOD can be attacked using exploiting vulnerabilities which may be present 
either in the application software, hardware (personal device or server) and an employed 
network (Weintraub, 2015), these exploitations can lead to attacks causing disruption to 
business processes and an increment in the information technology systems risk (Beale and 
Berris, 2018; Yan et al., 2012). The Georgia Tech Information Security Centre (GTISC) and 
the Georgia Tech Research Institute (GTRI) released Emerging Cyber Threats Report for 2013 
which stated vulnerable APIs, data loss, data compromise due to access to unencrypted data as 
a form of attacks against BYOD employed mobile devices (Hiller & Russell, 2013). Regardless 
of these attacks, smart devices need to perform their assign services. 
Information Security (IS) is an important situation in any organisation especially as BYOD 
activity is evolving and increasing. Therefore routine check-up for related attacks in BYOD 
deployed network and their smart devices is performed by organisations. These could include 
infiltrating the network with intrusion detection systems, encryption, two-factor authentication, 
firewalls and antivirus as some of the preventive measures by organisations and users to check 
attack. Since an attacker achieves its objective by infiltrating the network of an organization, 
and they utilise on various vulnerabilities of a targeted host, therefore it becomes necessary for 
both users and organisations implementing BYOD to be aware of the risk posed by each 
vulnerability. 
Classification of security level is influenced by network transmission, vulnerability, threats and 
up-to-date policy(Ahmed, Al-Shaer, & Khan, 2008), amid these influencers, an attack occurs 
when a vulnerability is exploited by an intruder since it considers it as an open door to enter a 
system, therefore vulnerability can be said to be a major influencer of network service 
exploitation. The bigger the organisations network the likelihood of a vast number of 
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vulnerabilities (L. Wang, Jajodia, Singhal, Cheng, & Noel, 2014). Also, quite a significate 
number of threats are actually vulnerabilities, such as in web browsers, email reader, document 
viewers and multimedia applications running on victim devices(Lippmann et al., 2007). 
The quantitative evaluation of security level is a significant area to research since its final 
objective is to predict risks and threat, but it is extensive and exhausting working on a bigger 
organisation with much complex network structure in contrast to a small organisation with 
limited infrastructure. So, for the purpose of this research, a sub-organisation network is used 
as a case study. To effect this, a tool is required to measure the feasibility (probability) of 
vulnerabilities present in its network by deploying vulnerability scanning tools such as Nessus 
vulnerability scanning tool to detect any defects (Daud, Bakar, & Hasan, 2014). The outcomes 
of the vulnerability scanning tools merely display the ports which are likely to be exploited and 
the type of likely attack. 
In network security engineering more effort is placed on safeguarding a network by tracing the 
steps of attackers in attaining their target and placing intrusion detection mechanism in the 
network. But for the security implication of an organisation offering a diversity of collective 
services (BYOD service), maximum effort should be put in measuring the general security 
level of the organisation's network quantitatively (Boyer et al., 1986; Wang et al., 2014; Homer 
et al., 2013; Ou and Singhal, 2011). The concept of an attack tree is an important model used 
as a strategy by a security administrator to illustrate all the possible path of an attacker in 
breaching a security policy by exploiting the necessary vulnerability. Whereas this is a safe 
option, it is just a part of a holistic definition of a quantitative security risk evaluation, therefore 
a holistic quantitative security metrics in establishing the security risk level is deemed a useful 
approach. These metrics will aim to tackle the establish security goal of data confidentiality 
protection, uphold data availability to only authorised personals for authorised use and 
preservation of data integrity. 
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The following chapter examines the motivations which demonstrate how suitable this research 
is with regard to the problem it seeks to solve as well as the aims and objectives that the research 
intends to accomplish. Subsequently, the contributions of this thesis in terms of both knowledge 
and technical perspectives are emphasised. Finally, the overview of the contents of this thesis 
is explained. 
1.1 Research Background 
Theoretically, Smartphones and tablets are fast on the increase and employees (users) find it 
necessary and convenient to use them for official duties, thereby a BYOD. Yet, BYOD has no 
formal effective evaluating system and no continuous evaluating process for coping with 
changes which means that once a BYOD device is designated to a connected it remains 
connected with difficult for user’s side security evaluation[20]. Significate amount of security 
continues to be the greatest factor in a BYOD environment, where there is a need for the 
protection of both the organisation network (data) and the personally own devices(Y. Wang, 
Wei, & Vangury, 2014). It is no longer a good security practice to stop security attack as and 
when they appear but to take initiative with attack prevention tools such as anti-virus, Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS) and Intrusion Prevention System (IPS). However, these attacks have 
also found new ways of exploiting a vulnerability. 
Research shows organisations measure the risk of an attack statically by categorisation the 
many hardware and software policies and personal intuitions (MSRC, 2017). As a result, 
threats are tackled according to those that pose the greatest risk, however, an issue arises when 
these vulnerabilities/threats are too many to tackle and each is categorised by distinct scale 
(US-CERT, 2018), Currently, BYOD employed organisations and their users are prone to 
cyber-attack as their network is exposed to outside influences and so to reduce the impact of 
any vulnerability from being exploited. a quantitative measurement that scores BYOD variable 
security risk level promptly and clearly is a real challenge (Viehböck, 2011). 
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The development of security metrics by an organisation is a very challenging exercise as noted 
on the science of security report (Sanders & Nicol, 2018). Categorising the processes involved 
in its design, deployment, and evaluation is a tough challenge in cybersecurity. Particularly in 
the procedures used in identifying what should be covered in measuring a specific set of 
security policies and quantifying them efficiently. A security metrics level is centred on an 
Objectivity, answered by what required to be quantified its competence and control, also by 
the accuracy, authority and feedback of the created metrics. The main aim of the BAS metrics 
is in quantifying value (data) and measuring performance. Security metric is a problem-solving 
measure deployed in computing and information security engineering and its related field’s. 
Many security metrics are currently available that can be used to analyse an organisations 
network; State Time Estimation Metrics (McQueen, Boyer, Flynn, & Beitel, 2005), Mean Time 
to Compromise (Leversage & Byres, 2013), Mean Time to Failure(Dacier, Deswarte, & 
Kaâniche, 1996) used to analyse the frequency of failure in a network. Despite the strong 
influence of current network security metrics and exactly how helpful they can be, there remain 
certain substantial limitations such as: 
 Models based mainly on the main network but fail to address an individual BYOD network 
and its user’s needs in the security metrics evaluation process. Authors (Zahadat, Blessner, 
Blackburn, & Olson, 2015; Ketel & Shumate, 2015) mentioned that a BYOD Security 
monitoring framework implemented for an organisation should reduce security breaches 
related to authentication, rogue mobile device access and the need to develop audit 
guidelines for BYOD (Brodin, 2015) 
 Another deficiency in present BYOD security measurement is the classification of 
vulnerability solely on Mobile Device Security and ignoring the issue of network 
vulnerability. For example, Mobile device vulnerabilities such as inconsistent security 
policies within Different devices, Laptop Encryption discredited within a “Bypass Mode”, 
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Unmanageable BYOD Laptops, Shared Media Leakage, Adhoc BYOD measurement, 
Readable Data carried on in a Disposed Of Devices, Inter application Data Leakage (Girard, 
2013). 
 Security and risk enforcement on BYOD system is challenging because of the variable 
classification into People (users), Technology (network, Operating Systems(devices) and 
applications) and Policy hence it is difficult for enterprise security administrators to audit 
its security policies (Yang et al., 2016). Resulting in limited Information on security risk of 
using the BYOD in terms of security attribute, trust and efficiency. 
All these details offered the motivation towards the development of a new approach to 
overcome the measurement impracticality phenomenon and to achieve a comprehensive 
understanding of the BYOD variables. Two research problems are to be addressed. Firstly, by 
what means does all the organisational variables participate in the measurement, including the 
network configuration, personal device category and the users then create a relationship 
between the pertinent information. Secondly, with all the information incorporated, how to 
measure the security level of a system and references to establish policies relating to BYOD 
management. 
1.2 Aim and Objective 
To tackle the limitation of a security metrics, a framework is proposed centred on the 
techniques proposed in the research, which can have a true application with an impact in the 
scope of network security metrics system. The framework aids data integration and cyber-
security measurement purposes. Affecting procedures enables the probable impact score to be 
produced as a result of data integrated from multiple network security tool. The essential aim 
is the ability to provide practical scoring metrics to rank vulnerabilities according to those that 
pose the greatest risk, focusing on organisations providing BYOD services on its network. 
The aim of the research can be defined in these exact objectives: 
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1. To investigate the state-of-the-art techniques of security metrics and research gaps 
particularly in the area of computer network security. Also to examine tools available to 
employed BYOD users, and aid in decision making when evaluating the security risk level 
of their computer network. 
2. To examine major BYOD security attacks and identify known and unidentified attacks 
which have been introduced onto an employed BYOD network thru the exploitation of 
known and unidentified vulnerabilities. 
3. To develop a method to integrate data from individual metrics which allow for an employed 
BYOD  network and its user’s vulnerability level to be assessed. The approach should be 
able to calculate the identified known vulnerabilities and unidentified vulnerabilities based 
on probability rule and expressed as an absolute score, and launch towards the security 
requirement of users and the organisation as a whole. 
4. To design an approach for BYOD security metrics. Then apply the proposed approached 
on a designated organisation’s BYOD employed network 
5. Evaluate the approach performance in comparison with state-of-the-art approaches 
1.3  Major contributions 
This research is focused on addressing the existing security measurement gap and investigates 
an approach by which to score the security risk level of an employed BYOD variable (Network, 
User device). this is done by using an extracted vulnerability information and categorising it 
accordingly. That is, the vulnerability type is classified into known and unidentified 
vulnerability. This is to ensure the practicality of the BYOD security metric. The aggregation 
of individual metrics into the computation process is one of the remedies that can overcome 
the limitation of establishing BYOD security measurement procedures. The BAS metrics are 
used to calculate the likelihood and impact of an attack on an employed BYOD variable and 
scored quantitative (absolute score). 
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The main contributions of this thesis are arranged in the following items: 
1. It contributes towards the knowledge of present network quantitative security metrics by 
rising the understanding as to what ways current issues are usually tackled and why the 
weakness persists. 
2. The representation of the extracted vulnerability is designed to integrate formula from 
individual metrics, this contributes to improving the consistency of measurement by 
overcoming the complexity and heterogeneous of interconnected computer networks. 
3. It describes a novel BYOD Absolute Score(BAS) measurement framework. This is 
developed and evaluated and the metric shows an increase in its precision but also intensify 
in exact security level prediction. 
1.4  Thesis Organisation 
This thesis is structured as follows. It begins with chapter 1 where the general background of 
the thesis is presented followed by a brief description of the motivation and contributions of 
the research are offered. 
Chapter 2 gives the theoretical background and related work highlighting different methods 
and approaches that are used in security risk assessment and mitigation in general and 
application of security metrics in particular. 
Chapter 3 Introduces the BYOD Absolute Score framework and its modules in vast detail, this 
comprises the core of this work. 
Chapter 4 Discusses the implementation of the proposed BYOD security metrics alongside the 
detail procedures that are used in calculating the score of the security level. 
Chapter 5 Discusses the evaluation approaches. A comparison evaluation using a case-study to 
determine the system security requirements followed by result precision, accuracy and 
practicality of the security measures. 
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Chapter 6 presents the conclusion, in summary, the goal of the thesis is defined and the 
directions for future work are also presented. 
Finally, the thesis includes the bibliographic references used for its elaboration and annexes 
that provide information relevant to the thesis. 
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CHAPTER 2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
In order to describe the security metrics of any system, it is suitable to understand the objective 
behind the measurements of that system; for this particular study, the objective is the 
measurement of the security risk level of a BYOD system quantitatively. This chapter 
introduces the concepts employed by this research towards the realisation of that objective. 
First, a discussion on BYOD is presented in Section 2.1 in which a brief history of BYOD 
given, including the introduction, deployment, and its potential security risks. Followed by, 
Section 2.2 where an overview of BYOD Security Technologies is outlined such as features 
and schemes which employed metrics in information security risk prediction. Section 2.3; 
presents work on risk assessment models standards, which we will be later referring to in this 
thesis, the CVSS and the OWASP risk rating methodology. The former helps in characterising 
and calculating the effect of IT vulnerabilities while the latter methodology is to measure the 
security risk level of a BYOD invisible attack. Section 2.4 presents the Information Security 
Risk Management outline that is followed in the security requirement classification for this 
thesis. This section outlines the different sets of BYOD policy requirements that have been 
proposed together with the different approaches that are used in improving those questions. 
Section 2.5 describes the various security metrics used for the network evaluation. Section 2.6 
illustrates intrusion detection and vulnerability assessment security tools. Finally, Section 2.7 
summarizes the chapter and reports on the main observations obtained from preceding work 
that motivated the use of the quantitative measurement approach proposed in this thesis for 
BYOD security risk metrics. 
2.1 Bringing Your Own Device (BYOD) 
More organisations are introducing their networks and its data to the outside world, meaning 
they allow personally owned mobile devices to access their network either in the organisation 
or outside the organisation (Forrester Consulting, 2012). Nevertheless, it becomes even more 
interesting when employees are allowed to use these devices for work purposes such as 
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retrieving and storing of data, upload and download of files and any other official duties, this 
is done either in or outside the office premises, the phenomenon is known as BYOD ( Ketel & 
Shumate, 2015). BYOD, as the name articulates is the use of personally owned devices within 
a working environment for professional purposes, the personally owned devices can be any 
smart devices such as smartphones, tablet, mobile devices, and laptops. The term BYOD 
became evident about 16 years ago by Information technology (IT) service provider Intel 
(Field, 2011), for reasons such as; 
1) Allowance was allocated to employees to purchase devices of their choice for work 
purposes. 
 
2) Using an employee’s personal device to access corporate resources is allowed by the IT 
department of an organisation. 
 
3) Most importantly, BYOD promotes mobility and flexibility, therefore users are drawn to 
them in their workplaces than the one that has been offered to them by their organization’s 
IT department for the benefit productivity, increment in work efficiency and mobility ( 
Bradley, et al., 2012; Twentyman, 2012; Sarker, et al., 2012). 
Hence, an organisation is said to be practising BYOD only if the BYOD device user is allowed 
to use the BYOD device to access the organisation’s resources without any hindrances. 
The occurring security issues in terms of information security and its effective means of 
measuring these security threats when necessary is needed for safeguarding a BYOD employed 
network.  Although most of the reviews are affected by consulting firms that mostly gives 
descriptive suggestions of the BYOD occurrences and normative advice for executives 
(Niehaves, Köffer, Ortbach, & Katschewitz, 2012). However, there are peer reviews and white 
papers on BYOD framework, some of these white papers recognised the risk associated with 
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BYOD and provided Policy-Based solutions. For example (EY, 2013), suggested the three 
areas of BYOD risk made up of mobile devices risk, application vulnerabilities, and inventory 
and platform management risks, but its white paper has a general explanation to BYOD risks 
and concluded by presenting eight steps to secure and improve BYOD programs. Other experts 
in the field of Information Technology such as (Leavitt, 2013; Morrow, 2012; Miller, et al., 
2012; Thielens & Axway, 2013; Tokuyoshi, 2013; Olalere, et al., 2015). This showed the 
existence of BYOD by coming up with some information on its security concerns and how it 
can be handled administratively by an organisation. Nevertheless, they agreed on data security, 
malware, and network security as the main security challenges (Olalere, Abdullah, Mahmod, 
& Abdullah, 2015). 
2.1.1 Evidence of Risk in BYOD Adoption 
In the subsequent sub-sections, a review on BYOD security risk classification is presented with 
the different types of methods and techniques used in its assessment. 
2.1.1.1 Features of Security Risk Management Approaches 
Many different approaches have been used to rank computer security risk management; Static 
security management is one of the approaches that have been used by many organisations and 
researchers. (Morrow, 2012), ranks static security risk by scrutinising through an application 
or system to locate any malicious behaviour this includes software’s or applications having 
conduct of maliciousness. In (Dawson, 2015; Chandramohan & Tan, 2012; Garba, Armarego, 
& Murray, 2015), the static mobile security risk is also defined based on threat towards the 
physical devices (Mobile devices). Likewise, authors like (Wang, Wei, & Vangury, 2016; 
Morrow, 2012; Jain & Shanbhag, 2012, Garba, Armarego, & Murray, 2015) also examines 
Static security policies as one of the main threat affecting data security in a Mobile device and 
its application environment with changing nature. 
In (Eijndhoven, Iacob, & Ponisio, 2008; Hermosillo, Seinturier, & Duchien, 2010). Dynamicity 
is referred generally, as finding a decision point in a process and classifying them by their 
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business rules. Interestedly in the mobile security world, as explained by (Dawson, 2015), 
dynamic analysis happens when an investigator has access to a mobile application being 
executed in a remote environment, such as a virtual machine or using an emulator for 
monitoring. Authors in (Twentyman, 2012; French, Guo, & Shim, 2014; Morrow, 2012), 
Monitors security risk dynamically based on the computing system auditing policies of a 
security management system in real-time without major interaction from the environment 
(Chandramohan & Tan, 2012). 
Furthermore, from the literatures both static and dynamic rankings are being affected by 
external factors and how they react to it makes it either dynamic or static, these factors include; 
(People (Users behaviour, Technology (physical devices), OS, applications) Organizational 
Policy (Management rules)) (Olalere, Abdullah, Mahmod, & Abdullah, 2015). Both static and 
dynamic security techniques have been highlighted in Table 2. 1, it also shows some 
advantages and disadvantages. Additionally, Table 2.2 to 2.3 characterises computing systems 
security vulnerabilities and their mitigation approaches. 
Methodology Advantages Disadvantages 
Static Security 
Monitoring System 
(Russo & Sabelfeld, 
2010) 
It examines program code and 
reasons over all possible behaviours 
that might arise at 
runtime manually 
It is easy to manipulate since 
there is physical contact 
program any time there is a 
change in variable 
Dynamic security 
Monitoring System 
(Wanniarachchi & 
Gamage, 2019) 
Monitoring takes place at each stage 
of a BYOD program or operation, 
these observe the executions. 
Dynamic analysis should be exact 
with no estimation. 
involves a great deal of 
calculation and may not 
always be relevant for later 
implementations 
Table 2. 1 Static and Dynamic Security Monitoring System 
Static Security Vulnerabilities Mitigation Approaches 
Physical threat and Exposure of 
confidential data from ; 
Stolen or loss and 
decommissioned of devices 
Malware, Hacking, Social Engineering 
Personal device storage areas should be 
Encrypted 
Training users not to store sensitive data on personal 
mobile devices 
Shutting down of devices remotely by administrators 
in the case of lost or stolen devices 
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(Dawson, 2015; Morrow, 2012; Lee & 
Shin, 2014; 
Garba, Armarego & Murray, 2015) 
User education and awareness 
Table 2. 2 Static Security vulnerabilities with their Mitigation Approaches 
Dynamic Security  
Vulnerabilities 
Mitigation Approaches 
Risk of data insecurity or leakage(loss) 
from misuse of BYOD policy on access 
and insider threat. 
 (Y. Wang et al., 2014; Morrow, 2012) 
 
 
encryption of corporate data 
BYOD devices should be restricted 
Device integrity scanning application should be used 
Storing an organization’s data to an 
unsecured location (Jain & Shanbhag, 
2012) 
Regular user 
education and awareness 
System Monitoring 
 
Insecure interface and APIs due  to; 
Direction from Malicious QR codes 
(Quick Response Codes) 
Weak   API(application programme 
interface). (Collett, 2015; Sharma, 
2012; Thielens, 2013; Hashizume & 
Rosado, 2013). 
 
Untrusted content downloaded on a BYOD device 
should be avoided 
Use secure web gateways, HTTP proxy servers, etc. to 
validate URLs 
Before allowing access 
Restrict peripheral use on mobile 
devices(e.g,disabling camera use) to 
prevent QR code reading 
strong authentication and access control mechanism 
Untrusted Networks, application and 
mobile devices could result in the 
following; 
Eavesdropping 
Man-in-the-Middle attacks 
Malware attacks 
Downloading Malicious applications  
(Yang et al., 2016; Ketel & Shumate, 
2015; Tokuyoshi, 2013). 
Mutual authentication procedure should be used for 
verification from both endpoints 
Inactive Network interfaces disabled 
The third-party application should undergo a risk 
assessment before allowed to be used as a BYOD 
device 
forbid insecure Wi-Fi  network 
connection 
15 
 
Insecurity in Virtual Machine Migration 
or creation. 
(Uehara, 2013; Tari, 2014) 
Location services in mobile devices turn- off in 
sensitive areas or implement firewalls 
Use a separate browser within a secure sandbox for 
browser-based access related to organization 
monitoring through IDS (Instruction Detection 
System 
Table 2. 3 Vulnerabilities Security vulnerabilities with their Mitigation Tactics 
2.2 BYOD Security Technologies 
Information security technology can be defined as the type of protection given to a piece of 
information to mitigate risk, these technologies can be used to secure information on the level 
application, host and network. Since the inception of the internet Information Security 
Administrators has tackled the issue of information security either by Proactive or reactive 
measures. Proactive technology measures are those information security technologies 
employed to keep data and its resources safe before a security breach can occur. Also, reactive 
technology measures are those security technologies being taken in the course of an 
information security breach so further damages are prevented and its related data and resources 
are kept secure. Furthermore, both proactive and reactive security technology measures are 
used at both the network, host or application levels which makes it an important field in 
measuring the BYOD security. 
Presently, security risk evaluation is performed by an IT organisation to classify different 
vulnerabilities which threaten hardware and software policies. these vulnerabilities are tackled 
according to those that pose the greatest risk. However, an issue arises when these 
vulnerabilities are too many to tackle and each is scored by distinct scales. 
A report on a BYOD security framework as published by the centre for internet security (CIS) 
( Zahadat, Blessner, Blackburn, & Olson, 2015).CIS confront the security concern of BYOD 
adoption using an authentication framework, The structure is made up of seven essential stages; 
(Plan, Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover, Assess and Monitor), surrounding the four 
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compulsory stages of the BYOD Security Lifecycle, the mentioned security framework is 
meant to fit in security policies of organisations and particularly acts as part of their risk 
management framework(Alberts & Dorofee, 2010). The proposed security framework stands 
as a static security strategic as it fails to dynamically monitor and update unknown devices and 
their risk associated. In the identity phase, users and their devices are registered on the 
organisation's network but only known devices are authenticated, but an error can occur where 
devices are newly registered and it is assumed it’s following organisational security policy. 
The framework does not distinguish between visitors and regular. Nevertheless, there are peer 
reviews and white papers on BYOD framework, these white papers recognised the risk 
associated with BYOD and provide non-technical (policy-Based) solutions. For example, 
Insights on governance, risk and compliance report by Ernest and Young (EY, 2014), suggested 
the three areas of BYOD risk made up of securing mobile devices, addressing application risk, 
and managing the mobile environment it further concluded by presenting eight steps to secure 
and improve BYOD programs.from all studied literatures it could be noted that BYOD security 
program in specific is part of a larger security policy of most organisation. 
In the following subsections, a detailed review on Vulnerability Scoring System is presented. 
This includes different methods of security risk scoring system being outlined in section 2.2.1 
whiles previous work on security frameworks are outlined in subsection 2.2.2. 
2.2.1 Vulnerability Scoring System 
In the following sub-sections, a detailed review of vulnerability scoring approaches is presented 
with the different types of methods and techniques. 
2.2.1.1 Security Risk Scoring Approaches 
For the conversion of vulnerability data into an actionable material a Vulnerability Scoring 
System becomes necessary, there are several scoring systems used for grading vulnerability 
with each having its benefits. The Vulnerability Notes Database by CERT Coordination Center 
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(CERT/CC) (Viehböck, 2011)is used to generate vulnerabilities scores in the range of 0 to 180 
and considers whether the Internet infrastructure is at risk and the category of security 
requirement a prone to exploitation. In (MSRC, 2017), which introduces the SANS 
vulnerability analysis scale consider where any form of weakness is located by deliberating on 
default configurations, client and server systems. Also, within (CWE, 2016) Microsoft’s 
proprietary scoring system is introduced, which considers the difficulty of risk exploitation and 
the total impact of the vulnerability. While these scoring systems are useful, yet they are not 
made to suit the environment (individual and organisation) of a particular situation, therefore 
they can be term as an invariable solution. 
2.2.1.2 Features for Evaluation and Predicting system’s environment vulnerability 
There are many different security risk management methods and models that have been 
proposed for smartphone usage. Some of these are dynamic security frameworks, which 
concentrate on system security policy and requirement. Authors in (Mell, Scarfone, & 
Romanosky, 2007; Scarfone, 2009) outline Security Management to include identifying, 
assessing and monitoring of all IT platforms for vulnerabilities. In spite of this, prioritizing and 
predicting these threats and vulnerabilities that pose the greatest risk is essential. Similarly, 
Authors (Mell et al., 2007), proposed a scoring system to translate the threats and 
vulnerabilities data into readily used information to prevent each different threat and 
vulnerability to be scored differently. Institutions such as (MSRC, 2017; NIST, 2018; 
Palmaers, 2013) classify vulnerabilities for scoring based on code, design, and architecture 
requirements. These systems reported in (CVE, 2019) and helps IT security managers to make 
decisions on activities to be performed in other to reduce the risk of Vulnerabilities and also 
encourage flexibility in the situation of BYOD users. 
Modern security monitoring systems use vulnerabilities databases to predict the likelihood of 
an attack (Weintraub, 2016). These databases are frequently revised as new vulnerabilities are 
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detected and later using the scoring algorithm to predict the potential organisational losses, that 
is the returns on investment. Furthermore, these measures by assessing the database of 
published security vulnerabilities then compare it to real-time organisational vulnerabilities for 
present exposures (alert) and calculate the requirements which are confidentiality, integrity and 
availability. The impact measures for the organisation are also based on the environmental 
variables these are updated in the system's Configuration Management Data Base(CMDB) 
proposed by (Keller & Subramanian, 2009). This helps in making the scoring models proficient 
as prediction will be based on the organisational damages on a real environment rather than on 
the user's estimations. Figure 2. 1. Shows a Cluster-Based Monitoring system as an example 
used by the author (Weintraub, 2016) for its scoring system. 
Cluster Based Monitoring 
System
Update CMDB
Security Risk Scoring 
Database
Vulnerability Database
NVD
Common vulnerability 
scoring system
CVSS
Configuration Management 
Database (CMDB)
Dynamic Role Based Access 
Control
User table
 
Figure 2. 1 Structure for Cluster-Based Monitoring Evaluation  
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The CMDB as presented in Table 2.4 below has configurations information of a system made 
up of the following entities: software, Application and system components, for instance, 
operating system, database management systems, utility programs and development 
components. The CMDB database is a corresponding database to the Cluster-Based Monitoring 
Evaluation system. 
Column value Column Name Column 
Description 
Value 
Basic parameter None, Partial, Complete N, P, C Unique 
COMPONENT TYPE Hardware Type 
(Smartphone, Tablet 
disk…), Software 
type(Microsoft, Apache ), 
etc. 
 
For example 
Database, 
Table, 
Unique 
CONFIDENTIALITY 
IMPACT (CI) 
   
CR Confidentiality 
Requirement 
The importance of 
the affected IT asset 
to a user’s 
organization, 
measured in terms of 
confidentiality 
L,M,H 
IR Integrity Requirement Guarding against 
improper information 
modification or 
destruction. 
L,M,H 
AR Availability Requirement Ensuring timely and 
reliable access to and 
use of Information… 
L,M,H 
20 
 
Table 2. 4 CMDB Database environmental Variables 
 
2.2.2  Security Management Frameworks 
In the following sub-sections, a review on security frameworks are presented in addition to 
other different types of scoring frameworks. 
2.2.2.1 BYOD Security Lifecycle 
This includes the security life cycle of the mobile device during its involvement in a BYOD 
program. The definition of each component, according to ( Zahadat, Blessner, Blackburn, & 
Olson, 2015) is presented below, with their component also highlighted in Figure 2.2 
Figure 2. 2  BYOD security lifecycle 
I. Register 
The mobile device is listed onto the BYOD program. The device and its mobile operating 
system are scrutinized to certify they meet the basic requirement for its inclusion to the 
program. 
II. Admission 
This includes the Enrolment policy of the organisation where preparing and equipping the 
network are allowed for services and new users are admitted. During the process, the device is 
set-up with configurations settings, software, and certificates necessary to prepare the device 
for its admission into the BYOD program. 
III. Operate 
Register operateAdmission De-provision
Real-time Data and setting removed
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This involves granting access to BYOD users organisation resources. With all things being 
equal, the user continues to enjoy the benefits of BYOD while maintaining compliance with 
all organizational requirements for participation in the BYOD program.  
 
IV. De-provision 
In the cause of any tragedy factors such as theft or device loss, there is no longer a need for a 
device to stay connected to the BYOD program, therefore all the organizational data are 
removed dynamically(automatically) and in real-time that is immediately when the user 
resigns, report of the device stolen or any mishap. 
Key de-provisioning activities: 
• Real-Time access removal 
• Real-Time Wiping of sensitive Data 
• Real-Time removal of certification and configuration settings 
• Real-Time removal of security Software 
The device is returned to the user and is no longer able to access organizational resources. 
2.2.2.2 Dynamic BYOD Security framework 
Authors ( Kearns, 2016). Classifies the security framework of an organisation BYOD program 
into seven (7) main stages which are in an iterative process and illustrated in Figure 2.3 below 
; 
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Figure 2. 3  Dynamic BYOD Security framework 
Plan (Generating Security Policy) 
In undergoing any major endeavour there is proper planning. In this section, we will highlight 
some of the key concepts that are critical during the planning process of a security program. 
The Plan phase requires close coordination across multiple disciplines and among all 
stakeholders. The planning process must be supported at the highest levels of management to 
ensure that appropriate time and human resources are allocated. It starts with understanding the 
business environment, this includes identifying who the users are and what resources they will 
be accessing. This also includes the standards needed in order to ensure that variables are 
capable of supporting functions and security requirements. 
Some key planning item include: 
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a. Classify organisation information security policies with its security roles and 
responsibilities. 
b. Identify regulatory and legal requirements. 
c. Plan a business process model. 
The Dynamic Identification phase 
This begins the security lifecycle, and it includes registering of devices for participation in the 
BYOD program plus officially approved for use and provisioned with required security settings 
in accordance with the Plan phase. In the first step of the BYOD Security Lifecycle, the 
assigned department within the organisation will evaluate the variables to ensure it meets 
established hardware and operating system requirements for inclusion in the process. Some 
organisations may want to consider eligibility criteria for employees as well as devices. This 
extra check will ensure repeat violators of security policies are not placed in a position to cause 
additional harm. Prior to granting the user any access to organisational resources or data, the 
user should be trained on the policies and procedures as well as their individual role and 
responsibilities in carrying out the security controls associated with the said program. This 
initial training helps to clearly communicate the rules of behaviour expected of 
users(employees). Also, periodic training will reinforce security norms and build a culture of 
security responsibility and awareness surrounding a network. Next, the device should be 
provisioned in accordance with organisational policy. Provisioning is the act of implementing 
security configurations, settings, applications, device profiles, and software certificates 
necessary to fully realize all security controls established as part of the schedule. This can be 
done Over-the-air (OTA) or off-air, as approved by the organization during the Plan phase. 
Authentication 
It includes the organisation's variables being signed up to the network program. There is the 
need to ensure that devices and the information that resides on them are appropriately protected 
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throughout the BYOD Lifecycle. Subsequently, policies are adopted in the area of 
authentication and monitoring, and wireless and its related personal devices are protected from 
attacks such as man-in-the-middle and listening effect despite the best protections 
Dynamically Monitor 
New attacks may arise because of the dynamism in technology, people and organisational 
policy. Several different events such as new or updated operating system, behaviour change in 
users, patrons and guest and their frequency of stay etc. identified so as to immediately prevent, 
or respond to and recover from, intentional or unintentional threat events. 
Dynamic and real-time Respond 
Once a threat event has taken place, it immediately notified the organisation. The response will 
include applying vulnerability remedies that best suites the threat, Device account deactivation, 
remote wipes (malware and viruses) or removal incident response plan. However, these 
responses are based on the nature of the risk or threat event that has presented itself 
Dynamic and real-time recovery 
This phase is made up of the initial response in an event of a threat. In the event that this 
happens the organisation must be able to fully recover. Also, backups (organisation)  and 
device tracking based on appropriate trust model are recommended. Organisation and Personal 
devices should be back up either by targeted directories or the specific sandboxed environment 
in real-time. Employee back up of personal devices will be part of the Dynamic security 
program 
Dynamic and real-time Assess and monitor 
The most important part of a security framework is the Assess and monitoring phase. This 
phase of a Security Framework can be achieved through clustering. For example; 
25 
 
a. user and device clusters 
b. Security clusters 
c. Trust and reputation based clusters. 
Nevertheless, depending on the user’s nature which can be identified as either customer or 
visitor and their security risk levels, grouping the attack priority as High, Medium, Low and 
very Low will provide insufficient information to create an effective framework. Finally, the 
various clusters must be updated dynamically so different policies will serve different clusters 
for easy management. 
2.2.2.3 Other Dynamic security frameworks 
Some other approaches have also been used for Dynamic security measurements, authors like 
(Reinfelder & Weishäupl, 2016) used a Security Success Model where the data item in question 
is the smartphone security policy of an organisation. But this proposed security model lack 
dynamicity which could be used with a BYOD policy in place, it needs to show individual 
outcomes with the effects of organisational variable, including the usage of a 
smartphone(personal devices) and its security issues. It’s should also be able to store 
information on individual and organisational concerns on security events and processes to 
know the security trend aiming as a feedback loop. Furthermore establishing and maintaining 
dynamic trust in mobile devices have been embarked on by many researchers in an attempt to 
solve it, the Trust project by (Marsh, 1994) was one of the first attempts to formalize trust in 
computer science, the model introduced the concept widely used by other researchers such as 
security context and its condition of trust which constitute their Computational Dynamic Trust 
Model for User Authorisation framework. Also, The mutual authentication model from 
(Choudhury, Kumar, Sain, Lim, & Hoon, 2011; Zhong, Bhargava, Lu, & Angin, 2015) is 
established on dynamism as an information trust database to monitor risks and its probability 
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of occurrence, this database is built using the behaviour of users whose actions change based 
on certain patterns over time. 
Works by (Das & Islam, 2011) presented a new architecture The Dynamic Trust Computation 
Model for Secured Communication in Multi-agent Systems this operates directly by integrating 
parameters like user feedback credibility, user similarity and historical trust into a trust 
computation technique. Other models by (Matt, Morge, & Toni, 2010), who also use a  trust 
computation method technique for Multi-agent Systems combine statistical information 
regarding the past user behaviour to predict the expected future user behaviour that could cause 
security difficulty. This trust models prove challenging because it does not consider “context”  
that is the particular situations affecting the value of trust, thereby it accurate representation for 
real-life situations is argued. 
According to (Zhu, Lv, Yu, & Zuo, 2010), the process of tackling information security of a 
grid computing system is determined by user authorization, where it operates by specifying the 
access rights to resources using the Dynamic role-based access control model to determine the 
role, task and the environment of a particular user. The authorization decision is updated 
dynamically by a monitoring component keeping track of user attributes, service attributes and 
the environment. A very similar model for grid computing was also proposed by (Fan, Liu, Li, 
Wu, & Guo, 2012) this also emphases on the dynamic change of roles of services. Though 
these approaches consider “context” into trust computation, their application is also limited to 
specific domains. Some ideas from this work can help in the development of the BYOD 
dynamic security model. 
2.3 Risk Assessment Methodology 
A performing computer and its associated network application security measurement is a 
challenging task since the application in question can have a complicated architecture. 
However, this assignment should be like any other software examination methodology such as 
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the use of valuable tools, skills and knowledge which has been explaining in some of the earlier 
works by ( Aagedal, et al., 2002). 
In the following sub-sections, a detailed review of risk and vulnerability assessment standards 
such as CVSS and OWASP is presented followed by the mentioning of other tools used in risk 
assessment. 
2.3.1 The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) 
The Common Vulnerability Scoring System (CVSS) (Mell et al., 2007), serves as an open 
framework for sharing the characteristics and effects of IT vulnerabilities. In the USA the exact 
CVSS scores for publicly recognised vulnerabilities are communicated by The National 
Vulnerability Database (NVD) (National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST), 2016, 
2018) and the Federal Information Processing Standards (FIPS) 199 (NIST, 2004). They use 
the security categorisation with the NVD and CVSS metrics to attain influential scores that are 
personalised to each agency’s environment.  According to the author (Allodi & Massacci, 
2014), CVSS is the most widely used scoring system by industries to identify high-risk 
vulnerabilities with maximum priority. Yet, there are still doubt about the explanation of the 
CVSS regarding its absolute attacks, therefore a good scientific methodology is needed to 
compare different policies to assess the most effective policy. Finally, CVSS considers it 
metrics and scores in the range of 0-10 according to specific characteristics, and it is explained 
using the score calculator and its metrics interpretation shown in table 2.5. 
CVSS Metrics Characteristics 
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Base Represent the intrinsic characteristics of the 
Vulnerabilities 
Considering the Exploitability of the following parameters 
Access Vector: access needed for the vulnerability to be exploited. The 
further distance an attacker is to the host, the greater the vulnerability 
score. 
Access Complexity: The complexity of an attacker to exploit the 
vulnerability  
Authentication; measures the level of authentication needed for an 
attacker to exploit a vulnerability. 
Impacts: the effect of exploiting the vulnerability on the three security 
factors; (Confidentiality, 
Integrity and Availability)(FIRST, 2018; Gallon, 2011; Gallon & Bascou, 
2011; Mell et al., 2007). 
Temporal: Characteristics are based on the vulnerability that changes over time but 
remains constant to the user environments, these include 
Exploitability(E): represent the present exploitability level of techniques 
or code  
Remediation Level (RL): quantify the Ongoing facilities for mending 
vulnerabilities. 
Report Confidence (RC): This metric measures the degree of confidence 
in the existence of the vulnerability and the credibility of the known 
technical details(Gallon, 2011; Keramati, 2017). 
Environmental: represents the characteristics of a vulnerability that are 
significant and dependent on a particular user’s environment (FIRST, 
2018) 
Table 2. 5 CVSS Metric interpretation 
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2.3.1.1 Measurement characteristics 
 The Base metrics are captured in a screenshot in Figure 2.4 whiles Figure 2.5 represents 
the CVSS base scoring calculator employed in determining the base score of the 
vulnerability below. 
 
 
Figure 2. 4  CVSS Base score calculator vulnerability(CVE-2016-0051) 
 
 
Figure 2. 5  CVSS base score metrics interpretation 
 Environmental Metrics 
shown in Figure 2.6 representing the CVSS environmental score calculator and Figure 2.7 the 
CVSS environmental metrics interpretations. 
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Figure 2. 6 CVSS environmental score calculator vulnerability (CVE-2016-0051) 
 
 
Figure 2. 7 CVSS environmental metrics interpretation. 
 Temporal Metrics 
Temporal score calculator is shown in Figure 2. 8 whiles Figure 2. 9 shows the Temporal score 
interpretation. 
 
 
Figure 2. 8  Temporal score calculator vulnerability (CVE-2016-0051) 
31 
 
 
Figure 2. 9 CVSS Temporal metrics interpretation 
However using the CVSS to score the security risk of a BYOD program have some deficiency, 
this is because only it's Base Score Group of Vulnerabilities is calculated by the CVSS 
calculator, leading to improper risk evaluation (Das & Islam, 2011.). Thus, systems 
vulnerabilities with its related situation are essential in the measurement calculation so as to 
obtain the correct score. 
2.3.2  Open Web Application Security Project (OWASP) 
OWASP risk rating methodology is said to be a straightforward technique used in calculating 
and scoring of an associated risk within a computer application or software (Open Web 
Application Security Project, 2018). The process of rating risk and its related impact is by 
gathering factors regarding the participating threat agent. These include the skillfulness of an 
attacker, the motivation, prospect, the scope of the attacker domain, and its vulnerability 
factors. The OWASP methodology quantifies risk in the scale of low, medium and high. 
2.3.2.1 Definitions for OWASP Risk Rating 
From the definition of  OWASP, risk can is expressed  as  Risk = Likelihood * Impact 
A. The Likelihood = Threat agent factor and Vulnerability factor. 
Also, the definition from authors like (Rao & Pant ) computes likelihood as the possibility of 
vulnerabilities being exploited by an attacker. 
The two tables 2.6- 2.7, below explains the factors associated with the  Likelihood  calculation 
Threat Factors Definition 
Skill level This shows by what means is the threat agents technically skilled. 
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Motive How motivated is the group of threat agents to find and exploit this 
vulnerability? 
Opportunity What means and chances are needed for this group of threat agents to find 
and exploit this vulnerability? 
Size How important is this group of threat agents? 
Table 2. 6 Threat factors 
Vulnerability Factors Definition 
Ease of discovery How simple is it for this group of threat 
agents to uncover this vulnerability? 
Ease of exploit How simple is it for this category of threat 
agents to exploit this vulnerability in reality? 
Awareness In what way is this vulnerability known to 
this group of threat agents? 
Intrusion detection In what way possible is an exploit to be 
discovered? 
Table 2. 7 Vulnerability factors 
B. The Impact = Technical factors and Business factors 
Again (Rao & Pant; OWASP, 2018) defines the Impact of an attack as the calculation of 
estimation on numerous factors that shows a successful attack on an application. Certain 
institutions have an asset catalogue and an impact reference guide to formalize the potential 
harm. The two tables 2.8 and 2.9 below explains the factors associated with the impact 
calculation. 
Technical Factors Definition 
Loss of confidentiality how sensitive is the data? 
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Loss of integrity how much of the data can be damaged? 
Loss of accountability 
 
are threat agents activities traceable to a 
personality? 
Loss of availability 
 
how critical is this service? 
Table 2. 8 Techincal impact factor. 
Business factors Definition 
Financial damage 
 
Not as much cost to fix the vulnerability? 
Reputation damage loss of important accounts? 
Non-compliance are threat agents activities able to be seen by  
an individual 
Privacy violation: how much personal info can be exposed? 
Non-compliance: 
 
how much exposure does 
non-compliance introduce? high-profile 
violation? 
Table 2. 9 Business Impact Factor 
The Likelihood and Impact Levels are rated as in table 2.11, this is to show the severity level 
0 to <3 LOW 
3 to <6 MEDIUM 
6 to 9 HIGH 
Table 2. 10 Rating of Severity level 
2.4 Information Security Risk Management 
Information Security Management (ISM) can be said to be a strategy that allows information 
technology administrators to protect their Information and Communications Technology (ICT) 
against different risks, vulnerabilities and threats. Hence it is vital for organisations to have a 
security standard with which they will manage their information risk asset, that is where 
an  Information Security Management System Standards (ISMS) come into play with its 
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policies and procedures that can be implemented by an organisation to guarantee security 
requirements (confidentiality, availability and integrity) for its information resources from 
threat and vulnerabilities(Azuwa, Ahmad, Sahib, & Shamsuddin, 2012; Brodin, 2015). The 
ISO/IEC 27000 from (International Organization for Standardization, 2016) category is the 
most accepted and generally used ISMS, but the specific standard that is of relevance in BYOD 
security strategy is included in the ISO/IEC 27004 Information security measurements and 
ISO/IEC 27005 Information security risk management. 
Table 2.11 below defines (ISMS) standard ISO/IEC 27000 with its categories as using 
definitions by (Almorsy, Grundy, & Ibrahim, 2011; International Organization for 
Standardization, 2016). 
 
ISO/IEC standard 
 
Purpose 
ISO/IEC 27001 Information 
security management systems 
– Requirements 
This provides the requirement inadequately executing the 
information security management systems (ISMS) 
, including information security risks within an organization’s 
overall risks 
ISO/IEC 27004 Information 
security measurements 
It provides a framework letting an evaluation of ISMS 
efficiency to be measured and assessed in accordance 
with ISO/IEC 27001 
ISO/IEC 27005 Information 
security risk management 
Provides guidance on executing a process-oriented risk 
management method to help inadequately implement and 
achieve the information security risk management 
requirements of ISO/IEC 27001 
 
Table 2. 11 ISO/IEC standards which are significate in BYOD security 
Information security is the process where confidentiality, integrity and availability of sensitive 
information is observed, meaning sensitive information is protected from any alteration, 
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interference, destruction and scrutiny, observing security requirement for a BYOD system can 
best be managed if organisation and its employee (users) pays attention to their network in a 
BYOD situation. Authors in (Donald, 2004) define Framework as an outline structure 
supporting a system or approach,  therefore using an information security framework serve as 
the outline for constructing an information security programme with an advantage of improving 
system recovery, encryption, and application security and to control risk and reduce 
vulnerabilities (Donald, 2004; Granneman, 2013). 
The subsequent sub-sections show a detailed review of ICT security frameworks with its 
attributes. In addition, different security requirements are outlined in Section 2.4.1, while 
previous works on security attributes are outlined in Section 2.4.2. 
2.4.1 Information and Telecommunication Security Framework 
In the following sub-sections, a thorough review of ICT security outlines is presented in 
addition to the different types of security attributes. 
2.4.1.1 Security Attributes 
In a book by (Stallings, 1995), it describes network security as the most essential part in the 
information security risk management process since it’s accountable for safeguarding entirely 
the flow of information in network computers their related devices, users and programs. 
Therefore designing and building a security risk metrics requires an understanding of the 
different standard, measures and model methods similarly used, this has been review through 
literature and discussed therein. The next portion clarifies these security attributes in relation 
to BYOD Risk, Threat and Vulnerabilities. 
The concerns of any Information Technology Security (IT Security) according to SANS (Deck, 
2018) is the process of applying measures and techniques to steadily protect and defend 
information (organisation and personal data) using any kind of technology develop to build, 
save and use from any unauthorized access, misapplication, failures, alteration, destruction, or 
wrongful disclosure, in so doing defending its security goal of confidentiality, integrity, Non-
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repudiation and Authorisation and availability (Palmaers, 2013). The international standard 
(ISO/IEC 27002, 2005). also describes information security as the protection of confidentiality, 
integrity and availability of information, this could be in any form be it electronic or paper 
transcribe, other security goals such as authenticity, accountability, non-repudiation, and 
reliability are also involved. Similarly, description by authors (Arellano, 2015; IEC, 2018) on 
BYOD security goals is discussed beginning with Confidentiality, Integrity and Authentication 
(CIA) which is the generally accepted meaning of security. 
2.4.1.2 Security Requirement Outline 
 Confidentiality is the protection of information against disclosure to unauthorized groups. 
 Integrity is the prevention of alteration of the information by an unauthorized group. 
 Availability is the capability to offer information to authorized groups when necessary. 
 Non-repudiation is the prevention of denial of a  transaction by an interested individual. 
 Access Control is the selective controls of access to a resource. 
 Authentication is the technique of confirming the identity of a user or process. 
 Authorization is an act of assigning permission to a specific user or process. 
2.4.2 Goal-Focused Security requirements for a BYOD service 
Authors like (Miller, Voas, & Hurlburt, 2012); Donald, 2004; Ketel & Shumate, 2015; 
Armando, Costa, Merlo, Verderame, & Wrona, 2016; Friedman, 2008) express security as an 
everyday thing thereby effecting a continuous process made up of the constant collaboration 
amongst policies execution and technical measures. In measuring the security goals of any 
introduce technology, authors (Arellano, 2015; International Organization for Standardization, 
2016) examined starting with the traditional “CIA” (confidentiality, integrity and 
authentication) security goals, before specific arrangement such as BYOD can be examined 
with authenticity, accountability and non-repudiation. 
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The following sub-sections define the security goals which are relevant in measuring any 
BYOD technology. 
2.4.2.1 Ensuring Confidentiality 
Ensuring confidentiality relates to sensitive organisation data which is normally saved on users 
mobile devices. (Donald, 2004; Niehaves et al.,2017; Prashant Kumar Gajar, 2013). In (Bello 
Garba et al., 2015; Dawson, 2015), data is protected by being prevented from loss or leakages 
using encryption, implementing a user service agreement where personal devices are shut down 
remotely by IT administrators in the cases of lost or stolen devices and finally, authors  
(Morrow, 2012) suggested user education and awareness. 
2.4.2.2 Integrity Checks during data communication 
In (Y. Wang et al., 2014) Integrity goals is achieve when there are detection and prevention of 
any form of modification to data during transfer, previous work by (Morrow, 2012) in relation 
to the risk of Data integrity exploitation is the misuse of a policy or an Access control violation, 
Insider threat exploited or storing an organization’s data to an unsecured location. Likewise 
authors(Jain & Shanbhag, 2012); Bello Garba et al., 2015) methods of ensuring confidentiality 
such as Regular User education and awareness, encryption of corporate data and BYOD 
devices restriction, also works for data integrity as well. Furthermore Mobile Virtual Private 
Network (VPN) and application controls must be used to hold information in transfer in its 
exact form throughout the communication period between BYOD devices and organisational 
system (Jain & Shanbhag, 2012) 
2.4.1.3 Maintaining Availability 
(Donald, 2004) defines maintaining availability as guaranteeing access to data when needed. 
this includes offering access to information to employees outside organisational control. 
limiting availability means a decrease in productivity and proficiency in ICT practices. Hence 
for preserve availability; Device data must be backup frequently either remotely via a wireless 
connection or by means of cable services. Desktop virtualisation can be employed to implement 
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applications and data storage, instead of on personal devices (Bello Garba et al., 2015; Dery & 
MacCormick, 2012). 
2.4.1.4 Data Authentication 
Data Authentication is the identification and verification of BYOD users and its devices .the 
authentication of BYOD users includes using factors such as username and passwords. The use 
of Digital Signature algorithm and a trusted Digital Certificates to sign in between BYOD 
devices and organisational environment upholds authentication. When there are weakness or 
flaws in the authentication process from the SESSION_ID and weak passwords, due to only 
one timed authentication process or identity impersonation, An attack is likely to happen 
(Wichers, 2013). A situation of broken authentication and session management is said to have 
occurred when; there is rogue mobile device access (Brodin, 2015), usage of a guessable 
session_ID, unable to detect frequent guessing trials while there is a mechanism in place, weak 
cryptography, limitation of HTTP, Insecure session handling methods and, weakness in the 
session management technique (Huluka & Popov, 2012). This difficulty can be overcome with 
a solution such as Mutual authentication procedure should be used for verification from both 
endpoints, If possible choose not to be connected to internet location services, a two-way 
authentication process and use of location services as suggested by (Huluka & Popov, 2012; 
Yuan, Yang, He, & Simpkins, 2016). 
2.4.1.5 Securing Non-repudiation to Data 
Non-repudiation is to accept acknowledgement of data from a third party without dispute over 
its content. It can also discourage a receiver from repudiating data it received(Donald, 2004). 
Noted that non-repudiation endeavours are made to keep a comprehensive transmission of data 
from being denied. 
2.4.1.6 Access Control and Authorisation Regulation 
An access control policy according to (Bello Garba et al., 2015) is meant to outline the practices 
and measures used in protecting computer and its network devices from unauthorised 
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admission. Garba et al suggested managing access control by changing the password on 
periodically, any ideal device should be logout automatically at a stipulated time(example 
10minutes) without a repetition of the immediate password, limit the number of times failed 
password is repeated on organisational emails and applications. A dynamic access control 
system is created using information gathered on user devices behaviours (Koh, Oh, & Im, 
2014). Therefore Broken authentication and session management occurs when there are 
weaknesses or flaws in the authentication and authorisation process, such as SESSION_ID and 
weak password, in a situation where there’s only one timed authentication process stolen 
identity can be an attacking tool. There is also the issue of threat caused by insecure interface 
and APIs. Organisations currently send data via the Application Programming Interfaces 
(APIs) this is so because, when data is sent to a mobile device by an API it means the data does 
not need to reside on the device but instead it is retrieved by a mobile application running on 
the device (Wichers, 2013). In a circumstance when there are flaws with the security of these 
interfaces, attackers can invade. 
Furthermore, the general security threats of BYOD system include data loss and leakages, 
where the user’s willingly authorised or unwillingly shares data with an unauthorized user, 
application or a third party this can jeopardize an organisations confidentiality and integrity. 
Non-repudiation is said to be violated when Policies are misuse. That is the conflict between 
comfort, flexibility and productivity against security. A study by Cisco reveals 56% of workers 
don’t mind going against their boss in the performance of their duties (Bradley, Loucks, 
Macaulay, Medcalf, & Buckalew, 2012). 
2.4.2 Why Security Requirement? 
Working on securing a system is a continuous process, this also applies to BYOD systems, 
therefore, it’s better for the security monitors to take into consideration the security requirement 
(Lipner, 2004). There is a possibility of an amendment to the requirement during the 
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development stages, but in explaining the security requirements in the foundation stages 
prevent any requirement from being ignored. According to Firesmith (Donald, 2004).Thus, 
cases regarding loss in security requirements specifications in software development fall within 
three categories; 
(i) Security is muted completely. That is, security is omitted at the development stages. 
(ii) Plainly indicate unclear security goals. This point means a required security 
requirement is difficult to assess as a result of it being unstructured. 
(iii) Generally handles used security processes as architectural limitations, because security 
requirement is induced very early on the architectural decision causing unsuitable 
security mechanisms. 
Usually, security requirements are considered under non-functional requirements which 
represent how a system performs instead of what it achieves as a functional requirement, but 
Information security cannot be merely expressed by non-functional requirements, given that 
security objectives often inspire new functionality, for example, intrusion detection and access 
controls will also require functional requirements(Savola, 2007). 
2.4.2.1 Identification of BYOD Security Objective 
The first security objective to the service of a BYOD system is the physical defence of the 
mobile device used. Implying the threat of malicious application and the threat of unreliable 
and unguarded wireless communication network are most likely to be exploited by attackers. 
Importantly for BYOD to be successful there should be readily available internet which 
involves nodes and host systems on a network, and so Denial-of-service attack (DOS) could 
also become the main security threat towards BYOD operations. Denial-of-service (DoS) 
attacks occur when an attacker floods the resources (system, servers or network) of the 
authorised node connected to the internet with traffic rending it inaccessible. There is also the 
DoS activity where fabricated messages are sent for unauthorized nodes by an authorised node 
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via the flooding attack (Savola, 2007). Finally, since BYOD service is a process of a wireless 
communication system where users appreciate the safety of their information and resources 
from attacks and damage a vulnerability prediction score is crucial. 
2.4.2.2 Risk 
Authors such as (Singh et al., 2004) (Palmaers, 2013) reveals risk as the damage incurred from 
some intended or accidental occurrence and could negatively impact the information security 
process. Furthermore (Aven & Renn, 2009) define risk as occurrences where the result is 
unknown. Mathematically (Fernández-Muñiz, Montes-Peón, & José Vázquez-Ordás, 2012), 
express information security risk assessment as a representation of the attack impact and the 
likelihood of an information asset being the attack. This is express below 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 × 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑡 
Additionally, the impact of an information resource occurrence is equivalent to the output of 
asset vulnerability and asset value, represented mathematically as: 
𝑅𝑖𝑠𝑘 = 𝐴𝑡𝑡𝑎𝑐𝑘 𝐿𝑖𝑘𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 × 𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡 𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒 × 𝑉𝑢𝑙𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 
(Vazquez, 2014) uses risk to signifies threat (likelihood of an Attack), asset value and 
Vulnerability. Amongst the three asset value (device, confidential data) is the simplest to 
score.whilst vulnerability and asset value are said to be the most essential factors considered in 
determining total security risk score. 
2.4.2.3 Vulnerability 
According to The International Organization for Standardization definition vulnerabilities are 
defects or weakness in system security procedures, design or implementation of internal 
controls that could be exploited (accidentally triggered or intentionally exploited) and result in 
a security breach or a violation of the system’s security policy (International Organization for 
Standardization, 2016; ISO/IEC, 2018; (Azuwa et al., 2012). In principle, vulnerabilities occur 
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in organisations resources, which act as a gateway to attackers towards their computer 
systems(Mell et al., 2007). Author (Weidman, 2014) defines vulnerability as a weakness in a 
system (application and service) which lets an attacker evade security constraints and 
manoeuvre thru systems in a manner the developer never anticipated. Moreover, there is an 
increase in the number of services provided by computing devices (smartphones, Laptops and 
it related mobile devices) usage hence an increment in vulnerabilities as well (Viehböck, 2011) 
US-CERT, 2012.). 
The factor of user Vulnerability as discussed by (Eskins & Sanders, 2011) illustrates how users 
are often left out of the BYOD security measurement design, for the reason of wrong perception 
based on security, privacy, usability and trust. Even with a familiar device. The BYOD user 
plays an important role in a BYOD induced network, but the traditional methods of 
cybersecurity evaluation seem to ignore the part played by the user in the system, though by 
design users have an influence on the cyber systems, they are not thoroughly considered by the 
organisation as it is mainly the network and its physical devices such as administration security 
policies, software and firewalls that take part in the evaluation. Then again humans (users) in  
BYOD evaluation situations are either clearly ignored or considered as a standalone system 
with static properties who will carry on their specified task complying with the organisation's 
administrative security policies and procedure. But, this is not always true as users are dynamic 
and their practice depends on usability, motivation, conditions of the system and user 
acceptability, etc. failure for IT security managers to recognise this can result in Vulnerabilities 
both to the organisation and the User (Human Participant). 
2.4.2.4 Threat 
The NIST Special Publication (SP) 800-30 (National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST), 2016) defines threats as a series of occurrences within which a natural or intelligent 
invader may compromise the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of security system in an 
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illicit manner to cause harm (NIST, 2018). In the discipline of computer security, the threat is 
the likelihood of risk to computer resources with the intention of exploiting a vulnerability to 
breach security and cause harm (MSRC, 2017). 
2.5 Metrics 
Measurement is a process used in system identification for an environment with an extreme 
level of quantification accuracy. Lord Kelvin is quoted saying, “When you can measure what 
you are speaking about and express it in numbers, you know something about it”(C. Wang & 
Wulf, 1997). The development of security metrics by organisations is a very challenging 
exercise as noted on the science and security bulletin (Sanders & Nicol, 2018). Categorising 
the processes involved in design, development, evaluation, and deployment of security metrics 
is a tough challenge in cybersecurity, particularly in the procedures used in identifying what 
should be covered in measuring a specific set of security policies and quantifying them 
efficiently. Authors Vaughn, Henning, & Siraj, 2003; Villarrubia, Fernández-Medina, & 
Piattini, 2017) uses training and monitoring measures for its user security metrics. However, 
an effective way to tackle the security threats of a BYOD organisations network is to categorise 
the security metrics that quantify the security configuration characteristics dynamically. 
Saydjari defines metric as “a system of related measures enabling quantification of some 
characteristic” and with the measure as “a dimension compared against a standard.” (Saydjari, 
2006). To help simplify the problem, the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST, 2016) through their security metrics manual on information technology system 
perceived that, security metrics must bring forth information that is quantified in keeping track 
of a system's performance, measures a repetitive activity and finally readily available 
data(O’Brien et al., 2015). Likewise, it should be measurable by using suitable procedures in 
collecting data of occurrences onto a pre-defined scale to represent appropriately the assign 
security requirements that meet an organisation’s environment. This work falls under the 
concept of situational awareness which gives a whole approach to understanding threat and 
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vulnerability analysis using predictive analytics to perform an evaluation of the current security 
situation and projects future security position. Similarly. situations awareness as defined by 
(Endsley, 1995; Dacier et al., 1996; NPFC, 1995) states that “the perception of an element in 
the environment with a volume of time and space, and the comprehension of their meaning 
shows the projection of their status in the near future”. 
Coming from the perspective of a defender in security analysis and auditing, one will have to 
be able to enforce Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability security policies in a BYOD 
environment without compromising the performance of its network. However, having an 
attacker mindset is very effective because an attacker is inspired to attain a set goal 
continuously. Thus, investigations with such a background are more practical, as data can be 
gathered from simulated attacks (Jonsson & Olovsson, 1997). 
NIST describes metrics as implementations made by organisations to help in policy-making 
through its data collection, evaluation, and reporting of significate performance-related data. 
Also, the author (Pendleton, Garcia-Lebron, Cho, & Xu, 2016) considers metrics as allocating 
value to an objective, many researchers and organisations have attempted to standardise 
security metrics, authors such as(Jansen,2010; Pendleton et al., 2016) explains security metrics 
on how a designated systems security objectives are met based on its quantitative attributes on 
certain scales such as nominal, interval, and ordinal. With the later moving on to subdivide it 
into sub-metrics namely Vulnerability, attack, defence, and situation respectively. 
Basically, Metrics gives the organisation and their users (employee) a technique (quantitative 
or qualitative measurement) they can use in sorting and calculation their threat and 
vulnerability so that risk pose on information resources can be ranked quantitatively and 
qualitatively (NIST, 2016). Qualitative metrics define the evaluation process resulting in a non-
numerical value which is difficult to analyse. Example (“high,” “medium,” and “low”), whiles 
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Quantitative is simple to understand and preferably meet a specific situation, It appropriate for 
decision making because it usually represented in numerical form. 
Measurement-based security metrics by (Ramos, Lazar, Filho, & Rodrigues, 2017) is created 
from the examination of a system model where several parameters are entered (input). For 
instance, data from an Intrusion Detection System device (IDS), and then use suitable 
procedures in collecting the data of occurrences onto a pre-defined scale to represent 
appropriately the assign security requirements that meet an organisation’s environment. 
(Almasizadeh & Azgomi, 2013) model-based security measures a repetitive activity and finally 
produces readily available mathematical output. Also, Analytical metrics by (Böhme & 
Freiling, 2008) which is a formal mathematical model is used as a  Quantitative ranking metrics 
incorporating the human (User) in the policy of a workable BYOD security evaluation metrics. 
This is essential when it comes to balancing security and usability. A report from IBM’s 2014 
Cyber Security Intelligence Index (IBM, 2018.) indicates the anticipation from computer 
security officers and their designers about users mostly conforming to security rules and 
policies, as they are the weakest security link in an information security environment. The 
report thereby concluded on humans (user) errors such as default or weak passwords usage, 
loss of mobile devices, continuous opening of unsafe attachments or URL and deliberate by-
passing security policies and procedure influences being 95%  of all information security 
incidents. 
According to (Ketel & Shumate, 2015; Inc., 2018), in recent times the use of personal devices 
for official duties both on-site and off-site has increased tremendously and so are its related 
security concerns. Yet, usable security measurements continue to be the greatest factor in a 
BYOD environment with security risk and vulnerabilities increasing each day. Consequently, 
a full security estimation should be considered. (Eskins & Sanders, 2011) also discussed how 
users are often being left out of the BYOD security measurement metrics design, for the reason 
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of the wrong perception related to security and privacy, usability and trust. Even with a familiar 
device. The BYOD user plays an important role in a BYOD induced network, but the traditional 
methods of cybersecurity evaluation seems to ignore the part played by the user in the system, 
though by design users have influence on the cyber systems they are not thoroughly considered 
by the organisation as it is mainly the network and its physical devices such as administration 
security policies, software’s and firewalls that take part in the evaluation . Then again humans 
(users) in  BYOD evaluation situations are either clearly ignored or considered as a standalone 
system with static properties who will carry on their specified task complying with the 
organisation's administrative security policies and procedure. But, this is not always true as 
users are dynamic and their practice depends on usability, motivation, conditions of the system 
and user acceptability, etc. failure for IT security managers to recognise this can result in 
Vulnerabilities both to the organisation and the User (Human Participant). 
Authors in (IEC, 2016) make user security evaluation on a computing system to form part of 
the quantitative analysis (Measurement) step, for this to be productive the network of the 
organisation needs to be in the public space (internet) for the authorised users to be able to 
access it always. (ISO, 2015) categories the security metrics to indicate the level of security on 
Efficiency, Trustfulness, Accessibility, Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability and 
Accountability. Organizational Metrics as depicted by Authors (Ralston, Graham, & Hieb, 
2007) in their Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) control systems to explain 
this form of metrics. Takes part in high-level security marking, for instance, the decision on 
the type of security initiatives available on an organisations data and their strength. 
Finally, Threats agent’s give rise to threats, which might exploit vulnerabilities to violate 
information security properties such as confidentiality, integrity, availability, etc. Security 
controls implement countermeasures to defend information technology systems (BYOD) by 
mitigating threats or plugging vulnerabilities, or both using policies, algorithms and metrics. 
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Hence achieving a precise measurement on the quality of the system results in a trustworthy 
BYOD realisation. This has been shown in Figure 2.11 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. 11 Connections amongst Threats, vulnerabilities, risks and security controls 
 
2.5.1 Categories of  Metrics 
This explains the various forms of Host-based Security Metrics used in the information system 
security measurement of an organisations network. 
2.5.2 Host-based Security Metrics 
These are metrics used to measure the security level of distinct hosts in a network. The host-
based security metrics can be divided into two categories “with probability” and “without 
probability”. This is done for the reason that: (i) in, instances locating a probability value for 
an attack happen to be infeasible, and (ii) Certain analysis and optimisation can be performed 
with or without probability concerns as explained in ( Roy, Kim, & Trivedi, 2012). 
2.5.2.1 With Probabilistic value 
Publication on the measurement of belief by ( Suppes, 1979) quantifies probability in the 
function of between 0 and 1. Probability Theory concepts have been adopted and used broadly 
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by disciplines such as artificial intelligence, machine learning and computer science etc.To 
measure the likelihood of prospective clustered attacks. Publication by ( Denuit, Dhaene, 
Goovaerts, & Kaa, 2005) uses probability theory in modelling risk, this is based on the possible 
turn of event to take place. ( Li & Wang, 2019) uses a probabilistic reasoning algorithm to 
develop precise navigation and integrated information system from existed wireless local area 
networks (WLAN) signals. 
Conversely, the security metrics can also be measured based on their probability values, these 
include probability security metric (Wang, Islam, Long, Singhal, & Jajodia, 2008). Authors (J. 
A. Wang, Wang, Guo, & Xia, 2009) uses a Probabilistic metric known as the Attack Graph-
Based Probabilistic metric, this combines numerous vulnerabilities from different network 
framework, the VEA_bility by (Tupper & Zincir-Heywood, 2008; McQueen et al., 
2005)(Premaratne, Samarabandu, Sidhu, Beresh, & Tan, 2008) also uses the percentage of 
hosts with vulnerability on a network to measure its metrics. 
2.5.2.2 Without Probability Value 
This metric quantifies how fast BYOD induce network is likely to be compromised and the 
attractive of its different network topology to exploit, it measures the level of risk use in 
managing a system in an arranged environment. examples include State-Time Estimation 
Algorithms (STEA), Mean Time to Compromise(MTTC) respectively. The application of both 
the period based metrics can be said to be static but applying it in combination with a 
topological situation brings out the dynamic optimisation. 
The Return on Attack metrics ( Cremonini & Martini, 2005) is used to define the expected 
profit of an attacker upon a successful attack above the losses he suffers due to the security-
measure implemented by the target. Hence for an organisation to calculate the efficiency of a 
security-measure specific type of intrusion attempts in opposed. 
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2.6   Intrusion Detection and Vulnerability Assessment Security Systems 
Information and its communication mode continue to be an important business asset in all 
organizations. Therefore, it must be kept as safe as any other valuable asset. This can be said 
to be the objective of any information security program, not only in providing protection for 
its business information assets but for the protection of the business users as a whole. 
The Internet and its computer networks are subjected to a rising amount of security  
threats on a daily basis, with different forms of attack appearing frequently. Yet, building a 
flexible and adaptive security-oriented methodology is still a challenge. The use of hi-tech tools 
for web services and remote access in-network communities comes with its own network 
security concerns, also these tools are needed to deliver a precise and consistent defence against 
malicious attack. That is where intrusion detection comes into play. 
Network intrusion detection and prevention systems(NIDP)  can be divided into two definite 
groups, namely; knowledge-based system (Signature-Based Detection) and Behaviour-based 
system (anomaly-based detection) (Alessandri, 2001). The knowledge-based system act as an 
audit trail system as it uses the data from system signatures to determine the known attack and 
or clearly defined outcome of interest. It then moves on further to compare the result with 
define attacks and vulnerabilities, a positive match indicates an intrusion. These type of 
intrusion detection tool are the most popular on the market and believe to be fairly accurate 
because it produces a low rate of false positives(Venayagamoorthy, Sharma, Gautam, & 
Ahmadi, 2016). However, it is constrained in the detection of unknown attacks that attacks 
with no known signature. OSSEC (OSSEC, 2019) is an example of knowledge-based intrusion 
detection systems, which is an open-source, supporting operating systems such as OpenBSD, 
Macintosh, Window and Solaris. Alternatively, Behaviour-based detectors go-ahead to label 
all unrecognised signatures as dangerous. To run, these systems compare the detected 
behaviour of the system against a model of expected behaviour. Anything different from the 
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standard system behaviour is labelled an intrusion(Jha, Sheyner, & Wing, 2002). Behaviour-
based systems are thought to be complete, as it is able to catch all attacks. But, accuracy is said 
to be minimum. The  NIDP approach is not always a perfect answer to system security as it is 
difficult to implement one that fit an organisation complete system requirement. Secondly, a 
highly functional intrusion detection system has the potential of sounding false alarms if it is 
not well studied to produce what is considered standard behaviour. Therefore an intrusion 
detection system can create an alarm only before the reason for an alarm occurs. In many lots 
of situations, this could by this instance be late. 
In the following sub-sections, a detailed review of NIDP is provided. In addition, the 
architecture is outlined in Section 2.6.1, followed by computing vulnerability assessment 
methods in Section 2.6.2. 
2.6.1 Snort NIDP Architecture 
Snort is an open-source is a network intrusion detection and prevention (NIDP) developed on 
a rule-based expression joining signature, protocol and anomaly-based identification methods 
to identify hostile traffic. It was developed by Martin Roesch in 1998 (Roesch, Green, 
Sourcefire, Inc., & Cisco, 1998). Snort can be configured into a Network Intrusion Detection 
System (NIDS), this analyses the inward and outward traffic against a set of policies to expose 
any invasion in the network. Snort-based NIDS (S-NIDS) is designed to safeguard the networks 
from any form of likely intrusions and attacks, Snort examines packet header and executes 
protocol analysis. It also inspects a series of network threats by means of a content/signature 
pairing algorithms and records the traffic on the network by triggering an alarm against 
malicious events (Liao, Chun-Hung, Ying-Chih, & Kuang-Yuan, 2013). The architecture of a 
typical Snort NIDS involving the main parts; packet decoder, pre-processor, detection engine, 
logging and alerting system, and output modules are presented the Figure 2.10 below. 
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Figure 2. 10 The snort architecture 
In a packet sniffing situation, the Snort gathers information from the network and presents it in 
its raw form on a monitor in a TCP dump mode. Its packet acquisition actually depends on 
libpcap and winpcap libraries, libpcap and winpcap are particular policies used in collecting 
traffic from the network. Packet acquisition scrutinises the packet incoming time and computes 
its total duration, it also checks the interface connection type on which the packet was captured. 
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When a packet stream goes around the network, the NIDS listens in then seizes the packets. 
The packet decoder takes packets from various network interfaces, for instance, point-to-point 
protocol, Ethernet, and Serial Link Internet Protocol, Token, Ring, Bus, etc and afterwards sort 
out the entire packets on behalf of pre-processing and detection engines. Snort assess the traffic 
on each link layer and when in doubt about any malicious packet, it starts to create a line up 
for that traffic ( Karim, Vien, Tuan Anh Le, & Mapp, 2017). This process is a straightforward 
one specifically for an Ethernet link. The pre-processing perform numerous functions like 
analysing protocols and their activities for abnormality-based detection, the most important 
pre-processors inside a Snort are packet Defragmentation, Stateful Inspection session and 
application layer. The pre-processor is essentially a program operated to control the raw 
packets and limits them against abnormality-based behaviour, for example, HTTP plug-in 
administers the application at the time of traffic flow and also prevents processing undesirable 
traffic that can initiate an overload taking place in the network. 
The detection engine is an essential part of Snort, which employs different times for different 
spans of packets, therefore time is a necessity. The main goal of the detection engine is to obtain 
data or packets from the pre-processor and harmonises the configuration of the collected packet 
using the database of a specified set of rules. When the configuration harmonises, it 
subsequently generates an alarm against the malicious packet then ceases to work on that 
particular packet. Else, Snort handles the packet as regular traffic and does not produce any 
alarm against it. The alerts or logs are generated subject to the prescribed rule, for example, if 
the rule is of little significance it will result in a low-level alarm. In the NIDP system mode, 
the greater the traffic level that Snort holds on to, the greater the number of packets abandon ( 
Alserhani, et al., 2009). 
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2.6.2 Vulnerability Assessment 
Recent studies on Vulnerability assessment define the process as a  systematic technique of 
identifying security concerns (i.e., vulnerabilities) in a computing device, network, and their 
related communication infrastructures (Harrell, Patton, Chen, & Samtani, 2018). In definition 
related to this write-up, Vulnerability Assessment can be said to be the use of security test 
scanners to identify vulnerabilities, threat and its related risks posed, and the result of the 
scanners are presented in a vulnerability assessment report. 
Currently, vendors such as Tenable (Tenable, 2019), Portswigger (PortSwiggers, 2018), and 
others offer organisations a variety of automated vulnerability assessment tools to support the 
position of their cybersecurity awareness through scanning and reporting of vulnerability 
status. Whereas competencies might differ between vendors, all vulnerability assessment tools 
are basically made up of two very functionalities that are scanning and reporting. The definition 
of each component, according to (Harrell, Patton, Chen, & Samtani, 2018) is presented below: 
A Scanner is a software used to examine the architecture of a network, reports on the detected 
vulnerabilities, and in some cases give instructions on remediating the error 
The Report presents a summary interpretation of the systems and their corresponding findings. 
Information on  IP address, risk rankings, vulnerability description, and solutions are contained 
within the reports. Figure 2.13, below gives a representation of a network vulnerability 
assessment definitions 
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Figure 2. 11 Vulnerability scanning and Reporting representation. 
The different type of known vulnerability assessment scans types include: 
 Network-based scans; work to recognise possible network security attacks. This form of 
scan is able to detect weak systems on wired and wireless networks. (Tenable, 2019) 
 Wireless network scans; usually scans an organization's Wi-Fi networks emphasising 
particularly on point of attack accessible to the wireless network infrastructure. (Kavado, 
2019) 
 Application scans; this is used to scan websites so as to detect known software 
vulnerabilities and any weak configurations within a network or web applications. 
(OWASP, 2018; Sanctum Inc, 2018) 
 Database scans; is used to recognise the weak points in a database for the prevention of 
malicious attacks, for example, SQL injection attacks (Kaiyu, Xiao, Wei, & Dequan, 2019). 
Below is a description of the universally accepted vulnerability assessment tools 
2.6.2.1 Nexpose 
This is said to be the most efficient vulnerability management tool used in giving consistent 
and timely results of findings according to (Rapid7, 2018). It aims to identify, measure and 
55 
 
mitigate the security risk level of networks revealed as exposure by vulnerabilities, 
misconfigurations and security policy violations, It can also be used to analyse malware in an 
IT environment which manages different operating systems, databases and web applications. 
It interacts with the user through a web browser and uses an attack generating tool known as 
Metasploit (Allodi & Massacci, 2014) to exploit vulnerabilities and calculate its criticality 
using CVSS(Keramati, 2017). 
2.6.2.2 OpenVAS 
OpenVAS is an open-source vulnerability assessment tools used in scanning and managing       
Vulnerabilities develop by Greenbone. Its definition according to (Greenbone Vulnerability 
Management (GVM) Solution, 2018; OpenVAS, 2018), is presented below; 
 It supports different operating systems 
 It can be term as an-inclusive vulnerability assessment tool recognising issues concerned 
to security in devices of a network 
 Its engine is updated on a regular basis by the Network Vulnerability Tests, and it free of 
charge 
 It mostly certified under GNU General Public License (GPL) 
2.6.2.3 Wireshark 
Wireshark is a comprehensive and powerful network protocol tool. 
 It best used to analyze the networks at a minute level 
 It picks up the problem  online and the analysis is executed offline 
 It can run on different programs such as Linux, macOS, Windows, Solaris (Beale & Berris, 
2018). 
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2.6.2.4 Nessus Professional 
Nessus tool is an exclusive and patented vulnerability scanner built by Tenable Network 
Security, The definition of its task according to (Tenable, 2019; Security, 2014), is presented 
below; 
 It blocks the networks on or after the penetrations caused by hackers by evaluating the first 
vulnerabilities discovered. 
 It is able to scan the vulnerabilities which allow remote hacking of sensitive data from a 
device. 
 It supports almost all known operating systems, Databases, applications and a number of 
other devices among virtual and physical networks. 
 It can be said to be the most widely used vulnerability assessment tool by users for both 
vulnerability assessment and configuration issues. 
Nevertheless, the assessment of unidentified vulnerabilities is done by Identifying the visibility 
of a systems attack, this can be organised into categories such as Detectible attack, Detectible 
behaviour and host visibility then Using Invisible attack encounters such as Google Dorking. 
 
2.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, a literature review of related works of Information Security scoring system has 
been discussed in this thesis. An information security vulnerability is measured using a series 
of events and the likelihood of it occurring alongside its consequence, therefore it provides a 
means of assessing the security requirement of both the organisation and its related BYOD 
user, based on the needs of each networks security administration, a series of specific 
suggestions will be generated. It highlighted the major security scoring metric approaches and 
explained the principles of arithmetical calculation of each approach. 
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Despite using measurement as a security analysis tool in detecting security vulnerability level 
and answering the questions associated with BYOD deployment, it has become very important 
for Network administrators to attain a quantitative score value(numerically) rather than 
qualitative results to establish the actual value of risk critically. 
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CHAPTER 3 A BYOD ABSOLUTE SCORE MEASUREMENT 
FRAMEWORK  
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter introduces the BAS Metrics for BYOD vulnerabilities in an organisation’s 
variable. The BAS Metrics is a measurement framework that utilises the design science 
research knowledge, by proposing a novel approach to measure the security level of a BYOD 
system using the vulnerabilities information on a BYOD device and its network as an input. 
The model applies an evaluation process centred on mathematical analysis that generates 
quantifiable measurements to provide security risk level and provide recommendations. Thru 
this information, an organisation can make better decision to strengthen its network, data and 
mitigate the risks introduced whilst adopting BYODs. It begins with a brief introduction in 
section 3.1, followed by the description of the framework, in section 3.2, this includes the 
architecture design and the main components. Finally, section 3.3 summarises the chapter. 
3.1.1 Framework For BYOD Security Level Measurement 
With the significate development of network connectivity, has brought about an increment in 
the number of security attacks on institutions and organisation causing a distraction to their 
business operations. These institutions and organisation allow user-owned mobile devices to 
access their network either in the organisation or outside the organisation, thus BYOD affects 
various parts of people’s life, being education, social or economic with it many benefits, as 
well as vulnerabilities. These Vulnerabilities may be present either in the operation system, 
application software, hardware (personal device or server), system authentication not properly 
setup, or users abuse of a targeted component. An attacker achieves its objective by infiltrating 
the network against both the user and the organization, they exploit on various vulnerabilities 
of the targeted host, therefore it becomes necessary for both users and organisations 
implementing BYOD to be aware of the risk posed by each vulnerability. When these attacks 
occur it can cause critical data loss, Denial of Service attack (DOS) etc., harming both the user 
59 
 
and the organisation. Therefore creating a secure environment for a BYOD system should 
include vulnerability scoring metrics to help identify high damaging vulnerabilities. The 
BYOD vulnerability scoring metrics is a ranking quantitative algorithm that is used to assess 
possible harm facing an organisation by evaluating the severity of the vulnerability and 
referencing it numerically for severity score of each vulnerability. 
There are many networks and software such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems and CVSS 
metric which is being employed by organisations in the discovering and assessment of 
vulnerabilities. However, these approaches lack a better understanding by most computer 
security administrators as to their standard of measuring vulnerability in a BYOD facility. 
Moreover, dynamicity is not considered in a security measurement. This is because, essential 
security tasks, for example, responding to alerts, implementing network forensics, and 
searching mitigation techniques, require security administrator to gather and process a large 
volume of information that is outer the scope of a  BYOD facility. These information’s are 
located online, for instant vulnerability and exploit databases, vendor news, and security blogs, 
and could be unstructured text, therefore can be time-consuming to either patch up or setup 
exposed hardware and software appropriately. The scoring system is used to translate the 
threats and vulnerabilities data into readily used information. Hence, the BAS metrics is a 
security Metric that estimates the security level that a BYOD system is capable to grant. 
This chapter introduces a novel vulnerability measurement scoring metric for the understanding 
of vulnerability information on BYOD facility. The proposed approach has developed a 
framework of a BYOD absolute score (BAS) metrics, the BAS metrics is an integration 
framework for the creation of assessment based measurement system that uses ratings as their 
source of knowledge. The motivation behind this approach is to not only tackle the limitation 
that security administrators sustain on the computation and representation of BYOD systems 
but as well as take into consideration the inconsistency in security policies used in managing 
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vulnerability posed on BYOD employed networks and its users. The BAS architecture takes 
into consideration the cybersecurity lifecycle of an admitted personal device to obtain 
information for its Risk Management. Additionally, to lessen the time taken in its vulnerability 
measurement, the BAS metrics make use of dynamic taxonomy in its security policies 
requirement classification. Its also does not go through all the stages in a security risk 
management framework but concentrates on the monitoring and assessment stages for better 
performance. 
We begin with a quantitative ranking method of taxonomy described as Known attacks. The 
objective of the approach, first of all, is to extract necessary vulnerabilities using a vulnerability 
scanner based network traffic from the nodes of an operating system and integrate with 
information from numerous severity sources such as CVSS score, and user induces score from 
VEA_ability metrics. Integrating this information by means of taxonomy will obtain the ideal 
score. 
Likewise, the second objective is to quantitatively measure the security risk level created from 
the taxonomy of the organisation's variables(Users, Technology and Policy). In order to offer 
appropriate quantitative metrics, two main probability principles approach, The law of total 
probability and inclusion-exclusion probability principle is used to compute the metrics on the 
said variables, that is, Individual users, employed network and department policy. This is to 
prevent the difficulty in vulnerability overload problem and to establish integrity and 
Efficiency. 
On the other hand, NIPD is used to identify and categories unidentified vulnerability based on 
their visibility. Thus Google dorks (commands) is used as a taxonomy of unidentified 
vulnerabilities in reference to their attributes. The final objective is to put forward a set of rules 
in a Snort NIDPS signature database which is used to score the BYOD unidentified 
vulnerability. A case study involving a BYOD employed organisation have been used to 
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evaluate the system and to improve its accuracy, as is shown in greater detail in the evaluation 
chapter. The goal of this work is to increase the efficiency and conformity of the scoring metric 
by considering all variable (User, Organisation policy and Technology) in an employed BYOD 
system. 
Figure. 3.1 below, shows the order for BYOD variable features, which consists of six classes: 
Variable class, Goal class, Composition class, Measurement reliability, Division and 
measurement Instant. 
 
Figure 3. 1  BAS Metrics Identified Classes 
I. Variable Class 
The metrics calculation is done using an organisation variable this is done considering both the 
physical (technology) and user security. 
a) The physical security includes the protection of an organisations assets such as 
information, hardware and software from threats 
b) User security comprises the protections of BYOD engaged users. 
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II. Goal class. 
The expectant result of this quantitative metrics is to measure: 
a) Conformity of the security policies, procedures and standard of a BYOD employed 
organisational focus. An example is the metric sum of personnel with passwords in 
conformity with the password security policy. 
b) Efficiency metrics quantify how well security solutions implemented are actually 
performing their assign task of responding to a security vulnerability. 
III. Composition Class 
It is the represented structure of the security metrics framework in question, this represents the 
organisation variable class being weighed thru a formal mathematical model. The metric is 
created from the examination of a system model. Parameters are entered (input) which include 
data from an Intrusion Detection System device (IDS) and vulnerability scanner and generate 
as output the required mathematical model based absolute value. 
IV. Measurement Reliability 
The BAS measurement reliability is Objective metrics. Thus, the extent to which data is 
unbiased, fair and impartial. That is, using the same method but different human users produced 
the same output 
V. Division Class 
The BYOD security is a quantitative metrics which is express as a cardinal number (  counting 
just how much something there are) or percentage. 
VI. Measurement Instant 
The operations of a BAS metrics under the variable class performs in Dynamic or run-time, 
both its monitoring and access. 
The BAS metrics framework has been built for situations where there is a need for personal 
devices and its user being assigned unto the BYOD platform are scrutinized to identify their 
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security risk levels. In its scope, the term security risk level is defined by the degree of severity 
and each vulnerability is scored by selecting appropriate factors that fit the BYOD 
organisations variables. The framework is adaptable as it can be personalised to any particular 
domain so far as it meets the measurement reliability class condition of having 'objectively' 
relevant items. 
3.2 Outline Design 
All these class mentioned in section 3.1. will impact on the score of each identified variable 
and the security requirement of each organisation. Hence this work has been presented with 
this relevant viewpoint. The proposed BYOD Absolute Score metrics (BASmetric) framework 
focuses on quantitatively ranking the security risk level of both an organisation and its BYOD 
user by integrating probability theory and period based metrics with support from security 
attribute taxonomy. This metrics is for measuring vulnerabilities and aimed to quantify an 
organisation and its BYOD systems vulnerabilities through their security attributes, host-level 
(operating system ) vulnerabilities. 
The framework BAS metric is consist of two-component, the first is constructed on known 
vulnerabilities and the second component is constructed on unidentified vulnerabilities. We 
begin the framework with an explanation of Data Gathering in section 3.3 and allocated into 
the first component (Known vulnerabilities), this is expressed in section 3.3.1, and in two 
layers. The first layer is the vulnerability scanning process, where vulnerabilities are identified 
and the second layer is the measurement layer, where the scoring procedure is finalised. The 
second component(Unknown vulnerabilities) is expressed in section 3.3.2 which look at the 
likelihood of BYOD variables being abused by an unidentified vulnerability leading to their 
exploitation. All the vulnerability data collected on a BYOD network are shown in  Figure.3.2 
below. 
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Figure 3. 2 A BYOD employed Network 
As shown in Figure.3.2, above. The BYOD network is employed by five (5) departments that 
are part of a bigger organisation located in England (United Kingdom). These are further split 
into network nodes with each node representing an accessible BYOD host. This is for an easy 
measure of the security risk level scored as a result of discovered (known) vulnerabilities. Data 
were taken from February to September 2017 employing Nessus version 7.0.1. Also, the 
vulnerability description is defined based on Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE). 
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Calculations were done with Microsoft Office Excel 2016. The discovered vulnerabilities are 
appropriated into account. This is further elaborated in the experiment in chapter 4.0. 
Subsequently, calculated by means of two probabilistic principles, a metric is built with user 
induced rule of theVEA_ability metrics and the defined probability to produce a BAS metrics 
score. 
3.2.1 BYOD Absolute  Outline 
A block diagram of the proposed BYOD Absolute Outline is displayed in Figure 3.3 below. 
 
Figure 3. 3 BYOD Metrics Procedure 
The process as illustrated in Figure 3. 3 above, displays all the participating processes that are 
involved in calculating the BAS metrics vulnerability score. The working architecture can be 
used for vulnerabilities identification, evaluation and response behaviour of a BYOD system 
without compromising its participating network. This method is applied here, for the 
calculation of vulnerability impact in the BYOD organisations variable and predicting the 
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likelihood of new threats and vulnerability level. Therefore the BYOD absolutes score which 
signifies the severity, for each variable is calculated using the average of the impact and 
temporal scores by the formula in Eqn. (3.10) 
 
 
𝑆 =
𝐼𝑠 + 𝑇𝑠
2
 
 (3.10) 
 
BYOD absolutes value of the vulnerability represented by 
The Temporal score(Ts) and Impact score(Is) are assigned by the CVSS value (Scarfone & 
Mell, 2009) value of the known vulnerability, which is then used to obtain the severity(S) of 
the vulnerability. 
Temporal score(Ts) = the input of  data by a user variable 
𝐼𝑠 = CVSS impact scores of related NESSUS data. 
There the Vulnerability level  is given by 
𝐵𝐴𝑆(𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑠) = 𝑆 + %Impact value                                                            (3.11) 
The configuration of the framework allows factors to be substituted without any additional 
amendments needed to other parts of the layers. For example, the security attribute of an 
organisation variable can be tailored to meet the security requirement and ranked appropriately, 
provided all the needed data needed in the measurement procedure is provided. 
3.2.2 Probability Measure 
In this phase, a practical statistical model is used in predicting the results of the experiments 
from the designated network occurrence if the subsequent two requirements are met. Firstly, 
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the applicable variables and their properties are reflected in the model. Secondly, the properties 
of the model should be mathematically reliable and generate a practicable evaluation. 
Modelling of the statistical measure is described using three conceptual entities namely sample 
space, event, and probability measure (Kobayashi, Mark, & Turin, 2011). 
1. Sample space: is the numerical collection of all likely experimental outcomes known 
as the sample space which is symbolised by (Ω). Additionally, entities which are within 
the (Ω) is referred to as sample point and symbolised in this research as (𝑛). Thus, 
individual sample point corresponds to a probable outcome of the experiment. 
Example; three probable outcomes of an experiment is represented in a sample space 
as Ω = {𝑛1, 𝑛2,, 𝑛3}. Furthermore, to measure the likelihood of exploiting the 
vulnerability on a host( BYOD employed technology), ideally, the generated result can 
stand between zero and infinity. So, symbolised as  Ω = {𝑛: 0 ≤ 𝑛 <  ∞}. 
2. Event: illustrates a set of sample points, this normally expressed in capital letters, such 
as B. Hence, Event  Ω = 𝐵𝑛(a set of outcome). Equally,  𝐵𝑛 = {𝑛: 0 ≤ 0 < ∞}. 
3. Probability measure: This is the apportioning of an actual number to an event described 
on Ω. The probability of an event B (a set of outcome) is symbolised by P(B). 
3.2.2.1 Axiom of Probability 
Two principles of probability were used in this approach, that is multiplication and Intersection 
principles. 
a) Proof of Probability Principle 
In this research, we are dealing with the collective set of experimental results. Although to 
determine the probability of event A, it is sometimes suitable to distinguish all possible 
occurrence leading to Event A. But, a probability involving a collective set of results A and B 
occurring simultaneously called joint event this is symbolised by P(A, B) (Kolmogorov, 1963) 
is used in treating a compound experiment. This is considered with one set having a possible 
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outcome of {𝐴𝑚 ∶𝑚  =1,2,3,⋯} and the additional also with possible outcomes of {𝐵𝑛 : 𝑗 =
1,2,3, ⋯ } and can be measured as a single experiment comprising the collection of possible 
outcomes  {𝐴𝑚, 𝐵𝐽} , Hence, applying the measure 𝐵𝑛 to discrete random variables {𝐵𝑛 : 𝑗 =
1,2,3, ⋯ } is accountable  as  0≤P(B)≤1. Also, the rule on joint probability can be generalised 
for  event B that is 𝐵1, 𝐵2 … , 𝐵𝑛 thru the iterations of joint probability P(A∩B) = P(A|B)*P(B)  
to define the  Multiplication principle and intersection principle, supposing 𝐵1 ∩ 𝐵2 ∩ … , 𝐵𝑗 ≠
∅, 𝑗 = 1,2, . . 𝑛. This is shown in  Table 3.1 of applied principles below. 
 
Multiplication rule Intersection principle 
𝑷(𝑨) = 𝑷[𝑨|𝑩𝟏][𝑩𝟏] + ⋯
+ 𝑷[𝑨|𝑩𝒏][𝑩𝒏] 
 
P(𝑩𝟏 ∩ 𝑨)  + 𝑷(𝑩𝟐 ∩ 𝑨)  + ⋯ 𝑷(𝑩𝒏 ∩ 𝑨) 
 
 
Table 3. 1 Table of applied principles 
3.3 Data Gathering 
In the same manner, the data gathering is also in two phases, the first phase is captured for the 
known vulnerabilities whilst the second phase is captured for the unidentified Vulnerabilities. 
This is further elaborated in section 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 respectively. 
3.3.1 Known Vulnerability 
As it was decided that the known vulnerability variable class is made up of the organisation's 
user and technology, therefore the main formats of information that is needed to be gathered to 
support this metric are internally generated. Fortunately, all of this information can be captured 
through open-source applications that are publicly available. For example, the likelihood of a 
user leaving their device unattended, random application installation and access to open free 
Wi-Fi network, exposes the organisation to harm. However, using a vulnerability scanner to 
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capture this information is considered the first layer in a security assessment. Extracting precise 
information from the open-source application on a whole network is always a challenging task 
in network security management, so the network will be treated as a node whilst the connected 
mobile devices and its operating system are the host. The individual user and operating system 
in a department represent the variables connected to a BYOD network. These are scanned to 
identify vulnerabilities using the Nessus vulnerability scanner, the scanning process is shown 
below in Figure 3.4. 
 
 
Figure 3. 4 Vulnerability scanning process 
3.3.1.1 Probability of vulnerability exploited 
First, we determine the severity of the host vulnerability by measuring the likelihood of 
exploiting an individual vulnerability on a host. This is achieved by using two probability 
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principles. For instance if, A is the subject of each individual node and 𝐵𝑛  is the measurable 
event annotated by probability theory? For each theory  {𝐵𝑛 : 𝑛 = 1,2,3, ⋯ } is the countably 
infinite partition of a sample space in vulnerability situations. It can be computed using the law 
of total probability algorithm as shown in Eqn 3.12 
𝑃(𝐴) = ∑𝑛𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵𝑛)                                                                                             (3.12) 
Where  𝐵𝑛  = measurable vulnerability situation and 𝑃(𝐴) is the probability subject of 
Individual host on each department. With the same interpretation, the principle of inclusion 
and exclusion is used to compute the totality in the rank of the measurable event  as shown in 
Eq.3.13 
𝑃(𝐴) = ∑ (−1)𝑘+1𝑛𝑘=1 (∑ P(𝐵𝑗1  ∩  𝐵𝑗2… ∩ 𝐵𝑗𝑘  )1≤j1<⋯<jk≤n )                                      (3.13) 
where K signifies the ith situation of a host in the department’s network. The probability value 
of the metric serves as an input for computing the vulnerability score. The output of this phase 
is a percentage value term as the absolute score which will be used BAS metric. Additionally, 
it is used as a control to check the validity of the organisations variable (user, security attribute, 
operating system, etc). If it is authorised, it is parsed, thereby the user and its device continue 
to stay in the BYOD, otherwise, it will be blocked. Modelling a  security framework that 
monitors individual department and ranks it numerically reduces the time taken to enforce the 
security solutions. 
3.3.2 Unidentified vulnerability 
This phase is used to measure the likelihood of BYOD variables being abused by an 
unidentified vulnerability leading to their exploitation. Network Intrusion Detection and 
Prevention System (NIDPS) is used to identify and categories unidentified vulnerability based 
on their visibility. Thus, Google dorks search operator list is used as a taxonomy of unidentified 
vulnerabilities in reference to their attributes. the detailed version of this component is 
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explained in chapter 4. This component is in three stages, the first examines the noted 
unidentified attacks, Stage two is to establish the risks of vulnerability in a BYOD variable by 
using the OWASP risk rating methodology and based on a security attribute. The final stage is 
the BAS metric referred to in Equation (3.10) and (3.11). 
3.3.2.1 Unidentified Vulnerability(Instance) 
Likewise, it was decided that the unidentified vulnerability class is made up of attacker 
activities which are generally presumed to be lawful. Thus, this attack has nothing to do with 
network security systems. For example, the transmission of information between two 
computing devices is completely an acceptable policy. However, sending data from one mobile 
device will be considered unlawful if the preceding operation is a brute force attack on the root 
passwords. Google dork is one of such well known invisible attacks. Fig 3.5 shows the interface 
of the google advance search which is used in the Google Dorking. 
 
 
Figure 3. 5 Google advanced search interface 
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Google Dorking also referred to as Google hacking, involves using advance search command 
to locate the needed strings of text about a device connected to an organisations network  
(Wilhoit, 2013; Gupta & Dhami, 2015). In a social engineering situation where an intruder 
follows the activities of its victim and gathers sensitive information with the help of the Google 
advanced search. As a result of ineffective systems design, search engines can collect more 
information than necessary while moving thru the web with the help of a search operator to 
exploit insecure websites. Table 3.2 shows the records of likely operators for various search 
services used to create invisible Vulnerabilities. 
Service Search operator 
Groups 
 
 
 
 
 
intext, allintext, author, allintitle, intitle, insubject, group. 
 
 
 
 
Web service filetype, allinanchor, inanchor, site, intext, intext, inurl, related, allintext, 
allintitle, allinurl, cache, define, id, info, intitle, phonebook. 
News 
service 
intext, intitle, inurl, allintitle, allintext, source, allinurl, location. 
Directory filetype, ext, allintext, intext, inurl, intitle, allintitle, allinur 
Image 
Search 
site, allinurl, allintitle, intitle, filetype, inurl, 
Product 
Search 
allintitle, allintext 
 
Table 3. 2 Likely Search Service Operators 
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The Google search engine has been used as a tool in exploiting vulnerability because a greater 
number of security countermeasures do not consider this form of attack. The procedure 
involved in data collection in the google hacking process is displayed in Table 3. 3, below. 
 
Google Advance Search 
 
 
Results Encrypted Username and User_ID 
 
 
 
Information decipher tool: Password decrypted 
 
 
Results Username and Password in plain text 
 
 
 
Access exposes system with complete right 
 
 
Result can Alter, steal or delete information 
Table 3. 3 Google Hacking Process 
Using the attack example illustrated in table 3.2 above indicates ways by which a well scripted 
and executed query in Google advanced search engine is used to fetch that sensitive 
information made up of usernames and passwords. Thus the attained information is decrypted 
quickly with the help of a decipher tool and further exploited in generating attacks. Though the 
user is unlawful it may seem lawful to the network, thus making the implemented security 
countermeasures on the network inadequate.this is captured by the BAS metrics as an 
unidentified vulnerability. 
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3.3.2.2 Unidentified attacks 
There has been an increment in the Vulnerabilities uncovered by search engines rapidly, hence, 
it is necessary to analyse these attacks specifically. Using their characteristics, theses invisible 
attacks are categorised into ten (10) groups as shown given in Table 3. 4 
 
Number Attacks Number of Commands 
1 Pages contain login portal 129 
2 Existing login websites 116 
3 Blogs / Forums 37 
4 Files having username and passwords in plain 
text 
25 
5 Error code message (Code 34) 8 
6 Phishing emails 16 
7 Files having username and passwords in 
encrypted form 
32 
8 Social attacks 5 
9 Sensitive directories or files containing 
interesting information 
134 
10 Plug-ins 4 
Table 3. 4 Taxonomy of invisible attack 
Table 3.4 shows a taxonomy of invisible attacks which came by as a result of the vulnerability 
factors not identified. This attacks will be scrutinised further in chapter 4, to ascertain the 
vulnerability impact level and subsequently, the BAS metrics for the unidentified vulnerability 
scored. 
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3.4 Chapter Summary 
This chapter presents details of the proposed BYOD absolute score metrics (BAS metrics). The 
BAS metrics framework is a combination of different component of an individual metric which 
are essential to achieve an effective working framework, these metrics are selected based on 
their network configuration and security requirements. The proposed framework supports the 
quantitative modelling of security risk levels of an employed BYOD network and its users. The 
defined approach is designed to provide monitoring references to the organisation and their 
users based on the numerical scoring profile of its variables for easy ranking and trustfulness. 
Two Probability theory is used to compute the absolute score for an individual department, 
individual users and the entire network as a solution for information overloading. Known 
vulnerabilities which were obtained from the network is the principal factor in this security risk 
metrics calculation. Factors influencing the source of a vulnerability such as Unknown 
vulnerabilities and human user factors are those vulnerabilities which permit an intruder to use 
them as access points to a network. For example, is possible for a web-services running on a 
host to be the exact targets for an intruder to compromise a network. 
Also, BAS metrics is a novel, systematic classification model which support the solution to the 
quantitative scoring of vulnerability level of a BYOD system both an organisation and its users 
which relates to the problems of offering high-quality quantitative ranking measurement to 
BYOD security administrator. Therefore its foundation is built on quantitative representation, 
measurement and indexing of security situation information and presents integrated elements 
shared across metrics. 
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CHAPTER 4 TAXONOMY OF BYOD VULNERABILITY SEVERITY MODEL 
4.1 Introduction 
In a BYOD employed environment, every single mobile device happens to be locatable, 
addressable and accessible. While more organisations are accepting in the emergent of this 
phenomenon for various reasons as explained in chapter 2, The BYOD employed network is 
expected to contain a number of entities which will communicate amid each other as well as 
with other objects. These do not only consist of the physical device, that is mobile phones and 
laptops which are the means to the networks, but also variables such as organisations security 
attribute and users. The diversity of devices and technologies used in delivering these services 
has a huge impact on interoperability and security measurement. Finding the appropriate 
quantitative security measures for security analysis based on BYOD has become a challenging 
assignment. Security scoring metrics represent a likely approach by which to tackle 
vulnerability overload. Whiles security metrics have been used for the analysis of the security 
risk level in the same field, the various metrics may result in approximating the scale types of 
security risk analysis in BYOD. Therefore a predictive score which ranks each vulnerability 
based on the likelihood it will be leveraged in an attack is used to solve the approximation 
problem. 
There are numerous influences trade-off struggle between security and efficiency in 
implementing an effective vulnerability monitoring system as mentioned in chapter 2 and 
efficient business operations practices could be equally omitted. The numerical representation 
improved security risk potential examining process, by using information from various metrics 
and integrated into attaining a comprehensive score with which to respond to a system’s 
Variable (People, Technology and Organisational Policy). Likewise, modelling security 
metrics quantitatively is one of the main aims of applying the BYOD security risk level 
categorising. This chapter describes in detail both the comprehension of the categorisation 
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model and the vulnerability evaluation procedures that have been used in BAS metrics and 
exactly how the approach can tackle vulnerability overloading and numerical scoring problem 
experience by BYOD organisations and users. In the categorisation section, a new approach is 
presented to quantifies the percentage of hosts on a network using different probabilistic 
principles for both law of total probability (individual department) and inclusion-exclusion 
probability (entire network). Also, an algorithm is proposed to illustrate the concepts of 
comprehensive scoring metric. The recorded information is entered as an input in the 
vulnerability scoring metrics. BAS metrics attempt to solve the issue of security and efficiency 
experience by BYOD employed organisation and their users. In this thesis, two vulnerability 
taxonomy has been collected to support the proposed approach. Firstly, the known vulnerability 
and  secondly the unidentified vulnerability 
The second input support in this chapter discusses in depth the principle been proposed for 
assessing the stages involved in measuring the unidentified vulnerability level of a BYOD user 
based on security attributes. A file on Google dork commands is built from the NIDS filtering 
approach which recognises unidentified attacks. The OWASP mapping tools/ metrics are 
utilised to enhance the unidentified vulnerability algorithm. Furthermore, using OWASP 
classification metrics in the BYOD vulnerability scoring system helped to increase the security 
requirement made up of Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability(CIA) of an employed 
BYOD system to its users. 
This chapter is organised as follows; The framework is introduced earlier in Section 4.1. 
Section 4.2 provides the experiment's operation and the result of the known vulnerabilities with 
a full description of its approach. Section 4.3.provides the experiment’s operation and result of 
the unidentified vulnerabilities structure with a full description of its approach. Section 4.4 
summarises the chapter. 
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4.2 Known Vulnerability Analysis 
The collection of known vulnerability into the absolute score process serves as one of the 
answers to overcome the limitations of established security risk metrics systems. A metrics is 
a measurement–based systems which are used to classify a particular process or activity 
quantitative or qualitatively. In technology, security metrics are used as a measure to assess the 
risk level of an organisations security goals and its users. 
The systematic classification in a metrics is used to measure a  BYOD known vulnerability 
information on an employed organisation variable(security policy, technology and users). The 
use of the vulnerability of a system to assess the security risk level of an organisation 
quantitatively helps in the distinctive evaluation procedure, example for example ( Pendleton, 
Garcia-Lebron, Cho, & Xu, 2016), categorises security metrics for measuring the vulnerability 
of a system by quantifying the organisations and its computer systems vulnerabilities by means 
of user’s password, software vulnerabilities, and the vulnerabilities of the use cryptographic 
keys. However, these are supposedly scored or rank according to the security level of distinct 
hosts in the network. By enabling an organisations network structure to be allocated into 
individual network resources help in easy measure of the security risk level produced as a result 
of known vulnerabilities(Homer et al., 2013; Issa-Salwe & Ahmed, 2011). Additionally, 
treating individual host on the network gives it an advantage of evaluating the likelihood of 
exploiting a particular vulnerability within the host by an attacker. 
4.2.1 Principle of  Known Vulnerability structure 
Both commercial and non-commercial vulnerability scanning tools which have been looked at 
in the literature in chapter 2, help to identify network vulnerabilities and their related devices. 
However, these tools only do a fuzzy evaluation, classifying in terms of high, medium and low. 
So, it has become necessary for an absolute number to be achieved in the determination of the 
79 
 
security risk level of an employed BYOD organisation network and its users, hence this 
approach have been adopted and used in the design of this methodology. 
All the useful information related to the BYOD network structure and how useful information 
are collected from the network has been described in chapter 3 section (3.2). These are 
presented as departments. There are 5 main departments dependent on the network with a 
further 15 classes of nodes connected to the departments. In addition, four distinct operating 
systems(host) are run on the identified nodes. Vulnerabilities are identified using the Nessus 
vulnerability scanner (security, 2014). This process defines an organisation variable that is 
technology(operating systems) which is further considered in the metrics. Moreover, the 
scanned results also show the services running on the network 
The scanned data is collected from the network communication traffic both incoming and 
outgoing. A total number of 1567 different vulnerability is collected, this has been deliberated 
in table 4.1 below. 
Hosts Operating System Low Moderate High 
H1 Apple Mac OS X 10.3.9 0 1 0 
H 2 Linux 2.6.18- 308.24.1.e15 12 9 37 
H 3 Microsoft Lumia 950 windows 10 53 76 147 
H4 Android 8.1 Oreo Moto G5 Plus 3 38 185 
H5 Apple IOS 10 IPhone 8 Plus 0 0 30 
H6 Android 8.0 Samsung galaxy s8 /s8 plus 0 10 37 
H7 Apple IOS 10 IPhone 7 Plus 0 0 0 
H8 Microsoft Lumia 950 widows 10 53 76 147 
H9 Apple iPad  IOS 9.3.5 0 0 1 
H10 Apple iPad  IOS 9.3.5 0 0 1 
H11 Androids 7.0 Nougat Samsung Galaxy Note 5 9 14 205 
H12 Apple IOS 12 Phone XS 0 0 0 
H13 Android 8.1 Oreo Moto G5 Plus 3 38 185 
H14 Apple Mac OS X 10.3.9 0 0 0 
H15 Androids Android 7.0 Nougat Samsung Galaxy Note 5 14 9 205 
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Table 4. 1 Vulnerability Data Collected Base on Hosts 
The rate of operating systems being affected most by the known vulnerability collected is taken 
notice of with Andriod having the most vulnerabilities made up of 955 vulnerabilities making 
it the mobile device operating system which is the most vulnerable to attacks. Using a small 
number of vulnerabilities from the Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures (CVE) metrics 
which we listed for some of the Andriod identified vulnerabilities, for example, The Android 
1.0 through 9.0 has security concerns with score via CVE-2018-15835 and in all Android 
releases (Android for MSM, Firefox OS for MSM, QRD Android) via CVE-2018-10753, CVE-
2018-11281, CVE-2018-11278, Android 9, Android ID: A-112661641 CVE-2018-9531 etc 
We categorising the known vulnerabilities into the four distinct operating systems being 
discovered, this is distributed onto the nodes as follows; Apple macOS = Seven (7) nodes, 
Andriod =five (5), Windows = two (2) and Linux OS one (1). A bar chart representing the 
various distinct operating systems(host) and their distribution on the nodes are plotted as shown 
in Figure 4.1below 
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Figure 4. 1 Allocation of Operating System(host) against Nodes 
Furthermore, thirty-six (36)services were discovered to be running on the nodes. The 
description of some of these services and their related nodes has been elaborated  HTTPs 
services is running on all 15 nodes, Google Play services are running on 12 hosts and File 
Transfer Protocol (FTP) is on 10 nodes etc. A bar chart representing the various services and 
their distribution on the nodes is plotted as shown in Figure 4.2 below 
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Figure 4. 2  Allocation Of Host Against Services Type 
Additionally, to help understand the likelihood of the known vulnerability severity impact,  
an allocation of percentage severity impact against distinct nodes is shown by a  pie chart 
based on the result from table 4.1. above. This is described in Figure 4.3 below. 
 
Figure 4. 3 Percentage likelihood Impact chart 
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Figure 4.3 above, presents the allocation of percentage vulnerabilities impact based on distinct 
nodes. This has been labelled as High, Moderate, Low and Non-likely, with the Moderate being 
the most likely severity of impact. This shows an initial estimate to survey the differences and 
similarities of the establish measurement. And in order to organise the models realistically the 
Nodes signify how personal devices(host) interact with the employed network. 
4.2.2 Measurement of Known Vulnerability(Probability) 
Three scenarios are designed to measure the severity level of vulnerability of a present BYOD 
employed organisation, created from real-time information of a system’s variables(Users, 
Technology and Organisational Policy) quantitatively to produce an absolute value. we begin 
by using the letters L, M and H to represent the potential impact of Low, Moderate and High 
severity impact respectively. Although table 4.1 above shows some zero value in the scanned 
data. At this point, we scrub the data that has marked as zero(0).  
Let say Hi stand for the ith Host in the network, then the security level of vulnerability in every 
single department on the assigned network and subsequently the entire network can be 
calculated to achieve an absolute value. The five identified department is labelled as  Payroll, 
Administration, Computing, Finance and Estates and is represented by Pr, Admin, Cp, Fin, Es. 
Thereafter three techniques have been identified by which to model a BYOD security situation 
as follows; 
Technique I: Describes the method used in calculating the probability of attack upon 
Individual users in the department and expressed as Low, Moderate and High. 
Technique II: Describes the method used in calculating the probability of attack upon 
Individual user on a department network characterised by the total of known vulnerabilities. 
Technique III: Describe the method used in calculating the probability of an attack on the 
entire BYOD employed network. 
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4.2.2.1 Technique I 
The probability of an attack on Payroll (𝑃pr), Administration (𝑃Admin), Computing (𝑃com), 
Finance (𝑃Fin) and Estates (PEs) departments is described by means of  Low, Moderate and 
High values from table 4.1. These probabilities are ascertained using the law of total probability 
From the equation (3.12) the probability subject of Individual host on each department 
calculated and their results are shown in Table 4.2 
Formular based on probability 
subject(Department) 
Impact value 
High moderate Low 
𝑃𝑃𝑟 = ∑ 𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵𝑛)
5
𝑛=3
 
 
0.2% 32.6% 0.5% 
𝑃Admin = ∑ 𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵𝑛)
11
𝑛=9
 
 
42% 7.76% 49.8% 
𝑃cp = ∑ 𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵𝑛)
12
𝑛=10
 
 
0 33% 0 
𝑃fin = ∑ 𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵𝑛)
8
𝑛=6
 
 
55.7% 0.38% 43% 
𝑃Es = ∑ 𝑃(𝐴 ∩ 𝐵𝑛)
15
𝑛=14
 
 
0 0 0 
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Table 4. 2  Probability Of Individual Host 
The result as shown from table 4.2  saw that the Payroll department has a 0.2% High (H) and 
Low (L) vulnerability impact values came out (0.5%) which indicates the Payroll department 
is prone to some BYOD employed attacks. But, this is not always true for users in this 
department, as the security risk level with reference to moderate vulnerability impact values is 
32.6%, meaning there is a likelihood for a successful attack against BYOD host on the Payroll 
department. On the other hand, Finance (𝑃Fin) department, has High vulnerability impact value 
of 55.7%, Low of 43% and Moderate impact value of 0.38%, indicating the utmost likelihood 
for a successful attack against BYOD host on the Finance department. Subsequently, the 
Computing department can be said to be secure in terms of High and low to known 
vulnerabilities as they both had (0) in the vulnerability impact value risk level but there is a 
Moderate vulnerability impact of 33% found meaning there a likelihood to attack. The 
Administration (𝑃Admin) department has an utmost vulnerability impact level because all the 
define impact levels of  High, Moderates and Low has been fulfilled with percentage values 
42%, 7.76% and 49.8% correspondingly. Additionally, the Estates (PEs) department from the 
result shows a zero vulnerability impact value, hence this will not be added in the evaluation 
of the  BAS metric. 
4.2.2.2 BAS Metrics Result 
The BAS metrics is a combination of distinct metrics to create novel metrics for BYOD 
organisation variables (for instance, we combine host-based and network-based metrics to form 
Absolutes Percentage score. This is shown in Figure 3.2 ). Therefore the Absolutes Percentage 
score which signifies the severity impact for each department is calculated using the notion of 
average impact and temporal scores using equation (3.10) and the final layer that is BAS metric 
refers to equation (3.11). Table 4.3 below shows the result for the BAS metrics in Percentage. 
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Equation (3.11), for each defined Department %BAS Metrics 
High moderate Low 
𝐵𝐴𝑆(𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑠) = 𝑆 + %Impact value 
 
Payroll 
7.6 7.96 5.25 
𝐴𝑑𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 7.6 7.72 5.74 
Computing 12.6 7.33 2.0 
Finance 8.61 7.33 4.43 
Estate 7.75 7.15 5.05 
                                                    
Table 4. 3 BAS metric Result 
 
4.2.2.2 Technique II 
Describes the method used in calculating the probability of Vulnerability impact upon 
Individual users on a department network characterised by the total of known 
vulnerabilities.values from table 4.1. These probabilities are ascertained using the principle of 
inclusion and exclusion. From the Eqn  3.13,  the probability subject of Individual host on each 
department based on the total of the known vulnerabilities. Table 4.4 shows the percentage 
impact value of total known Vulnerabilities on each host and subsequent BAS Metrics. 
Formular based on probability subject (Departments) %Impact 
value 
BAS metrics using 
Equation. 3.11 
𝑃(pr) =∑ (−1)𝑘+15𝑘=3 (∑ P(𝑁𝑖3  ∩  𝑁𝑖4  ∩3≤i3<i4<i5≤5
 𝑁𝑖5  )) 
0.1% 7.7% 
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𝑃Admin 
 
24.7% 
 
10% 
 
𝑃cp 
 
0.2% 
 
7.8% 
𝑃fin 
 
24.3% 
 
10% 
 
𝑃Es 
 
0 
 
0 
Table 4. 4  Probability of Impact Value and its BAS Metrics in Percentage 
4.2.2.3 Technique III 
Describe the inclusion-exclusion define in Eqn  3.13 in calculating the probability vulnerability 
impact on the entire BYOD employed network and subsequently the BAS metrics of an entire 
network.  
This is identified by EN (BYOD employed network). 
There 𝐸𝑁 = ∑ (−1)𝑘+115𝑘=1 (∑ P(𝑁𝑖1  ∩  𝑁𝑖2 … . .∩ 𝑁𝑖𝑘  )1≤i1<i2…<i𝑘≤15 ) 
E𝑁 = 10% + (BAS Metric for entire network) 
4.2.3 Discussion 
The BAS Metrics calculation results of each building Pr, Admin, Fin, Com, and Es are shown 
in table 4.3 and table 4.4, whilst table 4.2- 4.3 shows the percentage impact value derived from 
the probability principles. Since the percentage value of BAS metrics is in the range [0], [10], 
therefore values beyond 10 are converted to 10. However, for the Percentage impact value, this 
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does not apply as it fellows the probability principle of a countably infinite partition. 
For  the %Impact values: 
 The percentage score of 0 implies the best score since it has the lowest in low, moderate 
and high known vulnerability values 
 The percentage score from 10 onwards indicates the worst security risk level in the low, 
moderate and high known vulnerability values 
For % BAS metric 
 0 signifies the worst value since it has the lowest score of the BYOD variable security. 
 10 signifies the best value since it has the highest score of BYOD variable security. 
4.3 Unidentified Vulnerability Analysis 
This phase is used to measure the likelihood of BYOD variables being abused by an 
unidentified vulnerability leading to their exploitation, and it's in three stages, the first examines 
the noted unidentified attacks, a NIDPS rule is developed to monitor and safeguard the 
organisations BYOD network against vulnerabilities and it related invisible attacks, Stage two 
is to establish the risks of vulnerability in a BYOD variable by using the OWASP risk rating 
methodology and based on a security attribute. The final stage is the BAS metric referred to in 
Eqn  3.10 and 3.11. 
Commercial NIDP tools which have been looked at in the literature in chapter 2, help to identify 
vulnerabilities and their related strategies. Also,  All the useful information related to the 
BYOD network structure and how useful information are collected from the network has been 
describe in chapter 3 section 3.2. An attacking procedure has been illustrated in table 3.2 above, 
this indicates ways by which a well scripted and executed query in Google advanced search 
engine is used to fetch that sensitive information made up of usernames and passwords. Table 
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3.1 in chapter 3 shows the records of likely operators for various search services used to create 
invisible Vulnerabilities 
4.3.1 Principle of Unidentified Vulnerability Structure 
As indicated in chapter 3 section 3.2 the BYOD considers five departments on the network 
structure, namely Aca, Admin, Com, Fin and Hou departments. This has also been used for the 
known vulnerability. Also, information on an Individual department is limited to users within 
that department and specific webserver is employed to satisfy users webpage need. A network 
configuration based on user’s devices policy is shown in Figure 4.4 below, this is used in the 
deliberation for identifying and quantifying the security vulnerability level against invisible 
attacks. 
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Figure 4. 4  User’s Policy on a BYOD network Topology 
Nevertheless, an essential factor to note is that the organisation is unaware of the invisible 
attacks because of the unidentified vulnerabilities. NIDP system is employed in between a 
firewall and the webserver to guard the networks sensitive information, The NIDP is used to 
detect and prohibit harmful intrusion by ensuring a deep examination of the incoming and 
outgoing data packets. 
The introduced  NIDP in the BYOD network topology is the Snort. The Snort is prefered 
because is a signature-based network intrusion and prevention system with adaptable rules that 
can be manipulated to fit any organisations business process. The network also consists of a 
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cisco catalyst series 3650 switch, a 1.0 Gigabit cables and 10 Gigabit cables are used in 
connecting the switch and various devices. A packets size of 128 byte signifying the aggregate 
of data is generated from source to destination. Figure 4.5 below highlights the NIDP object 
on the BYOD network design. 
 
 
 
The NIDP as indicated in Figure 4.5 consist of built-in rules. Yet, the number of built-in rules 
do not determine its potency but the rule that is best in discovering attacks regardless of internal 
design or behaviour. Thus, Additional rules are implemented to capture malicious traffic and 
as a result capture attacks. Snort NIDP systems have a 7600 number of policies packed in its 
database. 
 IDS
Traffic Generator
Traffic Generator
Traffic Generator
Traffic Generator
Traffic Generator
Traffic Generator
switch
Figure 4. 5 NIDP Object on network Test bed 
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4.3.2 Measurement Technique 
The BAS metric is a novel scoring approach for a BYOD system develop by integrating 
available security methodologies. Hence, for the measurement of the unidentified 
vulnerabilities related to a BYOD system an OWASP risk rating methodology is first used to 
rate the likelihood of a vulnerability. 
Furthermore, three Stages have been identified by which to model a BYOD scoring metrics for 
unidentified vulnerability  situation as follows; 
 The first stage, NIDPS rule is developed to monitor and safeguard the organisations BYOD 
network against vulnerabilities, this is used to examines unidentified attacks. 
 Stage two is the establishment of the likelihood of vulnerability in a BYOD variable by 
using the OWASP risk rating methodology and based on a defined security attribute. 
 The final stage is the BAS metric referred to in equation (3.10) and (3.11). 
4.3.3 The first stage (Develop NIDPs rules to examine unidentified attacks) 
In the case of the first stage, the identification and mitigation of the vulnerability of invisible 
attacks on the BYOD organisations network is examined. By means of Google advanced search 
engine, numerous Google dork commands are generated. During the cause of the study, 
confidential information such as Student ID, Password, Contact details and Exam score of the 
academic department is disclosed by Google dorks, to safeguard this information a signature-
based NIDP system is positioned in between the firewall and web server as shown in the BYOD 
network topology in Figure 4.5 above. The essential objective of the firewalls is to deter access 
to particular services by operating as security personnel at the entrance of the network. 
Therefore, in the meanwhile, a NIDP system is adopted to Identify and register any effort of 
an unlawful intrusion attempt. It operates by conducting a profound scrutiny of data flow 
behind the firewalls. As mentioned in section 4.3.1, snort is the NIDP systems used for this 
research. Its flexibility and straightforward rule description language features make it a better 
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choice for this study, meaning Snort allows it, users to write down specific rules (policy) to 
filter the network traffic and mitigate invisible attacks. Figure 4.6, below shows the snort rule 
developed and tested and further stored in its database and applied as a rule 
Figure 4. 6  Snort rules (policy) 
As shown in Fig 4.6, a specific NIPD system rule policy can be divided into two sections: 
1) Rule header; The section in the blue write-up represents the Rule header. The rule header 
essentially describes the packet’s “who”, “where” and “what”, then offers the specifics 
regarding the packet response. 
2) Rule options; The section surrounded in parenthesis is the rule options, whiles text ahead of 
the colons in the rule options part is dubbed option keywords. 
The rule's action, protocol, source and destination IP address, and source and destination ports 
should be part of the rule header. The rule action, being the first field of the rule header directs 
the NIDP system towards the appropriate function upon locating a packet that meets its policy 
criteria. By default, five action rules are available in the chosen NIDP system. With every rule 
action explaining definite behaviour as follows; 
Alert; causes an alert then logs the packet 
Log; logs the packet 
Pass; disregard the packet 
Activate; alerts and triggers the dynamic rule 
Dynamic; stays idle until activated by an activation rule, then functions as a log rule 
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In this first stage, the executed action is “Alert” this is very important because it is the objective 
of every network administrator to know the security condition of their network instantly for 
immediate action. The next field expressed in the rule header is protocol. Presently, the chosen 
NIDP system is able to scrutinise traffic for TCP, UDP and ICMP protocols for dubious 
descriptions. In the developed rule, the TCP protocol is used. It does not require the 
specification of source/destination IP and source/destination port numbers since the detail rule 
is in charge of monitoring traffic that is coming in and going out of any personal machine. The 
Alert messages and packet units being examined are illustrated in the rule options, this involves 
contents that the packet information would record for the packet to be highlighted as malicious. 
In this case, should a packet include some Google dork operators such as filetype, allintext and 
allintitle within the message contents, then NIDP system will signal the administrator via a 
generated message formed in the subsequent field of the rule options section? The additional 
fields in the rule option units are thresholds, which indicates interval alerts. Regarding the 
created rule, an alert is formed every two (2) minutes for the type limit. Figure 4.7, below shows 
the generated alert based on the specified rule for a Google dork operation on the network 
 
Figure 4. 7  an illustrated alert obtained once as a test case 
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After adding the generated rule to the NIDP system rules database it assesses the Organisation's 
variable (Network and user) against invisible attacks, particular commands are produced, 
which are discovered by the implemented organisations NIDP system as shown in Figure 4.7, 
the results accomplished in stage one (1) indicates that by establishing a rule within the NIDP 
system, a network is able to be protected against invisible attacks. Chapter 3, Table 3.3 shows 
the taxonomy of the invisible attacks collected as a result 
4.3.4  Stage Two; The Establishment of probable vulnerability in a BYOD environment 
It is vital to establish the risks and facts of vulnerability in a BYOD system. However, it has 
become important to assess the attack associated with the organisation quantitatively. For this 
reason, the OWASP risk rating methodology is utilised to assess the vulnerability security level 
of the department of an organisation against invisible attacks. The OWASP tool has been 
chosen for this research because of its simplicity and capability towards the challenges being 
faced by web application. Thus, due to its features, numerous security administrators and 
security designers prefer using it. 
In the BYOD situation, coming from the viewpoint of an attacker, an attacker takes advantage 
of an organisation's unidentified vulnerabilities by using the Google advanced search engine to 
develop invisible attacks which takes an organisation's confidential information. The BYOD 
risk methodology is made up of three (3) phases, and it’s illustrated as follows; 
1. Phase I Risk Identification 
The first phase of the risk model involves the identification requirement being rated. Because 
a system administrator gathers information concerning threat agents, vulnerabilities, attacks 
plus their impacts on an organisation. For the purpose of the BYOD employed department, the 
threat agents are the organisation variable (students and staff). This group use their mobile 
devices to access information from the organisation variable(Network). The vulnerabilities 
detected in this circumstance is the username and password, these can be exploited by the threat 
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agents to accomplish their goal. But, for the purpose of this study Google dorks is considered 
as a threat to BYOD service whilst the agent is the organisation variable (students and staff). 
2. Phase II Features for assessing likelihood 
Factors that influence the assessment of vulnerability likelihood are further categorised into 
two: 
1) Threat agent features = Students and staff  being BYOD users 
2) Vulnerability features. For example, Aca (L) = the choice in the likelihood factors, where 
“P” = the specific attribute and “L” = likelihood of impact level 
a. Threat agent features 
Threat agents are identified as an individual attacker or a group of attackers that essentially 
produces incidence. Additionally, the factors(features) required in the framework of a threat 
agent to assess the probability of a fruitful attack are skills level, motivational level, opportunity 
and size of the threat. So, the vulnerability impact value related to each characterised threat 
agent features labelled A1 to A4 is deliberated below; 
AI) Skill level 
This indicates the attacker’s ability to exploit the vulnerabilities of the system. Diverse 
selection on threat agent’s skills are given below. 
No technical skills (1) 
Some technical skills (2) 
Advanced computer user (5) 
Network and programming skills (6) 
Security penetration specific (8) 
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Featuring this specific scenario, “Some technical skills” is a better choice to weight on, since 
it does not necessitate any penetration, programming or advanced skill to retrieve vulnerability 
of the network. 
A2)  Motive 
Motive signifies the level of interest of threat agents exploiting the weaknesses of the network 
system. 
Low or no reward (2) 
Possible reward (3) 
High reward (9) 
Selecting the “Possible reward (4)” option from the list is suitable because usually, threat agents 
ask questions about an organisations information during exploration. This is an information 
collection phase. Therefore, the documented information is used for assessing the value related 
to the possible attack on the company. Since the organisation under deliberated is not secure; 
therefore, the gathered information could be composed to access systems having company 
financial data and its resources. 
A3) Opportunity 
Opportunity summaries the resources needed for an attacker to control and exploit the 
vulnerable components of the network. 
Full access or expensive access required (0) 
Special access or resources (2) 
Some access or resources required (8) 
No access or resources required (7) 
98 
 
“Some access or resources required (8)” is a better option to choose from the specified choices 
as the threat agent barely needs to access the invisible attacks by exploiting time, Internet and 
a suitable Google dork commands. 
A4) Population size 
The population size defines the number of people participating in causing the attack, in addition 
as exploiting the vulnerability of the system. 
Intranet users (3) 
Partners (5) 
Authenticated users (5) 
Anonymous Internet users (9) 
“Anonymous Internet user (9)” is a better option to emphasis on since severity risk assessment 
is related to the Internet particularly from outside the network. 
b. Vulnerability Factors 
The aim of this feature is to predict the probability of detecting and exploiting particular system 
vulnerabilities. Let’s assume an attacker has adequate knowledge on the use of Google dork 
operators and understands how to develop a command from these operators so as to query 
particular vulnerabilities. 
The factors that influence the detection, as well as exploitation of the system vulnerability, are 
labelled from B1 to B4 below. 
B1) Ease of discovery 
Different vulnerabilities come with different detection levels which is influenced by the 
attacker’s skill in addition to the tools essential in creating potions. The Following are the range 
of options used to establish how to discover a vulnerability. 
Not relevant (0) 
99 
 
Practically impossible (1) 
Demanding (2) 
Easy (5) 
Automated tools available (8) 
The appropriate option to select is the “Easy (5)” because it has become simple to detect 
vulnerability by Google dork operators and does not require any other device or sophisticated 
skills. 
B2) Ease of Exploit 
Having detected the vulnerability, it has become necessary to measure how easy to apply it in 
order to compromise the system. 
Not relevant (0) 
Theoretical (2) 
Demanding (4) 
Easy (5) 
Automated tools available (9) 
Because the information uncovered during the research is very sensitive and can be exploited 
by threat agents to gain entrance into different organisations network resources easily, 
therefore, “Easy (5)” is the appropriate option to select from the listed options. 
 
B3) Awareness 
This factor explains in what way the attacker knows the vulnerability. 
Not relevant (0) 
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Unknown (2) 
Hidden (4) 
Obvious (5) 
Public knowledge (8) 
“Hidden (4)” option is the best choice among the selected vulnerability detected via 
Google dorks. 
B4) Intrusion detection 
This factor assesses intrusion based on the exploitation of vulnerability by the system Intrusion 
detection countermeasures. 
Not relevant (0) 
Active discovery in application (2) 
Logged and reviewed (2) 
Logged without review (9) 
Not logged (8) 
Table 4. 5 and  Table 4. 6  shows the Threat agent factor and vulnerability factors with their 
selected options. 
Threat agent factor Selected options 
Skill level Some technical skills(2) 
Motive Possible reward (3) 
Opportunity some access or resource required(8) 
Population size Anonymous internet user(9) 
Table 4. 6 Threat factors and their selected options 
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Vulnerability factors Impact 
Easy of discovery Easy (5) 
Ease of Exploit Easy (5) 
Awareness Hidden (4) 
Intrusion detection Logged without review (9) 
Table 4. 7 vulnerability factors and their selected options 
3. Phase III Factors for Assessing Impact 
Once vulnerabilities are exploited, the BYOD employed network with its resources is exposed 
to harmful factors, Therefore measuring the impact of an attack on the organisation or user 
level is necessary. These factors are discussed and measured based on the user level. 
Using the expression  P (L) to signify option in the impact factors. 
Where  P= specific feature, 
L=describes the impact level 
Hence, the impact value level is assessed based taxonomy below; 
A) Technical Impact value Factors 
This impact value factor defines the influence of the attack on the organisation variable. By 
means of a define security requirement attribute of both the employed BYOD organisation and 
the user. Based on the department define in this study, the impact factors(security attribute) are 
categorised into confidentiality, integrity, availability and accountability. 
 Decomposition of BYOD user Security Requirements 
The term decomposition is the break down into smaller segment a whole scheme. There are 
various discussions on the use of decomposition in security measurement, the requirements 
were started by ( Wang & Wulf, 1997) and subsequently used by authors like Savola and Abie 
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in their Basic Measurable Components (BMCs) ( Savola & Abie, 2009). So, BYOD security 
attribute(requirements), decomposes by 
a. Find successive factors from each security requirement that impact at a level suitable to the 
security suitability, efficiency and flexible 
b. Analyse the dependent factors to ascertain if further decomposition is necessary; 
c. End decomposition once there is no need for any other leaf nodes to be decomposed. 
Also, a target type must be defined. This includes the physical security that is protection of 
organisations assets such as information, hardware and software from threats. Whilst User 
security comprises the protections of BYOD engaged users (information. hardware, Education) 
(Ramos et al., 2017). Hence Figure 4. 8 below shows the scenario used in the decomposition 
of  confidentiality security attribute 
A1 Loss of Confidentiality 
The loss of confidentiality impact assesses the sum of data that is likely released by invisible 
vulnerability. 
Figure 4. 8 Loss of confidentiality  
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Not relevant (0) 
 Insignificant non-sensitive data disclosed (3) 
Extensive non-sensitive data disclosed (7) 
Extensive critical data disclosed (6) 
All data disclosed (8) 
The data released in the case study includes confidential information example usernames and 
passwords which could be used to gain access to both user and organisations network .this is 
illustrated in Figure 4.9 requirements. 
A2 Loss of integrity 
Figure 4. 9  Loss of integrity requirement 
The loss of Integrity as illustrated in Figure 4.9, assesses the sum of data that is likely to be 
corrupted or damaged in the situation of a successful attack. 
Not relevant (0) 
Integrity
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 Insignificantly slightly corrupt data (2) 
 Insignificant seriously corrupt data (2) 
Extensive slightly corrupt data (6) 
Extensive seriously corrupt data (5) 
All data totally corrupt (8) 
In the analysis process, it was discovered that the information that was store have 
Login with maximum user privileges over several network resource in the academic 
department, and in addition causes an alteration in the entire organisation's data. This is because 
a modification in one instance affects a data in the other, thus, all other resources in the 
department can be modified. 
 
A3 Loss of availability 
This Figure 4. 10. below, which is availability requirement assesses ways a vulnerability being 
exploitation can impact the network BYOD services availability. 
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Figure 4. 10 Availability requirement 
Using the scenario in a set of questions as follows; 
 Will the attack causes the network to shut down? 
 Will the attack cause any form of interference in the BYOD service? 
 In what critical way will be the impact of services on the performance of the BYOD 
network and its users? 
To respond to the above-stated issues, selecting from the itemised options can assist to quantify 
the impact of a loss of availability on the user. 
 Not relevant (0) 
 Insignificant secondary services interrupted (3) 
 Insignificant primary services interrupted (6) 
 Extensive secondary services interrupted (8) 
 Entire services lost (9) 
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Not relevant is picked, because the information access is from the Estate department, hence 
login details will present no impact on the network services. But, this accepted information on 
the BYOD employed network and its user can be the basis for an attacker to disrupt services. 
A4 Loss of accountability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. 11 Accountability requirement. 
The accountability requirement illustrated in Figure 4.11 above, occurs once a system has been 
compromised, this factor aids in quantifying how security countermeasures are able to 
efficiently trace where the modification occurs and bring them towards the point of 
exploitation. 
Attack fully visible to individual (2) 
Attack likely visible to individual (6) 
Attack fully unknown (8) 
Selecting the text “attack likely visible to individual (6)” option in the itemised choice is a 
better choice since the security countermeasures make any form of system modification made 
Accountability
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by the attacker such as alteration of user login to become visible. This does not in any way hold 
the lawful user accountable for abuse of its account. However, it is viable to get hold of the 
account but nearly impossible to reach the person producing the attack. 
B Business Impact Factors 
This deliberate on what is essential to the organisation and its users from an application 
approach. These impact factors are the regular fields (organisation business objective) for 
various organizations and are specifically unique to an organisation than the above-mentioned 
factors related to threat agent, vulnerability and technical impact. Some details of these factors 
along with their corresponding options are given below. In the case of BYOD metrics, the 
financial impact is not considered. 
B1 Trust violation 
This factor affects the way users view a BYOD service, thereby losing many important clients 
in addition to goodwill. 
Not relevant (0) 
Minimal damage (1), 
 Loss of major accounts (5) 
Loss of goodwill (6) 
trademark damage (9) 
The preferred option is “trademark damage (9)” because once the organisation has been 
affirmed as compromised; it becomes a challenge for it to realise the client trust again. 
B2 Non-repudiation violation 
This seeks to answer, how much vulnerability expose does Non-repudiation introduce? The 
decomposition is illustrated in Figure 4.12 below. 
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Figure 4. 12 Non-repudiation requirement 
Not relevant (0) 
Minor damage (3) 
Clear damage (6) 
High profile damage (9) 
High profile damage is a Preferred Choice to select for This Scenario. 
B3 Privacy Violation 
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This factor holds a number of causes, for instance, loss of confidential data (Personal) could 
result in identity violation, and loss of confidential data (commercial) may result in legal 
liabilities. The decomposition is illustrated in Figure 4.13 below. 
Figure 4. 13 Privacy Violation 
 
 not relevant (0) 
One individual (5) 
Hundreds of people (7) 
Thousands of people (8) 
Millions of people (9) 
The sub-organisation under consideration is a small organisation, therefore, the “hundreds of 
people” is the preferred option of information disclosure, meaning the bigger organisation will 
effect bigger information disclosure exploitation. Table 4.8 and Table 4.9 shows the technical 
and business factors and their selected options respectively 
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Technical Impact Factor Preferred Options 
Loss of confidentiality Extensive critical data disclosure(6) 
Loss of Integrity All data totally corrupt (8) 
Loss of availability Not relevant (0) 
Loss of accountability Attack likely visible to individual (6) 
Table 4. 8 Summary of the selected preferred options for both technical impact factor 
Business Impact Factor Preferred Options 
Trust violation Trademark Damage(9) 
Non-repudiation violation High Profile Damage (9) 
PRIVACY violation Hundreds Of People(7) 
Table 4. 9 Summary of the selected preferred options for both Business impact factor 
Step-IV: Establishing the severity of the risk 
The number of preferred options for the severity level is grouped from 0 to 9 and sublevel 0-3, 
3-6 and 3-9 representing the impact level in the order of low, medium and high as shown in 
Table 4.10 below. 
Security range Severity level 
(0, 3) low 
(3, 6) medium 
(6, 9) high 
Table 4. 10 severity level representation 
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The calculation of the overall severity risk level is based on the estimation of the likelihood 
and impact level of the security risk assessment. These are denoted by low, medium and high 
in Table 4. 11 below 
 Severity level 
LIKELIHOOD Low Medium High 
Low Low Low Medium 
Medium Low Medium High 
High Medium High High 
Table 4. 11 Estimation of the likelihood and impact level of the vulnerability assessment 
Lastly, the total vulnerability impact level of the invisible attack on the Academic department 
is evaluated as follows, 
𝑛L = Total number of options chosen from the likelihood 
𝑛I= total number of Impact factors 
𝐿𝑆= likelihood value and 
𝐼𝑆= Impact factor value 
𝐴𝐶𝐴𝐿(L) = An individual value of the particular likelihood options being chosen. 
𝐴𝐶𝐴𝐼(L) = An individual value of the particular impact options being chosen. 
𝐿𝑆= 
1
𝑛𝑙
∑ 𝐴𝐶𝐴𝐿  (𝐿) 
 
 (4.1) 
   
𝐼𝑆=
1
𝑛𝑖
∑ 𝐴𝐶𝐴𝐼 (𝐼)  (4.2) 
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Using the equation (4.2) and (4.2) the likelihood and impact value are calculated, this is shown 
in table Table 4. 12 below. 
Equation results 
(4.1) 𝐴𝐶𝐴𝐿(L) = 5.62  Likelihood factor score 
(4.2) 𝐴𝐶𝐴𝐼(I) = 6.62 impact factor score 
Table 4. 12 likelihood and impact  factor measure value 
Since, the likelihood score falls within the severity risk impact level of (3, 6) meaning 𝐿𝑆 ∈ (3, 
6), making it a medium risk severity level, also the impact score falls within the severity risk 
impact level of (6, 9), meaning I𝑆 ∈ (6, 9) making it a high-vulnerability severity level, in 
reference to the above description in table 4.9 and table 4.10 respectively. The noted 
corresponding risk severity level for {(medium, high), medium ∈ likelihood and high ∈ 
impact} is high. Consequently, the total impact level value for the academic department in the 
scenario affected by unidentified attack is high. 
4.3.5 Stage three;  BAS Metrics Results 
The BAS metrics is a combination of distinct metrics to create novel metrics for BYOD 
organisation variables for unidentified vulnerabilities (for instance, we combine OWASP 
methodology value and probability-based metrics to form an Absolutes Percentage score. This 
is shown in Figure 3.2 ). Therefore the Absolutes Percentage score which signifies the severity 
impact for each department is calculated using the OWASP risk methodology of likelihood 
factor score and impact factor score average as applied in Eqn 3.10. Consequently, From Eqn 
3.11, the BAS Metrics for the Unidentified Vulnerability is scored. Table 4.13 below shows 
the result for the BAS metrics in Percentage. 
𝑠 = 8 (CVSS impact scores of related Unidentified vulnerability data) 
𝐴𝐶𝐴𝐿(L) = 5.62  (Likelihood factor score ) 
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𝐴𝐶𝐴𝐼(I)  =  6.62 (impact factor score) 
Absolutes score % BAS metric 
6.12 0.14% 
Table 4. 13 likelihood and impact  factor measure value 
 
In reference to Table 4. 3 the likelihood severity level is high representing the impact level 
Thus, within the scenario the BAS metrics of 0.14% as shown in table 4.13 above, signifies the 
fine value since it has the lowest score of the BYOD  security level. Thereby the success rate 
for a BYOD organisation variable(user, network) to be exploited by an attacker is low. 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter explains the application of BAS metrics, It involves the application of each BAS  
section and stages which influence the activity of the measurement.  Data collection using  
Google dorks commands and Nessus scanner have been used to prove the existence of both 
unidentified and known vulnerabilities. This model addresses the issue of achieving security 
goals quantitatively in a BYOD domain. The procedures of suggested %likelihood and impact 
level value have been tested. Results showed BAS metrics are capable of predicting 
vulnerability security level of a BYOD employed system numerically, thereby helps in 
achieving BYOD security goals. Chapter 5 describes in details the evaluation process for the 
measurement. 
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CHAPTER 5 EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION 
5.1 Experimental Study 
The authors (O'Leary & O'Keefe, 1993), indicate the importance of an approach or metric is 
being “suitable” with regards to its proficiency since an unsuitable system has the potential of 
causing damaging errors. In Principle, a security metric is able to evaluate the absence of 
vulnerabilities (Wang A. A., 2005). But, in practice, the immense complexity of a systems 
problem indicates by no means can an approach details the absolute assurance that a system is 
safe (Bishop, 2003; Wang A. A., 2005). Thus, a model’s accuracy might although turn out 
sufficient by means of its estimates, as being inaccurate, points to the desirable conclusions 
(O'Leary & O'Keefe, 1993). Implying, the precise scores provided by BAS metrics may 
possibly not be extremely important. Instead, it is vital for the relative ranking in terms of 
vulnerability be reasonable. Again, (O'Leary & O'Keefe, 1993) discussed that a proficient 
system can be evaluated both on a component level and on a system level. Component level 
evaluation relates to analysing the distinct “segments” of the system and system-level 
evaluation involve analysing the entire operation of the system. All components in BASmetrics 
has been quantitatively evaluated by experiments and/or surveys. For instance, the 
effectiveness of vulnerability scanning tools was initially research within a literature review, 
then by an experiment, and finally by case studies. The main objective of this evaluation is to 
establish if the feasibility of the proposed measurement technique, which considers security 
metrics integration and individual attribute classification concepts for a BYOD situation, is 
better than the present BYOD network security methods, which does not consider individual 
attribute classification concepts for a BYOD situation. This chapter explains the experimental 
setup and reports the observed results. 
To attain the objectives, we carried out the experiment by deploying the network of a sub-
organisation that is a segment of a bigger organisation, with the sub-organisation made up 
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different departments and the network has a set of host Hs and vulnerability Vs. These notations 
are adopted for the evaluation.CVSS  is also utilised as the basis for the system because it has 
extensive coverage of security expressions. The results presented by metrics are in numerical 
values and can be clearly understood by most users. The ranking of the metrics will depend on 
how convenient is to be applied to the participating BYOD employed network with lots of 
vulnerabilities. Calculations results were achieved via Microsoft Excel. 
5.2 Experimental Description 
The scope of this experiment is devoted to the  Controller and Accountant Generals 
Department, located at Ministries which is a sub-organisation connected to a central 
organization in Accra by a wireless network. network management such as audit, monitoring 
and reporting are performed at the sub-organisation. Figure 5.1 shows the network topology of 
the assign organisation. 
 
Figure 5. 1 Network topology of the Ministries Sub-Organisation 
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The network topology of the Ministries sub-organizations as shown in Fig.5.10 comprises 5 
departments labelled (Ad, Es, Pr, Fin, Cp), with 2 servers namely network storage server(FTP) 
and web server (provides services to the mobile devices with different operating systems) 
respectively. The experiment lasted for a month that is from July-August 2018 in which data 
is collected on the number and characteristics of the identified vulnerabilities in the computer 
networks via Nessus version 7.1.1. There are two firewalls on the network and a network 
intrusion, Detection and prevention (NIDPS) device is placed in between them. Here, the inner 
firewall is used to safeguard the connections from the Internet to the network storage server 
while the outside firewall is used to allow secure connections to the web-server hosting the 
users, there are seven(7) host on the network, with a host in each department and the 2 servers 
also functioning as host, this has been labelled (hi where i = 1, 2, 3…, n). The NIDP device 
placed between the firewalls allows for deep packet inspection technology, as shown in Figure 
5.1, all packets that go towards and from the perimeter of the sub organisation is evaluated. 
With a  Cisco Catalyst 2960X-24PD-L Switch and an IP service software as a wireless 
controller. 
Each of the hosts are scanned using the Nessus vulnerability scanner, which shows details on 
open ports and vulnerabilities related to the host. Also, Common Vulnerabilities and Exposures 
(CVE) (MITRE, 2017) score on the relevant vulnerability of individual host as detected by 
Nessus, This is to allow simplicity in the evaluation. Table 5.1, below list the characteristics 
located in the host on the network. H_number signifies host number. 
H_number Open_Ports Operating system Known_Vulnerability CVE-ID 
High Medium Low 
1 2 Apple IOS 12 Phone 
XS 
1 1 9 CVE-2018-
11281 
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2 4 Android 8.0 
Samsung galaxy s8 
/s8 plus 
1 2 35 CVE-2018-
14987 
3 5 Apple Mac OS X 
10.3.9 
0 1 12 CVE-2018-
14985 
4 7 Android 7.0 Nougat 
Samsung Galaxy 
Note 5 
0 3 18 CVE-2018-
11259 
 
5 5 Linux 2.6.18- 
308.24.1.e15 
0 3 19 CVE-2017-8416 
6 3 Microsoft Lumia 950 
windows 10 
1 2 24 CVE-2017-9831 
7 3 Android 8.1 Oreo 
Moto G5 Plus 
2 5 27 CVE-2016-6910 
Table 5. 1 List of Vulnerability assigned Host 
5.3  Evaluation Metrics 
There are many procedures for evaluating security metrics systems. The evaluation involves 
the use of two analysis, one for the known vulnerability and the other the use of Snort as a 
security level experimental methods. The two evaluation methodologies will be discussed in 
detail in the following subsections. 
5.3.1 Security Analysis of the Example Network 
We use the exampled network in Figure 5.10 on existing security metrics such as MTTC and 
VEA_bility to execute security evaluation via the BYOD situation. Since the main organisation 
has a network Security management structure which is accessible. For efficacy, therefore, the 
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ministries sub-organisation security evaluation will focus primarily on BYOD monitor which 
is the scoring of the security risk level. vulnerability scanners such as Nessus is used to discover 
the network vulnerabilities (known). The objective of the study is; 
 To compute MTTC and VEA_bility values of each sub- organisations network for 
department  Ad, Es, Cp, Pr and Fin. 
 To compare the security level of different network configurations for departments Ad, Es, 
Cp, Pr and Fin. 
 To compute MTTC and VEA_bility, BAS score of the entire network. BAS score from 
chapter 4 
 To compare the feasibility and ease of using  BAS, MTTC and VEA_bility metrics in this 
study. 
5.3.2  Mean Time-to-Compromise Metric (MTTC) 
MTTC is the period assessment needed by an attacker to break into a system successfully in 
unit of days (McQueen, Boyer, Flynn, & Beitel, 2006). MTTC is a computation used for 
quantifying the risk established on system vulnerabilities and an attacker skill level. For 
example, the calculation is dependent on the attacker’s level of skills and class of vulnerability.  
The higher value of  MTTC score, the higher the level of network security and the lower the 
level of risk (Leversage & Byres, 2008). The actions of an attacker are divided into three 
statistical processes. However, the various equation from process 1 to 3 is realised from the 
master equation, which signified total time taken  for the three processes to  be compromise 
𝑇 =  𝑡1𝑃1 +  𝑡2 (1 −  𝑃1) (1 − 𝑢) + 𝑡3𝑢 (1 − 𝑃1)  (5.10) 
Where n indicates the nth day in time t (𝑡1 𝑡2 … … 𝑡𝑛). 
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 Process 1 (P1): this is when the attacker has discovered at least one known vulnerability 
and has at least one exploit accessible. The probability that the attacker is in process1is 
given as 
𝑃1 = 1 − 𝑒
−(
𝛼𝑉𝑀
𝐾
)
 
 (5.11) 
Where; 
V= number of vulnerabilities found in the unit of concern 
M= number of exploit accessible to an attacker 
K= the number of vulnerabilities(Known) available in the National Vulnerabilities 
Database (NVD) 
α = visibility factor 
The values of k,v, m, and α and their features are given in Table 5.2. 
Variable Definition Variable 
K Available total number of 
non-duplicate known 
vulnerability 
9447 
V Total number of 
vulnerabilities per host 
Low, medium, High 
m Possible number of exploit 
accessible to an attacker 
150(beginner) 
250(intermediate) 
450 (expert) 
α Visibility reduction factor of 
vulnerabilities due to 
1 (no review) 
0.3 (semi-annual) 
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boundary devices such as 
firewalls (depends on the 
number of security reviews 
conducted during a year) 
0.12 (quarterly) 
0.05 (monthly) 
p Likely value to quantify the 
attacker skills level 
0.5(beginner) 
0.9 (intermediate) 
1 (expert) 
𝐴𝑁
𝑉
 
The ratio of the average 
number of vulnerabilities 
that can be exploited 
depending on the level of 
skills of the attacker to the 
total number of available 
vulnerabilities of unit 
concern 
0,3(beginner) 
0.55 (intermediate) 
1 (expert) 
Table 5. 2 Features and Constants For MTTC Calculations 
Also, an attacker skills level is classified as; 
• Beginner: signifies an attacker just able of applying existing code, tools and attack methods. 
• Intermediate: signifies an attacker that is able to revise existing code, tools and attack 
methods. 
• Expert: signifies an attacker able to developing new code, tools and attack methods 
V = Total vulnerabilities for a host is obtained by the  equation (5.15) below since V is equated 
by either Low, Medium and High 
Therefore V= 0.1𝑣𝑙 + 0.5𝑣𝑚 + 1𝑣ℎ                                                                             (5.12) 
121 
 
 Process 2 (P2): this is when the attacker has discovered at least one known vulnerability 
but has no accessible exploit, and with the assumption that the Process 1 and Process 2 
cannot occur at the same instance. Thus, the probability of an attacker’s presence in 
Process 2 is given by: 
𝑃2 =  𝑒
−𝑉∗𝑀/𝐾 = 1 − 𝑃1  (5.13) 
Based on  Average-Time-to-Compromise Metric (ATTC) (Leversage & Byres, 2007).The 
assumption of time is denoted by 𝑡2. Likewise, this instance is also used by (McQueen, Boyer, 
Flynn, & Beitel, 2006; Turner, et al., 2004), to indicate the average time vulnerability is 
publicised on the accessibility of exploited code as; 
𝑡2 = 5.8𝐸                                   (5.14) 
Where E = estimated number of tries by an attacker, t2 being the estimated value of 
process 2 
Therefore 
𝐸 =
𝐴𝑁
𝑉
 (1 + ∑ [𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠 ∏ (
𝑁𝑀 − 𝑖 + 2
𝑉 − 𝑖 + 1
)
𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠
𝑖=2
]
𝑉−𝐴𝑁+1
𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑒𝑠=2
) 
                                 (5.15) 
Where ; 
AN= Average number of vulnerabilities that can be exploited depending on the level of skills 
of the attacker 
NM = Number of vulnerabilities the attacker is unable to use irrespective of their skills level 
V = Number of vulnerabilities on the unit of concern. 
And V is found using 
𝑉 = 𝐴𝑁 + 𝑁𝑀                                 (5.16) 
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The ratio 
𝐴𝑁
𝑉
  value is specified in Table 5.I1.   
   
 Process 3 (P3): this is when there is no data on known vulnerability and its exploit. That is 
an Unknown vulnerability (UV) is predicted in the next period (time) based on pass exploit. 
Hence this is dependent on the success of process 2. 
Therefore; 
Using the (Leversage & Byres, 2008) approach and introducing the proficiency level (P) of the 
attacker instead of AN/V from the Mcqueen approach, the probability of process 2 being 
unsuccessful is given by 
𝑈 = (1 − 𝑃)𝛼𝑉        (5.17) 
Where; 
The values o P shows the attacker skills level,  thus the possible value of P is provided in Table 
5.12. The time employed in Process 3 is denoted by 𝑡3, 
𝑡3 = 30.42 [(
1
𝑃
− 0.5)] + 5.8                      (5.18) 
Subsequently using the Mcqueen approach the equation (5.17) and (5.18) and becomes (5.19) 
and (5.20) respectively ; 
𝑈 = (1 −
𝐴𝑁
𝑉
)
𝛼𝑉
                                                                                                         (5.19) 
𝑡3 = 30.42 [(1 −
𝐴𝑁
𝑉
)] + 5.8                                                                                     (5.20) 
 
5.3.2.1  MTTC Evaluation Results 
System backup and firewall updates are executed by the Network Administrators of the sub-
organisation on a monthly basis, and so from Table 5.11 above the value of 𝛼 = 0.05. the final 
score for the MTTC metrics is presented in Table 5.12, this indicates the MTTC scores for each 
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host located in the building of Ad, Es, Pr, Fin, Cp, as well as the total MTTC score this is the 
mean score of the entire network, related to the attacker level of skills. The MTTC is used to 
assess the time needed by an attacker to exploit a system successfully within days. Meaning 
the higher the MTTC score the higher the level of network security and the lower the level of 
risk. 
HOST DEPT MTTC where 𝛼= 0.05 
Beginner Intermediate Expert 
1 Ad,FIN 74.46 28,62 0.00 
2 Cp 76.18 30.25 5.78 
3 Pr 70.29 28.89 3,39 
4 Fin 72.69 30.06 2.64 
5 Cp, Pr 73.36 29.66 13.88 
6 Pr, Es 75,69 30,72 6,28 
7 Es 71.36 29.40 20.48 
Overall_MTTC(days) 73.43 29.50 4.98 
Table 5. 3 MTTC score for Hosts in the departments 
A chart comparing the MTTC score versus the number of vulnerabilities is illustrated in the 
Figure. 5. 2, the graph shows a declining pattern in the score for beginner and intermediate 
skills levels of attackers. This appears with the MTTC theory as the higher the MTTC score, 
the higher the security level of the recommended network and the lower the level of risk. But 
this is not noticed in the expert level of attackers as the graph shows an upward trend, therefore 
it is not consistent with the MTTC theory. This is because values for the number of 
vulnerabilities used in plotting the graph are treated general and not categorised into low, 
medium, high, or critical risk level. (use this in the comparison) 
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Figure 5. 2 Chart Of MTTC Vrs Vulnerability 
5.3.3  Applying the VEA_bility metric to a network 
The VEA_bility (Tupper & Zincir-Heywood, 2008) measures the security level of an 
organisations computer network and presents it scores quantitatively, it also established on the 
CVSS scoring system (Scarfone & Mell, 2009) and is expressed to acquire the various factors 
that impact the security of a network. Together with three elements Vulnerability, 
Exploitability and Attack ability expressed as V, E and A respectively its scored. Each of the 
three elements scored is a numeric value in the range [0,10]. 
 
 Host Dimension 
The Temporal score(Ts), Impact score(Is) and Exploitability score(Es) assigned by the CVSS 
of a known vulnerability is used to obtain the severity(S) of the vulnerability. We define 
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severity(S) of the vulnerability to be the average of the Impact score(Is) and Exploitability 
score(Es). The severity(S) of the vulnerability is defined as 
 
𝑆 = (𝐼𝑆 + 𝑇𝑆) ÷ 2 
 
   (5.21) 
For each of the Host located on the BYOD employed network, we then define the three 
dimensions based on the total number of known vulnerabilities 
vulnerability on BYOD host Device is analysed as shown in Equations BYOD 
V(ph) which represents the level of Vulnerability in BYOD Host 
𝑉(𝑝ℎ) = 𝑚𝑖𝑛 (10, ln [∑ 𝑒𝑠(𝑣)]) 
 
 
                          (5.22) 
 
Exploitability(BYOD Host) = 𝐸(𝑝ℎ) 
𝐸(𝑝ℎ) =
𝑠𝑝𝑑
𝑠𝑛
𝑚𝑖𝑛 (10, ln [∑ 𝑒𝐸𝑠
(𝑣)
]) 
 
 
                               (5.23) 
 
Attackerbility(BYOD Host) = 𝐴(𝑝ℎ) 
 
𝐴(𝑝ℎ) = 10𝑛𝑎𝑝
𝑛𝑛𝑝⁄  
 
                                (5.24) 
Where spd = number of BYOD services on the host. 
Sn = number of  BYOD services on Network. 
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nap = number of attack paths 
nnp = number of network path 
 Network Vulnerability Dimensions 
The vulnerability of the entire BYOD network depicts the degree to which an exploit is able to 
impact a system. The subsequent values for the entire network is gained from, 
Vulnerability(BYOD employed network ) = 𝑉(𝑛) 
V (n) = min(10, ln[∑(𝑒) 𝑉(𝑝ℎ)]) 
 
                                (5.25) 
 
Exploitability(BYOD employed network) = 𝐸(𝑛) 
E (n) =∑ 𝐸(𝑝ℎ) 
 
                              (5.26) 
 
Attackerbility(BYOD employed network) = 𝐴(𝑛) 
𝐴𝑛=∑ 𝐴(𝑝ℎ)                               (5.27) 
Therefore the final VEA_bility score on an entire employed BYOD network is calculated by 
𝐵𝑌𝑂𝐷(𝑁)  = 10 − ((𝑉(𝑛) + 𝐸(𝑛) + 𝐴(𝑛))/3)                               (5.28) 
   
5.3.3.1  VEA_bility Results 
VEA_bility calculation results of each Host as per the building Ad, Es, Fin, Pr and Cp is shown 
in Figure 5.3. The value of VEA_bility is presented in the range [0,10], meaning the scores 
above the value 10 are recorded as 10. The final VEA_bility  score is also presented in Table 
5.4 below. 
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HOST DEPT     
V E A VEA_bility 
1 Ad,Fin 0 .00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2 Cp 10.00 10 0.00 3.33 
3 Pr 10.00 5.47 0.00 8.56 
4 Fin 10.00 10 0.00 3.33 
5 Cp, Pr 6.54 10 0.00 4.52 
6 Pr, Es 10.00 10.00 0.00 3.33 
7 Es 10.00 10.00 10.00 3.33 
Table 5. 4  Final VEA_bility Score on each Host 
 
 
 
Figure 5. 3 VEA Final Score 
H1 H2 H3 H4 H5 H6 H7
V 0 10.09 10.86 11.52 6.54 11.22 10.06
E 0 10 5.47 14.05 10 21.89 11.22
A 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0
5
10
15
20
25
VEA Results
V E A
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The values in both VEA final score shows a high score for exploitability, this is due to the is 
the host having a lot of services. This is critical as once a service contains exploits, the other 
services related to the same host will likewise be exposed to attack. In this analysis, low 
attacka_bility score is due to network connectivity restriction by the two firewalls implemented 
A. Interpretations of V, E, A Values: 
 A score of 0 signifies the best value as the network can be said to have the lowest rate of 
vulnerability, exploitability, or attack ability. Again 
 A score of 10 signifies the worst value as the network can be said to have the highest rate 
of vulnerability, exploitability, or attack ability 
B. Interpretations of VEA_bility Values: 
 A score of 0 signifies the worst value since the department network can be said to have the 
lowest level of security. 
 A score of  10 signifies the best value since the department network can be said to have the 
highest level of security. 
5.3.4 Experimental Results 
The two security measure metrics mentioned in the evaluation section were used to evaluate 
the results obtained from participating sub-organisations network comparison between the 
established MTTC and VEA_bility metrics and the BAS metrics. The objective of this study is 
to evaluate the situation and how the BAS metrics enhanced with numerical information 
improve the performance of the BYOD system in terms of network security level and accuracy. 
To evaluate this, three measures have been used on the network configurations of the sub-
organisation in fig 5.1 
 The Bas Metrics, which is the BYOD situation measurements model developed in this 
work and presented in chapter 4; 
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 The MTTC measures the time estimation needed by an attacker to breach a system 
successfully in a unit of days. This is a calculation for quantifying the security risk based 
on system vulnerabilities and an attacker skill level. 
 VEA_bility measures the level of security of a computer network configuration and 
shows its results with quantitative values. VEA_bility can also be used to evaluate 
numerous computer network configurations to establish which network is most secure. 
In this experiment, an application of three security metrics to a BYOD network is compared. 
One is the BAS metrics presented in this work with all its components initiated, and the other 
two also gives a quantitative score based on known vulnerabilities, however, the MTTC is based 
on the weakest adversary that can compromise. The standard score for each metric are presented 
in Figure 5.4, this shows that the proposed approach metrics worked far more precisely than the 
traditional metrics. Table 5.5 below indicates the performance comparison between BAS, 
MTTC and VEA_bility metrics 
 BAS_Metric MTTC VEA_bility 
Calculation More practical Less practical Less practical 
Consistency More consistent Less consistent consistent 
Num of Vulnerability Is able to measure a 
network with lots of 
BYOD related 
vulnerabilities 
Can be applied to a 
network with various 
vulnerabilities 
Less precision for a 
network with more 
vulnerabilities 
Measurement 
Attributes 
Level of Severity of 
BYOD system’s 
variables 
Adversary Skills 
level 
Vulnerability, 
exploitability, 
attack_ability 
Table 5. 5 Performance Comparison of BAS, MTTC and VEA_bility metrics 
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Figure 5. 4 Performance score of BAS, MTTC and VEA_bility metrics 
Based on the performance scores in Fig 5.4  between the three metrics BAS metric, MTTC and 
VEA_biity, the security level of department Pr and  Cp is the most secure when the BAS 
metrics were used for the measurement. Because it produced a higher percentage BAS score, 
the better the level of  BYOD network security. Therefore it can be said security review is 
performed frequently, and the risk factor is minimum hence the security level of the network 
is also getting better. The MTTC for a given number of vulnerabilities can be calculated using 
either the Leverage-Byres method or the McQueen method with each method producing a 
different score for the same variable. Thereby this method is less feasible in its calculation of 
a BYOD employed system. Additionally, since the VEA_bility is affected by the vulnerability, 
exploitability, and attack_ability score, it appears more tedious to be applied on a BYOD 
system. Hence, it is less convenient to be used on a BYOD variable with lots of vulnerabilities. 
We use the exampled network in Figure 5.1 on existing security metrics such as MTTC and 
VEA_bility to execute security evaluation via the BYOD situation. 
Calculation Consistency Num of Vulnerability Attributes
BAS 4.3 4.4 3.6 3.8
MTTC 1.4 2.5 3.5 0.57
VEA_bility 2 4 1.8 2
St
an
d
ar
d
Performance Accurancy
BAS MTTC VEA_bility
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5.4 Description of the Unidentified Vulnerability Experiment 
The exampled network in Figure 5.1 is used to conduct an experiment to test Snort NIDP 
performance in identifying and preventing harmful packets under high-speed traffic. A 
signature-based NIDP is preferred because of its popularity and its rules can be manipulated to 
fit the sub-organisations business process, the NIDP system is running a Snort and a Cisco 
Catalyst 2960X-24PD-L Switch as shown on the network design in Figure 5.1  above 
The connection between the switch and PCs is achieved by using a 1.0 Gigabit cables and 10 
Gigabit cables, the port linking the NIDP system to the network which sits on the switch acts 
as a spanning port. A packets size of 128 byte signifying the aggregate of data is generated 
from source to destination and is meant at the NIDP systems. The two types of packet 
considered are the TCP and UDP with a connection of 65536 bytes and 65507 bytes 
respectively. Additionally, the signature-based NIDP used in this work is made up of built-in 
policies. However, the amount of built-in policies does not determine its potency but the policy 
that is best in discovering attacks and prevent false positives regardless its internal design or 
behaviour, also policies simply implies the further possibility to capture malicious traffic. For 
7600 number of policies are packed in the database. 
The objective of this evaluation is to examine the number of packets accepted, analysed and 
dropped by the NIDP system. The performances were taken and recorded from the totality of 
the NIDP systems following executing for 1 minute, 3minutes, 6minutes and 10minutes. The 
systems task manager’s record is used in calculating the application's usage (CPU usage) 
The hardware description of the network elements is represented in Table 5.6 below. 
Machine type Hardware description 
Network traffic generator/Attacking 
machines: 
. Windows 7 (64 bit) 
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 Dell Optiplex 7010, Intel Core (TM) i5/i7 
CPU, 16GB RAM, 1Gbps Full Duplex NIC 
(intel) 
IDS Machine : 
Windows 7 (64 bit) 
. Windows Server 2012 (64 bit) 
. Linux (Fedora 3.5.3-1.fc17.i686) 
Android "Nougat" 7.0 
Switch Cisco Catalyst 2960X-24PD-L Switch 
with 24x1 Gbps ports 
Attacker machine 
Backtrack Linux 
Metasploit 4 
Framework 
Dell Precision, T3400, Intel Quadcore, 
Q6600,2GB Ram , 1Gbps 
network card 
 
ESXi Server 
VMware ESXi 
Hypervisor 
Linux (Fedora 3.5.3-1.fc17.i686) 
Suricata, 
Snort 
 
Dell Precision, T3400, Intel Quadcore, 
Q6600,4GB Ram, 1Gbps 
network card (for monitoring 
server), 10Gb for IDS 
Bandwidth monitor 
Table 5. 6  The hardware description of the network elements 
5.4.1 Data Source and Configuration 
The NIDP system is implemented inside the sub-organisation restricted network area subject 
to security processes. Anyhow, the IDS is assigned, the sensor can give a meaningful 
assessment into traffic passing through the network and the completed results are tallied by 
checking the logs that display alerts of the intrusion attempts. On whichever day, the NIDP 
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system can give out thousands of alerts, this alerts can be a demanding task to analyse, that is 
why a form of measurement(metrics) comes in. Metrics are useful in quantifying value (data) 
and measuring performance in everyday decision making. 
Defining the problem-solving metrics of the study depends on the factors specifying the 
security level of the BYOD employed organisation. So, the important questions linked to the 
BYOD user security will be, for example, is the network user security level increasing or 
decreasing? Is the NIDP system alarming schedule on the correct events. Thus, is this 
establishing metrics dependent on  NIDP supposed functioning? 
Presently Snort NIDP systems have the ability to categorise the alert generated based on the 
qualitative impact of an attack that is high, medium, low and very low via CVSS. But these 
fuzzy values are not very effective in assessing the security risk level of the organisation 
(network, user)   especially in terms of the attack. Therefore, it is necessary for a NIDP system 
security risk metrics, with the requirement of expressing the network status as an absolute value 
using the alert produced by the NIDP systems constantly. 
5.4.2 Metrics evaluation(Attack Exposure Rate) 
In order to establish the usefulness of the snort performance on distinct traffic speed, a 
Metasploit tool is introduced to generate malicious traffic in the direction of the NIDP system. 
The generated traffic speeds are then analysed to determine the performance of the Snort. Thus 
identifying the number of packets dropped. The data is shown in Table 5. 7 below, this depicts 
the packet captured and analysed. 
Traffic Speed 
(per second) 
 
Packet 
Analysed (%) 
Packet 
Dropped (%) 
Alarm generated 
by Snort (%) 
350Mb 
 
100 0 100 
400 Mb 
 
100 0 100 
750 Mb 
 
100 0 100 
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1.5 Gb 100 0 100 
2.0 Gb 86.4 13.6 99.7 
2.5 Gb 82.6 17.4 99.2 
Table 5. 7  Packet Captured and Analysed by Snort 
It can be observed from Table 5. 7, the entire packet analysed by the snort exposed attacks until 
the traffic speed attains 2.0 Gbps. Then, it drops in the packet by 13.6% and an inadequate alert 
generated by 0.3%. Additionally, the traffic speed of 2.5 Gbps also dropped in a packet by 
17.4% and an inadequate alert generated by 0.8%. Subsequently, the CVSS is used to classify 
the severity of the alert generated by snort NIDP in terms of high, medium, low and very low 
level. This is depicted in Table 5.8  below. 
Number Class-type Description Priority Number of 
alert obtained 
P1 attempted-admin Attempted Administrator 
Privilege Gain 
High 
250 
P2 attempted-user Attempted User Privilege 
Gain 
High 
3 
P3 inappropriate-
content 
Inappropriate Content was 
Detected 
High 
5 
P4 policy-violation Potential Corporate Privacy 
Violation 
High 
0 
P5 shellcode-detect Executable Code Was 
Detected 
High 
22 
P6 successful-admin Successful Administrator 
Privilege Gain 
High 
0 
P7 successful-user Successful User Privilege 
Gain 
High 
0 
P8 trojan-activity A Network Trojan Was 
Detected 
High 
2 
P9 unsuccessful-user Unsuccessful User Privilege 
Gain 
High 
0 
P10 web-application-
attack 
Web Application Attack 
High 
52 
P11 attempted-dos Attempted Denial Of Service() Medium 147 
P12 attempted-recon Attempted Information Leak Medium 437 
P13 bad-unknown Potentially Bad Traffic Medium 0 
P14 default-login-
attempt 
Attempt To Login By A 
Default Username And 
Password 
Medium 
2 
P16 misc-attack Misc Attack Medium 8 
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P17 non-standard-
protocol 
Detection of a Non-Standard 
Protocol or Event 
Medium 
1602 
P18 rpc-portmap-
decode 
Decode Of An Rpc Query 
Medium 
0 
P19 successful-dos Denial Of Service Medium 0 
P20 successful-recon-
largescale 
Large Scale Information Leak 
Medium 
0 
P21 successful-recon-
limited 
Information Leak 
Medium 
2204 
P26 web-application-
activity 
Access To A Potentially 
Vulnerable Web Application 
Medium 
20 
P27 icmp-event Generic Icmp Event Low 0 
P28 misc-activity Misc Activity Low 25 
P29 network-scan Detection of a Network Scan Low 0 
P30 not-suspicious Not Suspicious Traffic Low 0 
P31 protocol-
command-decode 
Generic Protocol Command 
Decode 
Low 
0 
P32 string-detect A suspicious string was 
detected 
Low 
0 
P33 unknown Unknown Traffic Low 0 
P34 TCP-connection A TCP connection was 
detected 
Very 
Low 
0 
Table 5. 8  CVSS classified the severity of alert generated by snort NIDP 
To attain a numerical measurement of the security level for the sub-organization network, 
describe earlier in Figure 5.1 and producing metrics data from the alerts generated by the 
Snort. By means of the snort default classification, a taxonomy of attacks expressed in the 
Snort rule is generated and a total of 5113 alerts recorded against malicious traffic. This is 
used to plot a chart for Total number of alert establish on attack priority and expressed as 
high, low and medium, this is shown in Figure 5.5 
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Figure 5. 5 Total number of alert establish on attack priority. 
From the chart, 334 of alerts has a high priority of attack, the medium priority of 4754 alerts 
making it the most significate and the remaining 25 alerts are of low priority, no alert exists for 
the very low (For detail, please see Appendix). Using the information provided by the number 
of threat is not enough for an evaluation since this data is in a qualitative form so it does not 
provide an absolute score (numerical value) for one to deduce whether security level is 
improving or declining. Therefore, to best predict the security risk level quantitatively 
(Absolute score) a security metrics is also needed to give a better picture. 
5.4.2.1 Evaluation Results 
In the quantitative security risk level assessment, an investigation was conducted using the 
ministries sub-organisation network in Figure 5.1 above. The test was executed at a traffic 
speed up to 1.5 Gbps. Afterwards, the evaluation is organised using two calculated values and 
expressed also in two events from named factors, such as; 
1) Categories of attack occurrences and 
2) Impacts of attack 
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Network Security level (N𝑆𝐿) established on distinct types of attack instances, represented in 
Table 5.7 above stands as an attack taxonomy, hence, it has been ordered into 34 different 
classes beginning with the class types obtained from the snort rules and each identified class 
type detailed alongside its description. Also recorded in the table is the number of alert obtained 
versus each attack category. This is considered arithmetically, for instance, suppose the attack 
category Pd is d ∈ z and 1≤ 𝑑 < 34 is the number of attacks generated against the variable 
(network). Therefore, V𝑆𝐿 (Pd,) becomes the network security level of a personal device due 
to Pd attack. similarly, the security level of a personal device(service) based upon the class of 
attack is an expression as follows: 
V𝑆𝐿 (Pd,) =(
𝛼𝑖
∑ 𝛼
) 
 
         (5.29) 
Where 
𝛼𝑖 = the number of alerts generated against (d) 
Σ 𝛼 = total number of alerts collected against (∀ Pd) 
Therefore from table 5.7, the network security level is calculated as 
 
V𝑆𝐿 (P1) =
250
5113
 = 4.87% 
 
 (5.30) 
 
V𝑆𝐿 (P2) =
3
5113
 = 0.05%  (5.31) 
V𝑆𝐿 (P3) =
5
5113
 = 0.09%   (5. 32) 
V𝑆𝐿 (P4) =
0
5113
 = 0   (5.33) 
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This is repeated for P4 through to P34 in, Table 5.9, below. The Security level (V𝑆𝐿) established 
on distinct types of attack instances. 
V𝑆𝐿 (Pd,) =(
𝛼𝑖
∑ 𝛼
) 
V𝑆𝐿 
(P1) 
= 
4.87% 
V𝑆𝐿 (P6) 
=0.0% 
V𝑆𝐿 (P11) 
= 2.87% 
V𝑆𝐿 (P16) 
=0.0% 
V𝑆𝐿 (P21) 
=43.1% 
V𝑆𝐿 (P26) 
=0.39% 
N𝑆𝐿 (P31) 
=0.0% 
 
V𝑆𝐿 
(P2) 
=0.05% 
V𝑆𝐿 (P7) 
=0.0% 
V𝑆𝐿 (P12) 
= 8.54% 
V𝑆𝐿 (P17) 
=31.3% 
V𝑆𝐿 (P22) 
=0.0% 
V𝑆𝐿 (P27) 
=0.0% 
 
V𝑆𝐿 (P32) 
=0.0% 
 
V𝑆𝐿 
(P3) 
=0.09% 
V𝑆𝐿 (P8) 
=0.04% 
V𝑆𝐿 (P13) 
=0.0% 
V𝑆𝐿 (P18) 
=0.0% 
V𝑆𝐿 (P23) 
=0.0% 
V𝑆𝐿 (P28) 
=0.49% 
 
V𝑆𝐿 (P33) 
=0.0% 
 
V𝑆𝐿 
(P4) =0 
V𝑆𝐿 (P9) 
=0.0% 
V𝑆𝐿 (P14) 
=0.0% 
V𝑆𝐿 (P19) 
=0.0% 
V𝑆𝐿 (P24) 
=0.0% 
V𝑆𝐿 (P29) 
=0.0% 
 
V𝑆𝐿 (P34) 
=0.0% 
 
V𝑆𝐿 
(P5) 
=0.43% 
V𝑆𝐿 (P10) 
=1.01% 
V𝑆𝐿 (P15) 
=0.0% 
V𝑆𝐿 (P20) 
= 0.0% 
V𝑆𝐿 (P25) 
=0.0% 
V𝑆𝐿 (P30) 
=0.0% 
 
 
Table 5. 9 The network security level of a user device service (Pd) 
The expression in Table 5.9 indicates the network security level of a user device (Pd) due to 
different attacks for P1is 4.87%  meaning the user device on the network is 95.13% secure 
against an attack, also P2  is 0.05% prone to attack, which implies that the user device on the 
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network is 99.95% secure enough. But in a worst-case scenario, the likelihood of an attack 
level is highest at P21 with a score of  43.1%. This implies that the user device on the network 
is just secure at 56.9%, thus it necessary for appropriate countermeasures to be initiated to 
restraint the network and its users from potential attacks. 
2) Event-3: Security level (B𝑆𝐿) established on the impact of attacks 
Representing the values for priority of attack in the fig 5.15 above, that is,  High, Medium, Low 
and Very Low with 𝐻, 𝑀, 𝐿 and 𝑉L  and scores of Σ𝐻 =334, Σ𝑀 = 4754, Σ𝐿 = 25 and Σ𝑉L = 
0, Σ𝐻 =334, Σ𝑀 = 4754, Σ𝐿 = 25 and Σ𝑉L = 0, respectively. 
Assuming, Σ 𝐻 + Σ 𝑀 + Σ 𝐿 + Σ 𝑉 = C. therefore, the Variable (network) security level 
(V𝑆𝐿) establish on impact is defined the equation: 
B𝑆𝐿 (𝐼c) = (
𝛴 𝐼𝑐 
𝑐
)                                                                                       (5.34) 
Where; 
𝐼c =individual impact type 
Σ𝐼c =Total alert of 𝐼c type 
C = the total alerts of all impact categories 
Now, using the number of alerts obtained values in equation 5.34. Such as; 
Ic =high impact =334, 
medium impact =4754, 
low = 25, 
very low impact = 0 
 
Therefore 
 
V𝑆𝐿 (H) =(
334
5113
) = 6.5%               (5.35) 
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V𝑆𝐿(M) =(
4754
5113
) =92.9%                          (5.36) 
V𝑆𝐿(L) =(
25
5113
) =0.48%                          (5.37) 
V𝑆𝐿(VL) =(
0
5113
) = 0                          (5.38) 
 
Results from equations 5.35-5.38 gives a quantitative (absolute value) of the security risk 
impact on the network. With equation 5.35 showing a high impact (V𝑆𝐿(H)) score of 6.5%, 
meaning the secure rate of the network is 94.3%, which is adequately secure against attack. 
Subsequently, the security risk level of the network in regards to medium impact score 
(V𝑆𝐿(M)) of attack is 93% .meaning its secure rate stands just at 7%. Hence, an applicable 
countermeasure must be used to secure it. Likewise, assessing the network security level by 
means of medium impact (V𝑆𝐿(L)) came out with a result of 0.48% for equation 5.37 and 
expressed as (0.42% <1%), shows a network security impact level of 99.5%. Nevertheless, this 
cannot be defined as a fully secured network and so security measure is not far from it. Finally, 
equation 5.38 gives a value 0 for the very low impact of attack V𝑆𝐿(VL) =0. That is, the 
network is fully secured hence is free and subsequently not vulnerable to any threat, but this is 
not always true. 
In this experiment, an application of two security metrics to an unidentified vulnerabilities of a  
BYOD network are compared. One is the metrics presented in this work with all its components 
initiated, and the other is the same process but with the categorisation of the different types of 
attack and their impacts being measured by limiting the evaluating to logs that indicate alerts 
of the intrusion attempts(Snort). The average values for each metric are presented in Figure.5.6, 
from the scores it can be concluded that the proposed approach worked far more precisely than 
the snort detection protection. 
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Figure 5. 6 performance Comparison Between BAS and Snort Process 
From both metrics, it can be observed that the Snort drops packets in heavy and with high 
traffic speed. though there is Cisco Catalyst 2960X-24PD-L switch situated within the 
experimented network to improve performance such that packets are no longer dropped. But 
the Snort takes a longer period to run. Therefore using only the snort to assess the security risk 
level of a BYOD system is not advisable 
5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter describes the experimental evaluation composition and its information sources. 
Also, the principal measurement evaluation procedures have been categorised. These have been 
presented based on two items (Known and unidentified vulnerability). According to the 
application of security metrics to a BYOD  system variable a quantitative security made up of 
the MTTC, VEA_bility were used for the known vulnerability evaluation, all the chosen 
metrics use the CVSS  and the input data for them is obtained from Nessus scanning tool used 
on the sub-organisations network. These metrics were used because they are capable of clearly 
indicating critical vulnerabilities within an acceptable secure network. On the contrary, the 
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examination of system performance with unidentified vulnerabilities is according to the Snort 
NIDP. This has been employed to measure the security level of a network’s personal device 
thru the examination of the alerts generated at different traffic speeds by means of the ministries 
sub-organisations network configuration. Data from the NIDP investigation made up of the 
different type of attacks and their impact is used in the evaluating process to obtain the security 
level of a network (metrics).  The BAS scored security metric ranks the network in terms of 
absolute value, thus helps in quantifying the impact in addition to the risk related to each 
distinct attack category. 
The evaluation results demonstrate the feasibility of the BAS metrics for a BYOD network. 
This is because it calculation process is easy with the known vulnerability data on the network 
extracted with a commonly available network security evaluation tools such as Nessus. 
Likewise, the results obtained from the BAS scores indicate the capability of the metrics 
signifying serious vulnerabilities in a rather secure network straightforwardly. 
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CHAPTER 6 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
This chapter represents the conclusion to the research path commenced in this thesis. A brief 
summary of the main topics that the thesis centres on and also summarises the main 
contributions offered by this thesis. Certainly, the study cannot be deemed as complete as much 
potential awaits and thus the last section outlines some recommended future work worth 
investigating. 
6.1 Conclusion 
Organizations employing BYOD on their network have a greater task to identify and evaluate 
vulnerabilities according to their risk and threat to the network this is due to the possibility of 
an increase in the number of personal devices and their complexity. Therefore this thesis deals 
with the issue of quantifiable means of security level measuring of a BYOD network. As has 
been discussed.  Meanwhile, the introduction of personal devices onto an organization network 
means there is an incredible amount of network resources in the organisation environment 
which presents an immense pull for malicious attacks. Henceforth, for an attack to be 
successful on a depends on its capability to exploit a network’s vulnerability, resulting in the 
compromise of the network resource. Also, a BYOD network can be set up to include firewalls 
that are used to monitor and block any intrusion. But, these scanning tools simply give an 
outline of the system design and vulnerabilities on one occasion. Thus the firewall may not 
always be the solution for measuring the security of a large scale BYOD organization’s 
network. Therefore to achieve the task of detecting incoming traffic from BYOD users to the 
network, Intrusion Detection and Prevention (NIDP) systems are preferred in capturing the 
network vulnerability information. Additionally using data on the vulnerability of a system to 
provide a solution by measuring the total security level of the  BYOD variable quantitatively 
has become a major challenge for network administrators currently. 
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This thesis emphasis on the following three main aspects: 
 Create a novel scoring system framework that can be used as a recommendation for 
security evaluation and references to effect policies relating to BYOD network 
management 
 Design and implement a composite BAS security metrics which combines individual 
host-based metrics with probability to give an absolute score 
 A taxonomy designed to identify Network security attacks with their related threats and 
vulnerabilities which are broken down into smaller ranks that can be thoroughly 
investigated. These are first used to measure the security impact, then assigns a score 
to each risk related with each individual attack category 
The main contribution of the thesis is that it offers a practical and convenient measurement 
system for the security risk level of BYOD an employed organisation variable(Network, User 
device) to tackle vulnerability overload problem through the developing of a composite 
framework which supports data accumulation and integration from multiple sources. However, 
BAS framework utilises quantitative security measures to enhance the security risk level and 
deal with approximating the scale types of security risk level in BYOD problem and to improve 
performance. 
Specifically, this work has made the following contributions; 
1. It contributes to the knowledge of existing network security metrics by increasing 
understanding as to how the issue is typically confronted and why limitation remains. From 
a scientific viewpoint, it makes relevant contributions to the emerging BYOD security 
metrics. 
2. The systematic model structured to integrate data on a system vulnerability will contribute 
to improving the BYOD network security risk assessment by overcoming the consistency 
of Vulnerability information. Additionally, it presents properties, such as generality, which 
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allows it to be managed in different security matrics which change with the user’s activity 
and the organisation's policy. 
3. The creation of a novel BYOD security metrics framework that is designed around the case 
of invisible attacks, the framework is executed to reveal how these attacks were identified 
and mitigated. With the existence of different categories of invisible attacks, this work is 
centred specifically on the impact of Google dorks (hacking). A metrics design to specify 
in absolute value the total security risk level of a BYOD system. 
Data was gathered for deliberated by using generated data on the system vulnerabilities to 
provide an absolute score of the BYOD network security risk assessment factor related to 
malicious cyber-attacks. The Vulnerability description is based on Common Vulnerabilities 
and Exposures (CVE), whilst Common Vulnerabilities Scoring System (CVSS) on the other-
hand provides numeric scores to each vulnerability in the CVE database based on their 
characteristics and security impact. 
The evaluation was done using data on individual departments in a BYOD employed Ghana, 
Ministries based organisation as a case study for both the known vulnerabilities and 
unidentified attacks. Using the results attained from known vulnerabilities in chapter 4, a 
BYOD security metrics framework is designed. In the situation of unidentified attacks, the 
study was executed to reveal how these attacks were identified and mitigated. With the 
existence of different categories of unidentified attacks, this work is centred specifically on the 
impact of Google dorks (hacking) and an unidentified risk to a BYOD variable.  The effected 
results achieved from unidentified attacks is applied in designing a rule and afterwards engaged 
in the NIDP systems by way of a mitigation method. The BAS metrics can be used in any 
working BYOD environment in order to specify the absolute value of the total security risk 
assessment of the organization. 
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Finally, The experiment results show that the framework in this research can reduce security 
risk prediction complexity and provide a more practical measurement of BYOD variables 
based on known and Unidentified vulnerabilities. The results show that the BAS score for 
unidentified vulnerability calculation is 5.62% compare to the snort score of 2.4%. Also, the 
calculation for the BAS metrics scores on Known vulnerability shows 4.3% compare to the 
usual metric VEA_bility 2.0% and MTTC 1.3%. This indicates that the proposed framework 
is able to offer improved prediction accuracy and practical security metrics for a BYOD system. 
The higher the BAS score, the better the level of network security. The more often a security 
review performed, the lower the risk so the security level of the network is also getting better. 
This is true for a general network security performance. 
6.2 Limitations 
• The NIDP system used for intrusion detection is the snort, but it is essential for another 
NIDP system to be further employed and its performance compares to Snort to come out 
with the most suitable one for a network. Therefore, this study is biased towards the Snort 
NIDP system 
 
 The definition and description of the BYOD security requirements assume a known 
understanding of the vulnerabilities involved, so if a particular threat or vulnerability is not 
a usually known issue it may not be acknowledged. This might lead to an unaccounted 
vulnerability, which will not be a proper reflection of the security requirement 
specification. 
6.3 Future Work 
• This research is limited to the Google dorks (hacking) established invisible attacks. 
However, the invisible attacks have the potential of being investigated further in order to 
build a generalised metrics involving a BYOD employed network. other forms of invisible 
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attacks such as phishing attack and zero base attacks can be explored further in a BYOD 
situation. 
• The main security risk being access in this research is an outsider attack, thereby 
overlooking the insider attack, hence this should be included in the future BYOD scoring 
systems. 
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APPENDICES 
 
Appendix 1 
CVE Vulnerabilities Based on  Nessus Vulnerability  
Reports Search Parameters:  
Results Type: Overview  
Search Type: Search All  
Keyword (text search): oracle database server  
There are 348 matching records.  
Oracle Database Server  
Vuln ID  Summary  CVSS Severity   
CVE-2017-3567  
Vulnerability in the OJVM component of Oracle Database Server. Supported versions that are 
affected are 11.2.0.4 and 12.1.0.2. Difficult to exploit vulnerability allows low privileged 
attacker having Create Session, Create Procedure privilege with network access via multiple 
protocols to compromise OJVM. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in 
unauthorized ability to cause a hang or frequently repeatable crash (complete DOS) of OJVM. 
CVSS 3.0 Base Score 5.3 (Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: 
(CVSS:3.0/AV:N/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H).  
  
Published: April 24, 2017; 03:59:04 PM -04:00 V3: 5.3 MEDIUM  
V2: 3.5 LOW  
CVE-2017-3486  
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Vulnerability in the SQL*Plus component of Oracle Database Server. Supported versions that 
are affected are 11.2.0.4 and 12.1.0.2. Difficult to exploit vulnerability allows high privileged 
attacker having Local Logon privilege with logon to the infrastructure where SQL*Plus 
executes to compromise SQL*Plus. Successful attacks require human interaction from a person 
other than the attacker and while the vulnerability is in SQL*Plus, attacks may significantly 
impact additional products. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in the takeover of 
SQL*Plus. Note: This score is for Windows platform version 11.2.0.4 of Database. For 
Windows platform version 12.1.0.2 and Linux, the score is 6.3 with scope Unchanged. CVSS 
3.0 Base Score 7.2 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts). CVSS Vector: 
(CVSS:3.0/AV:L/AC:H/PR:H/UI:R/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H).  
  
Published: April 24, 2017; 03:59:02 PM -04:00 V3: 7.2 HIGH  
V2: 3.7 LOW  
CVE-2017-3310  
Vulnerability in the OJVM component of Oracle Database Server. Supported versions that are 
affected are 11.2.0.4 and 12.1.0.2. The easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged 
attacker having Create Session, Create Procedure privilege with network access via multiple 
protocols to compromise OJVM. Successful attacks require human interaction from a person 
other than the  
 
attacker and while the vulnerability is in OJVM, attacks may significantly impact additional 
products. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result in the takeover of OJVM. CVSS 
v3.0 Base Score 9.0 (Confidentiality, Integrity and Availability impacts).  
  
Published: January 27, 2017; 05:59:04 PM -05:00 V3: 9.0 CRITICAL  
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V2: 6.0 MEDIUM  
CVE-2017-3240  
Vulnerability in the RDBMS Security component of Oracle Database Server. The supported 
version that is affected is 12.1.0.2. Easily exploitable vulnerability allows low privileged 
attacker having Local Logon privilege with logon to the infrastructure where RDBMS Security 
executes to compromise RDBMS Security. Successful attacks of this vulnerability can result 
in unauthorized read access to a subset of RDBMS Security accessible data. CVSS v3.0 Base 
Score 3.3 (Confidentiality impacts).  
  
Published: January 27, 2017; 05:59:02 PM -05:00  
Data handling  
Vuln ID  Summary  CVSS Severity   
CVE-2017-0131  
A remote code execution vulnerability exists in the way affected Microsoft scripting engines 
render when handling objects in memory in Microsoft browsers. These vulnerabilities could 
corrupt memory in such a way that an attacker could execute arbitrary code in the context of 
the current user. An attacker who successfully exploited the vulnerability could gain the same 
user rights as the current user. If the current user is logged on with administrative user rights, 
an attacker who successfully exploited the vulnerability could take control of an affected 
system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new 
accounts with full user rights. This vulnerability is different from those described in CVE-
2017-0010, CVE-2017-0015, CVE-2017-0032, CVE-2017-0035, CVE-2017-0067, CVE-
2017-0070, CVE-2017-0071, CVE-2017-0094, CVE-2017-0132, CVE-2017-0133, CVE-
2017-0134, CVE-2017-0136, CVE-2017-0137, CVE-2017-0138, CVE-2017-0141, CVE-
2017-0150, and CVE-2017-0151.  
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Published: March 16, 2017; 08:59:03 PM -04:00 V3: 7.5 HIGH  
V2: 7.6 HIGH  
CVE-2017-0094  
A remote code execution vulnerability exists in the way affected Microsoft scripting engines 
render when handling objects in memory in Microsoft browsers. These vulnerabilities could 
corrupt memory in such a way that an attacker could execute arbitrary code in the context of 
the current user. An attacker who successfully exploited the vulnerability could gain the same 
user rights as the current user. If the current user is logged on with administrative user rights, 
an attacker who successfully exploited the vulnerability could take control of an affected 
system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new 
accounts with full user rights. This vulnerability is different from those described in CVE-
2017-0010, CVE-2017-0015, CVE-2017-0032, CVE-2017-0035, CVE-2017-0067, CVE-
2017-0070, CVE-2017-0071, CVE-2017-0094, CVE-2017-0131, CVE-2017-0132, CVE-
2017-0133, CVE-2017-0134, CVE-2017-0136, CVE-2017-0137, CVE-2017-0138, CVE-
2017-0141, CVE-2017-0150, and CVE-2017-0151.  
  
Published: March 16, 2017; 08:59:02 PM -04:00 V3: 7.5 HIGH  
V2: 7.6 HIGH  
CVE-2017-0071  
A remote code execution vulnerability exists in the way affected Microsoft scripting engines 
render when handling objects in memory in Microsoft browsers. These vulnerabilities could 
corrupt memory in such a way that an attacker could execute arbitrary code in the context of 
the current user. An attacker who successfully exploited the vulnerability could gain the same 
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user rights as the current user. If the current user is logged on with administrative user rights, 
an attacker who successfully exploited the vulnerability could take control of an affected 
system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new 
accounts with full user rights. This vulnerability is different from those described in CVE-
2017-0010, CVE-2017-0015, CVE-2017-0032, CVE-2017-0035, CVE-2017-0067, CVE-
2017-0070, CVE-2017-0094, CVE-2017-0131, CVE-2017-0132, CVE-2017-0133, CVE-
2017-0134, CVE-2017-0136, CVE-2017-0137, CVE-2017-0138, CVE-2017-0141, CVE-
2017-0150, and CVE-2017-0151.  
  
Published: March 16, 2017; 08:59:01 PM -04:00 V3: 7.5 HIGH  
V2: 7.6 HIGH  
CVE-2017-0070  
A remote code execution vulnerability exists in the way affected Microsoft scripting engines 
render when handling objects in memory in Microsoft browsers. These vulnerabilities could 
corrupt memory in such a way that an attacker could execute arbitrary code in the context of 
the current user. An attacker who successfully exploited the vulnerability could gain the same 
user rights as the current user. If the current user is logged on with administrative user rights, 
an attacker who successfully exploited the vulnerability could take control of an affected 
system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new 
accounts with full user rights. This vulnerability is different from those described in CVE-
2017-0010, CVE-2017-0015, CVE-2017-0032, CVE-2017-0035, CVE-2017-0067, CVE-
2017-0071, CVE-2017-0094, CVE-2017-0131, CVE-2017-0132, CVE-2017-0133, CVE-
2017-0134, CVE-2017-0136, CVE-2017-0137, CVE-2017-0138, CVE-2017-0141, CVE-
2017-0150, and CVE-2017-0151.  
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Published: March 16, 2017; 08:59:01 PM -04:00 V3: 7.5 HIGH  
V2: 7.6 HIGH  
CVE-2017-0067  
A remote code execution vulnerability exists in the way affected Microsoft scripting engines 
render when handling objects in memory in Microsoft browsers. These vulnerabilities could 
corrupt memory in such a way that an attacker could execute arbitrary code in the context of 
the current user. An attacker who successfully exploited the vulnerability could gain the same 
user rights as the current user. If the current user is logged on with administrative user rights, 
an attacker who successfully exploited the vulnerability could take control of an affected 
system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new 
accounts with full user rights. This vulnerability is different from those described in CVE-
2017-0010, CVE-2017-0015, CVE-2017-0032, CVE-2017-0035, CVE-2017-0070, CVE-
2017-0071, CVE-2017-0094, CVE-2017-0131, CVE-2017-0132, CVE-2017-0133, CVE-
2017-0134, CVE-2017-0136, CVE-2017-0137, CVE-2017-0138, CVE-2017-0141, CVE-
2017-0150, and CVE-2017-0151.  
  
Published: March 16, 2017; 08:59:01 PM -04:00 V3: 7.5 HIGH  
V2: 7.6 HIGH  
CVE-2017-0035  
A remote code execution vulnerability exists in the way affected Microsoft scripting engines 
render when handling objects in memory in Microsoft browsers. These vulnerabilities could 
corrupt memory in such a way that an attacker could execute arbitrary code in the context of 
the current user. An attacker who successfully exploited the vulnerability could gain the same 
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user rights as the current user. If the current user is logged on with administrative user rights, 
an attacker who successfully exploited the vulnerability could take control of an affected 
system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new 
accounts with full user rights. This vulnerability is different from those described in CVE-
2017-0010, CVE-2017-0015, CVE-2017-0032, CVE-2017-0067, CVE-2017-0070, CVE-
2017-0071, CVE-2017-0094, CVE-2017-0131, CVE-2017-0132, CVE-2017-0133, CVE-
2017-0134, CVE-2017-0136, CVE-2017-0137, CVE-2017-0138, CVE-2017-0141, CVE-
2017-0150, and CVE-2017-0151.  
  
Published: March 16, 2017; 08:59:01 PM -04:00 V3: 7.5 HIGH  
V2: 7.6 HIGH  
CVE-2017-0032  
A remote code execution vulnerability exists in the way affected Microsoft scripting engines 
render when handling objects in memory in Microsoft browsers. These vulnerabilities could 
corrupt memory in such a way that an attacker could execute arbitrary code in the context of 
the current user. An attacker who successfully exploited the vulnerability could gain the same 
user rights as the current user. If the current user is logged on with administrative user rights, 
an attacker who successfully exploited the vulnerability could take control of an affected 
system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new 
accounts with full user rights. This vulnerability is different from those described in CVE-
2017-0010, CVE-2017-0015, CVE-2017-0035, CVE-2017-0067, CVE-2017-0070, CVE-
2017-0071, CVE-2017-0094, CVE-2017-0131, CVE-2017-0132, CVE-2017-0133, CVE-
2017-0134, CVE-2017-0136, CVE-2017-0137, CVE-2017-0138, CVE-2017-0141, CVE-
2017-0150, and CVE-2017-0151.  
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Published: March 16, 2017; 08:59:00 PM -04:00 V3: 7.5 HIGH  
V2: 7.6 HIGH  
CVE-2017-0015  
A remote code execution vulnerability exists in the way affected Microsoft scripting engines 
render when handling objects in memory in Microsoft browsers. These vulnerabilities could 
corrupt memory in such a way that an attacker could execute arbitrary code in the context of 
the current user. An attacker who successfully exploited the vulnerability could gain the same 
user rights as the current user. If the current user is logged on with administrative user rights, 
an attacker who successfully exploited the vulnerability could take control of an affected 
system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new 
accounts with full user rights. This vulnerability is different from those described in CVE-
2017-0010, CVE-2017-0032, CVE-2017-0035, CVE-2017-0067, CVE-2017-0070, CVE-
2017-0071, CVE-2017-0094, CVE-2017-0131, CVE-2017-0132, CVE-2017-0133, CVE-
2017-0134, CVE-2017-0136, CVE-2017-0137, CVE-2017-0138, CVE-2017-0141, CVE-
2017-0150, and CVE-2017-0151.  
  
Published: March 16, 2017; 08:59:00 PM -04:00 V3: 7.5 HIGH  
V2: 7.6 HIGH  
CVE-2017-0010  
A remote code execution vulnerability exists in the way affected Microsoft scripting engines 
render when handling objects in memory in Microsoft browsers. These vulnerabilities could 
corrupt memory in such a way that an attacker could execute arbitrary code in the context of 
the current user. An attacker who successfully exploited the vulnerability could gain the same 
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user rights as the current user. If the current user is logged on with administrative user rights, 
an attacker who successfully exploited the vulnerability could take control of an affected 
system. An attacker could then install programs; view, change, or delete data; or create new 
accounts with full user rights. This vulnerability is different from those described in CVE-
2017-0015, CVE-2017-0032, CVE-2017-0035, CVE-2017-0067, CVE-2017-0070, CVE-
2017-0071, CVE-2017-0094, CVE-2017-0131, CVE-2017-0132, CVE-2017-0133, CVE-
2017-0134, CVE-2017-0136, CVE-2017-0137, CVE-2017-0138, CVE-2017-0141, CVE-
2017-0150, and CVE-2017-0151.  
  
Published: March 16, 2017; 08:59:00 PM -04:00 V3: 7.5 HIGH  
V2: 7.6 HIGH  
CVE-2017-6814  
In WordPress before 4.7.3, there is authenticated Cross-Site Scripting (XSS) via Media File 
Metadata. This is demonstrated by both (1) mishandling of the playlist shortcode in the 
wp_playlist_shortcode function in wp-includes/media.php and (2) mishandling of meta 
information in the renderTracks function in wp-includes/js/mediaelement/wp-playlist.js.  
  
Published: March 11, 2017; 08:59:00 PM -05:00 V3: 5.4 MEDIUM  
V2: 3.5 LOW  
CVE-2017-6800  
An issue was discovered in ytnef before 1.9.2. An invalid memory access (heap-based buffer 
overread) can occur during handling of LONG data types, related to MAPIPrint() in libytnef.  
  
Published: March 10, 2017; 05:59:00 AM -05:00 V3: 7.5 HIGH  
V2: 5.0 MEDIUM  
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CVE-2016-5374  
NetApp Data ONTAP 9.0 and 9.1 before 9.1P1 allows remote authenticated users that own 
SMBhosted data to bypass intended sharing restrictions by leveraging improper handling of 
the owner_rights ACL entry.  
  
Published: March 01, 2017; 03:59:00 PM -05:00 V3: 8.8 HIGH  
V2: 6.5 MEDIUM  
CVE-2017-2791  
JustSystems Ichitaro 2016 Trial contains a vulnerability that exists when trying to open a 
specially crafted PowerPoint file. Due to the application incorrectly handling the error case for 
a function's result, the application will use this result in a pointer calculation for reading file 
data into. Due to this, the application will read data from the file into an invalid address thus 
corrupting memory. Under the right conditions, this can lead to code execution under the 
context of the application.  
  
Published: February 24, 2017; 05:59:00 PM -05:00 V3: 7.8 HIGH  
V2: 6.8 MEDIUM  
CVE-2016-3013  
IBM WebSphere MQ 8.0 could allow an authenticated user to crash the MQ channel due to 
improper data conversion handling. IBM Reference #: 1998661.  
  
Published: February 22, 2017; 02:59:00 PM -05:00 V3: 6.5 MEDIUM  
V2: 4.0 MEDIUM  
CVE-2016-9225  
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A vulnerability in the data plane IP fragment handler of the Cisco Adaptive Security Appliance 
(ASA) CX Context-Aware Security module could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker 
to cause the CX module to be unable to process further traffic, resulting in a denial of service 
(DoS) condition. The vulnerability is due to improper handling of IP fragments. An attacker 
could exploit this vulnerability by sending crafted fragmented IP traffic across the CX module. 
An exploit could allow the attacker to exhaust free packet buffers in shared memory (SHM), 
causing the CX module to be unable to process  
 
  
further traffic, resulting in a DoS condition. This vulnerability affects all versions of the ASA 
CX Context-Aware Security module. Cisco has not released and will not release software 
updates that address this vulnerability. There are no workarounds that address this 
vulnerability. Cisco Bug IDs: CSCva62946.  
  
Published: February 01, 2017; 02:59:00 PM -05:00 V3: 8.6 HIGH  
V2: 7.8 HIGH  
CVE-2017-3318  
Vulnerability in the MySQL Server component of Oracle MySQL (subcomponent: Server: 
Error Handling). Supported versions that are affected are 5.5.53 and earlier, 5.6.34 and earlier 
and 5.7.16 and earlier. Difficult to exploit vulnerability allows high privileged attacker with 
logon to the infrastructure where MySQL Server executes to compromise MySQL Server. 
Successful attacks require human interaction from a person other than the attacker. Successful 
attacks of this vulnerability can result in unauthorized access to critical data or complete access 
to all MySQL Server accessible data. CVSS v3.0 Base Score 4.0 (Confidentiality impacts).  
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Published: January 27, 2017; 05:59:04 PM -05:00 V3: 4.0 MEDIUM  
V2: 1.0 LOW  
CVE-2016-4323  
A directory traversal exists in the handling of the MXIT protocol in Pidgin. Specially crafted 
MXIT data sent from the server could potentially result in an overwrite of files. A malicious 
server or someone with access to the network traffic can provide an invalid filename for a 
splash image triggering the vulnerability.  
  
Published: January 06, 2017; 04:59:01 PM -05:00 V3: 3.7 LOW  
V2: 5.8 MEDIUM  
CVE-2016-2380  
An information leak exists in the handling of the MXIT protocol in Pidgin. Specially crafted 
MXIT data sent to the server could potentially result in an out-of-bounds read. A user could be 
convinced to enter a particular string which would then get converted incorrectly and could 
lead to a potential out-of-bounds read.  
  
Published: January 06, 2017; 04:59:01 PM -05:00 V3: 3.1 LOW  
V2: 4.3 MEDIUM  
CVE-2016-2378  
A buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the handling of the MXIT protocol Pidgin. Specially 
crafted data sent via the server could potentially result in a buffer overflow, potentially resulting 
in memory  
 
corruption. A malicious server or an unfiltered malicious user can send negative length values 
to trigger this vulnerability.  
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Published: January 06, 2017; 04:59:01 PM -05:00 V3: 8.1 HIGH  
V2: 6.8 MEDIUM  
CVE-2016-2377  
A buffer overflow vulnerability exists in the handling of the MXIT protocol in Pidgin. Specially 
crafted MXIT data sent by the server could potentially result in an out-of-bounds write of one 
byte. A malicious server can send a negative content-length in response to an HTTP request 
triggering the vulnerability.  
  
Published: January 06, 2017; 04:59:01 PM -05:00  
  
  
Microsoft Application Server  
  
Vuln ID  Summary  CVSS Severity   
CVE-2017-3823  
An issue was discovered in the Cisco WebEx Extension before 1.0.7 on Google Chrome, the 
ActiveTouch General Plugin Container before 106 on Mozilla Firefox, the GpcContainer Class 
ActiveX control plugin before 10031.6.2017.0126 on Internet Explorer, and the Download 
Manager ActiveX control plugin before 2.1.0.10 on Internet Explorer. A vulnerability in these 
Cisco WebEx browser extensions could allow an unauthenticated, remote attacker to execute 
arbitrary code with the privileges of the affected browser on an affected system. This 
vulnerability affects the browser extensions for Cisco WebEx Meetings Server and Cisco 
WebEx Centers (Meeting Center, Event Center, Training Center, and Support Center) when 
they are running on Microsoft Windows. The vulnerability is a design defect in an application 
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programming interface (API) response parser within the extension. An attacker that can 
convince an affected user to visit an attacker-controlled web page or follow an attacker-
supplied link with an affected browser could exploit the vulnerability. If successful, the attacker 
could execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the affected browser.  
  
Published: February 01, 2017; 06:59:00 AM -05:00 V3: 8.8 HIGH  
V2: 9.3 HIGH  
CVE-2016-0051  
The WebDAV client in Microsoft Windows Vista SP2, Windows Server 2008 SP2 and R2 
SP1, Windows 7 SP1, Windows 8.1, Windows Server 2012 Gold and R2, Windows RT 8.1, 
and Windows 10  
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Gold and 1511 allows local users to gain privileges via a crafted application, aka "WebDAV 
Elevation of Privilege Vulnerability."  
  
Published: February 10, 2016; 06:59:15 AM -05:00 V3: 7.8 HIGH  
V2: 7.2 HIGH  
CVE-2015-2359  
Cross-site scripting (XSS) vulnerability in the web applications in Microsoft Exchange Server 
2013 Cumulative Update 8 allows remote attackers to inject arbitrary web script or HTML via 
unspecified vectors, aka "Exchange HTML Injection Vulnerability."  
  
Published: June 09, 2015; 09:59:38 PM -04:00 V2: 4.3 MEDIUM  
CVE-2015-1771  
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Cross-site request forgery (CSRF) vulnerability in the web applications in Microsoft Exchange 
Server 2013 SP1 and Cumulative Update 8 allows remote attackers to hijack the authentication 
of arbitrary users, aka "Exchange Cross-Site Request Forgery Vulnerability."  
  
Published: June 09, 2015; 09:59:37 PM -04:00 V2: 6.8 MEDIUM  
CVE-2015-1764  
The web applications in Microsoft Exchange Server 2013 SP1 and Cumulative Update 8 allow 
remote attackers to bypass the Same Origin Policy and send HTTP traffic to intranet servers 
via a crafted request, related to a Server-Side Request Forgery (SSRF) issue, aka "Exchange 
Server-Side Request Forgery Vulnerability."  
  
Published: June 09, 2015; 09:59:33 PM -04:00 V2: 4.3 MEDIUM  
CVE-2015-0086  
Microsoft Word 2007 SP3, Office 2010 SP2, Word 2010 SP2, Word 2013 Gold and SP1, Word 
2013 RT Gold and SP1, Word Viewer, Office Compatibility Pack SP3, Word Automation 
Services on SharePoint Server 2010 SP2, Word Automation Services on SharePoint Server 
2013 Gold and SP1, Web Applications 2010 SP2, and Web Apps Server 2013 Gold and SP1 
allow remote attackers to execute arbitrary code or cause a denial of service (memory 
corruption) via a crafted RTF document, aka "Microsoft Office Memory Corruption 
Vulnerability."  
  
Published: March 11, 2015; 06:59:13 AM -04:00 V2: 9.3 HIGH  
CVE-2015-0085  
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Use-after-free vulnerability in Microsoft Office 2007 SP3, Excel 2007 SP3, PowerPoint 2007 
SP3, Word 2007 SP3, Office 2010 SP2, Excel 2010 SP2, PowerPoint 2010 SP2, Word 2010 
SP2, Office 2013  
 
Gold and SP1, Word 2013 Gold and SP1, Office 2013 RT Gold and SP1, Word 2013 RT Gold 
and SP1, Excel Viewer, Office Compatibility Pack SP3, Word Automation Services on 
SharePoint Server 2010 SP2, Excel Services on SharePoint Server 2013 Gold and SP1, Word 
Automation Services on SharePoint Server 2013 Gold and SP1, Web Applications 2010 SP2, 
Office Web Apps Server 2010 SP2, Web Apps Server 2013 Gold and SP1, SharePoint Server 
2007 SP3, Windows SharePoint Services 3.0 SP3, SharePoint Foundation 2010 SP2, 
SharePoint Server 2010 SP2, SharePoint Foundation 2013 Gold and SP1, and SharePoint 
Server 2013 Gold and SP1 allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via a crafted Office 
document, aka "Microsoft Office Component Use After Free Vulnerability 
 
Appendix 11 
Google Hacking Database 
2018-12-04 inurl:/help/lang/en/help 
Various Online 
Devices 
TheCrypticSailor  
2018-12-04 
inurl:public.php 
inurl:service ext:php 
Various Online 
Devices 
Rootkit_Pentester 
2018-12-04 
intitle:ProFTPD Admin - 
V1.04 
Various Online 
Devices 
XLOMBOX 
2018-12-04 intitle: "VB Viewer" 
Various Online 
Devices 
Brain Reflow 
2018-12-17 
intitle: "Nexus Repository 
Manager" 
Various Online 
Devices 
Alfie 
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2019-01-17 inurl:/setup.cgi@next_file= 
Various Online 
Devices 
ManhNho 
2019-01-21 
"Please click here to 
download and install the 
latest plug-in. Close your 
browser before 
installation." 
Various Online 
Devices 
Sohaib E.B. 
2019-01-30 
intitle:QueryService Web 
Service 
Various Online 
Devices 
Miguel Santareno 
2019-02-05 
intitle:"Device(" AND 
intext:"Network Camera" 
AND "language:" AND 
"Password" 
Various Online 
Devices 
Brain Reflow 
2019-02-05 
intext:"Any time & 
Anywhere" AND 
"Customer Login"  
Various Online 
Devices 
Brain Reflow 
2019-02-05 
intitle: "Screenly OSE" 
intext:"Schedule 
Overview" AND "Active 
Assets" AND "Inactive 
Assets" 
Various Online 
Devices 
Brain Reflow 
2019-02-05 
inurl:"fhem.cfg" AND 
'fhem.cfg' -github  
Various Online 
Devices 
Brain Reflow 
2019-02-05 
intitle:"webcam 7" 
inurl:'/gallery.html'  
Various Online 
Devices 
Brain Reflow 
2019-02-05 
intitle:"Login - Xfinity" 
AND "Gateway > Login"  
Various Online 
Devices 
Brain Reflow 
2019-02-18 
intitle:"Home-CUPS" 
intext:printers -mugs  
Various Online 
Devices 
Bruno Schmid  
2019-02-19 inurl:/snap.cgi?&-getpic 
Various Online 
Devices 
Midori-SH  
2019-02-20 allinurl:asdm.jnlp  
Various Online 
Devices 
Kevin Randall 
2019-03-01 
intitle:"NetcamSC IP 
Address" 
Various Online 
Devices 
Hussain Vohra 
 
UPR16 – April 2018                                                                      
 
FORM UPR16 
Research Ethics Review Checklist 
 
Please include this completed form as an appendix to your thesis (see the 
Research Degrees Operational Handbook for more information 
 
 
 
Postgraduate Research Student (PGRS) Information 
 
 
Student ID: 
 
795078 
 
PGRS Name: 
 
 
Priscilla M Boadi 
 
Department: 
 
 
School of Computing 
 
First Supervisor: 
 
Dr Shikun Zhou 
 
Start Date:  
(or progression date for Prof Doc students) 
 
 
01/02/2016 
 
Study Mode and Route: 
 
Part-time
 
Full-time 
  

 
 
 
 
MPhil  
 
PhD 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
MD 
 
Professional Doctorate 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Title of Thesis: 
 
 
A Systematic Approach to a Quantitative Vulnerability Assessment for BYOD 
System Variables through the Discovering of Threats  
 
 
 
Thesis Word Count:  
(excluding ancillary data) 
 
 
33582 
 
 
 
If you are unsure about any of the following, please contact the local representative on your Faculty Ethics Committee 
for advice.  Please note that it is your responsibility to follow the University’s Ethics Policy and any relevant University, 
academic or professional guidelines in the conduct of your study 
Although the Ethics Committee may have given your study a favourable opinion, the final responsibility for the ethical 
conduct of this work lies with the researcher(s). 
 
 
 
UKRIO Finished Research Checklist: 
(If you would like to know more about the checklist, please see your Faculty or Departmental Ethics Committee rep or see the online 
version of the full checklist at: http://www.ukrio.org/what-we-do/code-of-practice-for-research/) 
 
 
a) Have all of your research and findings been reported accurately, honestly and 
within a reasonable time frame? 
 
 
YES 
NO    
 
 
 
 
 
b) Have all contributions to knowledge been acknowledged? 
 
 
YES 
NO    
 
 
 
 
 
c) Have you complied with all agreements relating to intellectual property, publication 
and authorship? 
 
YES 
NO    
 
 
 
 
 
d) Has your research data been retained in a secure and accessible form and will it 
remain so for the required duration?  
 
YES 
NO    
 
 
 
 
 
e) Does your research comply with all legal, ethical, and contractual requirements? 
 
 
YES 
NO    
 
 
 
 
      
 
Candidate Statement: 
 
 
I have considered the ethical dimensions of the above named research project, and have successfully 
obtained the necessary ethical approval(s) 
 
 
Ethical review number(s) from Faculty Ethics Committee (or from 
NRES/SCREC): 
 
 
C78F-68DE-6ED5-931F-
3BC7-5799-AB27-3C9A 
 
If you have not submitted your work for ethical review, and/or you have answered ‘No’ to one or more of 
questions a) to e), please explain below why this is so: 
 
 
      
 
 
Signed (PGRS): 
 
 
 
 
 
Date: 08/09/2020 
UPR16 – April 2018                                                                      
 
